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Abstract 
 
Following the writings of philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson, 
and Alfred Mele, in this thesis I defend some central claims of the self-control 
view of human agency. However, I not only defend, but also supplement this 
view in the following two ways. First, drawing on work by Mary Midgley and 
Sigmund Freud I advance the claim that self-control requires the experience of 
internal conflict between an agent’s motivations and intentions. Second, drawing 
on insights from Simone de Beauvoir and Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as recent 
research in social psychology and cognitive science, I will argue in this thesis that 
self-control and vulnerability are inextricably intertwined with one another, and 
that as a result both are to be seen as constitutive of human agency. While it is 
the capacity for self-control that marks us out as human agents, I argue that it is 
also our uniquely human vulnerability which distinguishes our agency from the 
kind of agency which we might attribute to other potential or actual forms of 
sentience.  
Further, while the concepts of human agency and personhood are 
typically conflated in the analytic tradition of philosophy, in this thesis I will 
show that there are good reasons for understanding these two concepts as subtly 
distinct from one another. The term personhood, I will argue, can fruitfully be 
understood in substantive rather than purely formal terms. A person, in the 
superlative sense, is to be understood as someone who exercises their agency 
well; and, as such, persons are answerable to a number of normative 
prescriptions. Following Midgley, Nietzsche and Martha Nussbaum, I argue 
against Frankfurt’s normative prescription for personhood in the form of what 
he calls ‘wholeheartedness’, and offer four normative prescriptions for 
personhood of my own. 
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“When we were children, we used to think 
that when we were grown-up we would 
no longer be vulnerable. But to grow up is 
to accept vulnerability... To be alive is to 
be vulnerable.”  
 
Walking on Water: Reflections on Faith and 
Art, Madeleine L'Engle 
 
 
“Oh, wretched ephemeral race, 
children of chance and misery.” 
 
The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of 
Music, Friedrich Nietzsche
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Introduction 
 
The concepts of human agency and personhood have, most influentially in the 
analytic tradition of philosophy, been explored in the writings of Harry 
Frankfurt. In this thesis I will argue for and defend the central tenet of 
Frankfurt’s account, namely, that self-control is constitutive of both human 
agency and personhood. However, in this thesis I will also revise and supplement 
his view. Drawing on accounts of human agency and personhood in both the 
analytic and continental traditions of philosophy, as well as research pertaining 
to these concepts in psychology, the biological and cognitive sciences, 
behavioural economics, and literature I will argue that both self-control and 
vulnerability are constitutive of human agency and personhood.  
The basic project in this thesis, then, is to champion distinct conceptions 
of human agency and personhood which move beyond narrow, control focused 
understandings of what it means to be in command of oneself, towards more 
encompassing notions which incorporate the important consideration of our 
own human vulnerability.2 To be human is to be vulnerable, and so our human 
vulnerability is, at least in part, constitutive of our agency and personhood.  
Further, while the concepts of human agency and personhood are 
undoubtedly interrelated, the exact nature of this relationship has, to some 
extent, been neglected in recent philosophical work. In addressing this oversight, 
I will argue in this thesis that while human agency is required for personhood, 
the concepts of human agency and personhood should be understood as subtly 
distinct from one another. Personhood, I will argue, is to be understood as a 
substantive notion, and as such, I argue for four normative prescriptions for 
personhood.   
 
 
                                                 
2 The setting for this task within this thesis involves bridging two very distinct philosophical 
traditions, as well as incorporating understandings of agency and personhood from work in 
psychology and science. As such, much of the work requires the careful unpacking of different 
conceptions of agency and personhood, along with the careful unpacking of some notably 
slippery terminology used inconsistently across disciplines. As far as it is possible I have tried to 
pay attention to the different and complex contexts of the literature upon which I draw in this 
thesis, and I aim to present a view which draws coherently across traditions and disciplines as far 
as this is possible.    
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Human Agency 
 
In the first part of this thesis I will defend a self-control view of human agency, 
drawing on work the analytic philosophical tradition, while supplementing this 
view with important insights from biology and cognitive science, psychology and 
attention to the complexities of actual human life. Questions about the nature, 
functioning and importance of self-control have been central to discussions 
about the nature of human agency in both the analytic tradition of philosophy, 
most importantly for my purposes here in the work of Harry Frankfurt, Gary 
Watson and Alfred Mele and, more recently in biology.3, I will distinguish in the 
first part of this thesis, between agency simpliciter, which I see as involving only 
very basic self-direction or goal directed behaviour, and human agency, which I 
see as involving a more complex form of self-control. Drawing this distinction 
allows us to understand how the nature of our own agency is distinct from the 
kind of agency exhibited by non-human animals along a spectrum of goal 
directed behaviour. The best pictures of human agency generated on a biological 
view, as well as in the analytic philosophical tradition, explain agency in terms of 
self-control, because our ability to act rather than simply be blown through the 
world like leaves in the wind requires the exercise of various psychological 
activities, such as self-observation or critical reflection, in order to achieve 
mastery over the self. If we are able to achieve self-control, proponents of such 
accounts claim, we are able to govern and control our actions and behaviour, and 
this is what makes us actors or human agents, as distinct from other organisms. 
A major part of what makes a human agent’s mental life so complex is the 
fact that, as humans, we not only have primary, or brute, responses to the world 
in the form of beliefs and desires, but we are able to assess those basic responses 
                                                 
3 Most recently Murphy and Brown have brought cognitive science and philosophical thoughts on 
agency together, their picture provides a biological basis for the kind of control focused picture of 
agency developed in the analytic tradition of philosophy which I will be discussing. While I will 
not be providing a literature review of the biological accounts of human agency which can be 
accessed, I take this sensible account which engages with philosophy to provide an access point 
from which to establish what minimally we as philosophers would need to engage with to 
construct our views of the biological account of human agency. This does not amount to an illicit 
appeal to scientific authority as the philosophical claims underpinning the view are still up for 
grabs in the thesis itself. What I am discussing is a particular biological view which gives us a good 
picture, for philosophical discussion, of what a biological picture of human agency might look like.  
See N. Murphy and W. Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? - Philosophical and Neurobiological 
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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through critical reflection, form opinions or make assessments of them, and, in 
some instances, we are able to change them. In this way, critical reflection is not 
merely a passive capacity but, rather, it is active in the sense that it involves a 
deliberative or evaluative element. When critically reflecting on our basic 
responses to the world, we evaluate whether or not to act on those responses by 
assessing them in light of our values, commitments, projects, aims and goals – 
what we might be inclined to call our ‘better judgment’. In so far as we have the 
capacity for critical reflection, we have control over whether or not we act on our 
most basic responses to the world. And in doing so, we control ourselves from 
the inside. When we speak about exercising our agency, then, what we mean is 
that we should have self-control in this sense. A number of robust and plausible 
philosophical accounts of agency have been proposed along these lines, most 
notably by Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson and Alfred Mele.4 Philosophical 
accounts such as these outline the necessary structural features of the mind 
which must be in place in order for us to control our initial responses to the 
world and, thereby, allow us to perform actions which are calculated and 
controlled rather than being largely out of our control. Exercising self-control in 
this way allows us to make our own choices and decisions about the actions we 
take and the lives we come to live as a result, and is what we most basically refer 
to as human agency.  
Despite the richness of the analytic philosophical literature on human 
agency, not enough attention there is paid to the actual business of living, where 
all manner of constraints threaten our ability to exercise self-control. While the 
                                                 
4 H. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
68, No. 1, 1971, pp. 5-20. H. Frankfurt, ‘Identification and wholeheartedness’, in Frankfurt, H., The 
Importance of what we Care About, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988. H. Frankfurt, 
‘The Faintest Passion’, in Frankfurt, H., Necessity, Volition and Love, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. H. Frankfurt, ‘Autonomy, Necessity, and Love’, in Frankfurt, H., Necessity, 
Volition and Love, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. H. Frankfurt, ‘Taking Ourselves 
Seriously’, in Satz, D. (ed.), Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right, California, Stanford 
University Press, 2006. G. Watson, ‘Free Agency’, in Christman, J. (Ed.), The Inner Citadel: Essays 
on Individual Autonomy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989. G. Watson, Agency and 
Answerability: Selected Essays, New York, Oxford University Press, 2004. A. Mele Irrationality: An 
Essay on Akrasia, Self-deception and Self-control, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987. A. Mele, 
Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. A. 
Mele, Motivation and Agency, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. A. Mele, Backsliding: 
Understanding Weakness of Will, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012. A. Mele, ‘Autonomy and 
neuroscience’, in Radoilska, L. (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 
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formal analytic accounts found in this literature might provide us with a 
compelling characterisation of human agency, they tend to ignore our lived 
experience of agency in all its complexity. This is done perhaps intentionally, so 
as to present us with a purely formal picture of human agency, but I suggest in 
this thesis that this formal picture requires supplementation. Following the 
writings of philosophers and psychologists, such as Nietzsche and Freud, who 
have shown ‘that there are deep currents of meaning, often crosscurrents, 
running through the human soul which can at best be glimpsed through a glass 
darkly’5, I will argue that not only our ability to formulate our ‘better judgment’ 
but also to act in accordance with it is far more complex than suggested in 
current analytic literature. Through the development of the broadly 
psychoanalytic picture particularly, what emerges is a far more complex picture 
of our psyche which is largely characterised by conflict and is far from 
transparent (even, or perhaps especially, to itself). 
Our mental lives are characterised by disparate and often conflicting 
desires, beliefs, goals and values, making our psyche, I will argue, unmistakably 
divided. Drawing on fundamental insights from existentialism and recent work 
in the sciences, I will show that human agency can be threatened by such 
constraints, but also, and crucially, that human agency only emerges in contexts 
where it is threatened. As I see it, human agency is simultaneously (and, at first 
glance, perhaps paradoxically) both threatened by and necessarily dependent 
upon the effects of such constraints on the individual. And it is in light of this that 
I see the self-control view of agency requiring supplementation. I will argue in 
the first part of this thesis that human agency must be understood in terms of 
both self-control and vulnerability. Further, I suggest that vulnerability is not 
merely a contingent requirement for human agency. Rather, both self-control 
and vulnerability are constitutive of our agency. It is our vulnerability, I will 
argue, which not only distinguishes our agency from that of supernatural, 
disembodied or immortal beings, but it is also our vulnerability which positively 
shapes, flavours and enriches our understanding of our own agency.  
 
                                                 
5 J. Lear, Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1998, p. 28. 
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Personhood 
 
In Frankfurt’s paper ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ as well as 
in his later writings, there is a lack of clear distinction between the notions of 
human agency and personhood: he neglects, I think, to fully expound the nature 
of the relationship between these two concepts. This explanatory blind spot is 
not isolated to the Frankfurtian account, but is systemic throughout the existing 
literature on personal autonomy, agency, subjectivity, and freedom of the will. 
The second part of this thesis aims, in small part, to address this explanatory 
blind spot. I suggest that an account of human agency – as it is understood on the 
self-control view – on its own, does not give us a sufficiently rich account of 
personhood.  
Typically, personhood is understood as encompassing those capacities of 
self-awareness and self-control associated with human agency, as well as other 
capacities, attributes and features such as: understanding ourselves as 
temporally situated6 (having notions of ourselves as situated between a past and 
a future) and, relatedly, having a narrative structure to our lives7; having moral 
sensibilities (being able to draw distinctions between ‘right’/‘appropriate’ 
behaviour and ‘wrong’/inappropriate behaviour); and being members of a moral 
community (possessing certain rights and duties; recognising and treating other 
persons in appropriate ways – as worthy of respect or loss of respect; and 
understanding ourselves in cultural and interpersonal contexts).8  
In the second part of this thesis I will argue that an important difference 
between our understandings of human agency and personhood is that 
personhood is to be understood as a substantive notion. In order to understand 
                                                 
6 Philosophers working in the continental tradition of philosophy have focused on these issues 
most notably Sartre and Heidegger.  
7 J. Velleman, Self to self: Selected Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
8 C. Taylor and proponents of communitarian views or proponents of African Philosophy; as well 
as various contemporary continental philosophers who argue for the importance of 
intersubjectivity in our understanding of the constitution of the self such as Lacan and Derrida. C. 
Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989. A. Elliott, Psychoanalytic Theory: An Introduction, 2nd edn., Hampshire, Palgrave, 
2002. 
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what our personhood consists in, then, the description of human agency 
provided by the self-control view must be substantiated in normative terms.  
On his account of personhood, Frankfurt offers a normative prescription 
in the form of wholeheartedness, which for him entails the process which he calls 
dissociation. Contra Frankfurt, I argue that wholeheartedness is a problematic 
candidate for a normative prescription for personhood because it is ultimately 
damaging to the self. In the second part of this thesis I offer an alternative 
candidate for a normative prescription for personhood. Following Midgley and 
Freud, I see division and conflict as necessary parts of our psychology and our 
experience as human subjects. This division and conflict constitutes what I see as 
the essentially fragile internal situation in which we find ourselves as persons, 
and the struggle to exercise our agency well emerges in precisely this context. 
Drawing on examples of literary doubles given in the Gothic psychological 
horrors of the late Nineteenth century, I argue that to be a person is a struggle to 
achieve a measure of psychological integrity. Late Gothic fiction, I will argue, 
provides us with horror stories generated by the uncanny transcriptions of a 
fragile human condition which we often struggle to fully comprehend or 
embrace.9 What emerges from this picture, I will argue, provides us with a strong 
case against Frankfurtian wholeheartedness through the process of dissociation, 
and in favour of integrity. Persons, I will argue, ought to cultivate the kind of 
integrity Frankfurtian dissociation would stifle. 
Drawing on the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martha Nussbaum10, in 
second part of my thesis I will argue for three further normative prescriptions 
for personhood.  
First, I will argue for a normative prescription of ambivalence. Drawing on 
Nussbaum and her discussion of a case of tragic conflict in Aeschylus’ 
Agamemnon, I will argue that it is a normative requirement for personhood that 
persons ought to experience a degree of ambivalence.  
                                                 
9 R. Jackson, Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion, London, Methuen, 1981, pp. 17-24. 
10 M. Nussbaum, ‘Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche’s Stoicism’, in Schacht R. (ed.) Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
Morality, Berkeley, Calif. University of California Press, 1994, pp.139-167. M. Nussbaum, The 
Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, 2nd edn., Cambridge, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
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Second, drawing on Nietzsche’s characterisation of the Sovereign 
Individual and his suggestion of the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, I will argue 
for an epistemic normative prescription for personhood in the form of 
affirmation. I will argue that a key aspect of living well is our own recognition of, 
and, importantly, affirmation of, our vulnerability in the face of those aspects of 
our lives over which we cannot ever have control.  
Third, and finally, I will argue for a normative prescription for 
personhood of authenticity. I will argue that authenticity is an important 
addition to an account of personhood, since a vital part of living well is to live 
authentically. In living authentically, as persons, allows us to exercise our agency 
well, or to live well, in a distinct and important way, namely, by living 
authentically, we live our lives beautifully. 
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Part One: Human Agency, Self-Control, and Vulnerability 
 
What does it mean to say that I am a human agent? To say that I am a human agent is 
not merely to say that I am a human being. A human being need not necessarily be an 
agent, or at least not a full blown one. For example, children or mentally handicapped 
people might not be considered capable of exercising human agency, but are still 
considered human beings worthy of dignity and respect. Similarly, to say that I am a 
human agent is not simply to say that I am capable of exercising agency broadly 
understood. Agency, as it is broadly understood, refers to the ability of something or 
someone to exert an effect on or to produce some kind of change in the world. To say 
that I am a human agent, however, is to say that I am capable of exercising a 
particular and distinctive kind of agency. Human agency, I will argue in the first part 
of this thesis, is to be understood as distinct from the kind of agency we might 
attribute other actual or potential forms of sentience, because human agency uniquely 
requires both self-control and vulnerability.   
It might be seen as controversial by some philosophers to say that we could 
ascribe agency to anything other than human beings, or perhaps gods. The term 
agency, philosophers might argue, simply describes the uniquely human, or godly, 
ability to perform intentional actions, or to exercise self-direction. However, recent 
work in biology suggests that a degree of self-direction in the form of goal directed 
behaviour is something that we arguably share with other living things along a 
gradient ranging from basic to more complex levels.11 On this view, human 
agency can be distinguished from the kind of agency we might attribute to other 
manifestations of self-direction along a gradient on which the more self-direction 
a creature exhibits, the greater degree of agency we would attribute to it. 
Importantly, on this view, while non-human animals may have the ability to 
perform goal directed behaviours and thus be considered self-directing agents of 
sorts, human agency requires the most complex form of goal directed behaviour 
because of the complex mental systems found in human beings when compared 
with other animals. One advantage of adopting this view is that it allows us to 
describe a unique human capacity for self-direction, while leaving room in an 
account of agency for non-human animals. Although the debate about whether 
                                                 
11 See N. Murphy and W. Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?. 
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non-human animals do in fact have the necessary mental attributes required for 
self-direction at all rages on in philosophy, I take the arguments made recently in 
biology to be convincing based on my own interactions with animals.12 Further, 
viewing animals as agents of sorts, as such a biological picture suggests we 
might, should, I think, serve as a reminder that we share something important in 
common with other living beings. This could have implications not only for how 
we understand our own more ‘animalistic’ sides, but perhaps, even more 
importantly, for animal rights activism. Finally, by distinguishing agency from 
human agency we can arrive at a richer notion of human agency which highlights 
what is distinctive about human beings in psychological terms. 
Following this biological insight the first chapter of this thesis defends the 
view that human agency, as opposed to the kind of agency we might attribute to 
other living things, requires the psychological ability to exercise something like 
freedom of the will, as Harry Frankfurt has called it, or something like free 
agency as Gary Watson has called it, because of the complex mental systems 
found in human beings. Human agency is distinctive, I argue, because the kind of 
self-direction exhibited by human beings amounts to something like personal 
autonomy, or self-control, understood in broadly psychological terms. Freedom 
of the will, free agency, and autonomy are terms which are often used 
interchangeably in the literature, and the usage of these terms differs 
considerably not only across disciplines, but also within the analytic tradition of 
philosophy itself. What I present here, in terms of the concept of human agency, 
is an attempt to consolidate the meaning behind the use of these different terms 
as they are employed. The common thread I trace here lies in our understandings 
of self-direction and self-control. 
 
Human agents are typically thought of as having a very particular kind of control 
over their choices and actions. What is distinctive about human agents is that 
                                                 
12 The sceptic, who thinks that this biological picture does not provide evidence that we should 
attribute agency to anything other than human beings, might be disappointed that I do not 
provide any definitive arguments in my thesis in favour of attributing agency to non-human 
animals. However, such arguments would lead me astray from the central claims presented in 
this thesis. And, importantly, my positive account of human agency and personhood does not 
ultimately hang on whether or not the sceptic accepts the distinction between agency and human 
agency suggested by the biological view. 
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they not only form intentions to act in light of their goals, but they regard their 
own judgements about which courses of action to follow as an ultimate, and 
authoritative, motivational force. Rather than being the passive subjects of 
constraining forces, such as in situations of coercion or manipulation, human 
agents are free to the extent that their actions and behaviours can be explained 
by reasons and motivations which are, in the relevant sense, their own. By 
‘relevant sense’ here I mean the ability to exercise a particular kind of self-
control. Drawing on the writings of Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson and Alfred 
Mele in particular, I defend in the first chapter what has been presented as the 
core of the self-control view in seminal philosophical debates. On such a view, a 
human agent is to be understood as someone who can muster the motivational 
strength to perform actions which are, by and large, informed by what might be 
called her ‘better judgment’. Further, on such a view we can only be considered 
to exercise our agency if we are suitably free from constraints which affect either 
our ability to act or our ability to exercise critical reflection, that is, to form our 
better judgments or plan our intentions. Finally, people whose better judgements 
or intentional actions are determined solely by third parties are to be seen, on 
such a view, as lacking the kind of critical or evaluative freedom necessary to 
exercise human agency. 
Building on and supplementing this account, I will argue in the first 
chapter that a human agent is someone who experiences internal conflict 
between her motivations and intentions. As such, I will argue that self-control is 
to be understood as the ability to muster the motivational strength to act at a 
specific time in the face of competing motivations to perform other possible 
actions at that same time. A capacity for self-control, I suggest, requires that we 
have, in general, internal conflicts. While there may be particular cases in which 
we are not conflicted and we might still want to say that we retain self-control, 
understood as a general capacity, the kind of self-control necessary for human 
agency cannot be had without at least the potential for internal conflict. It is my 
view here that, just as surely as too much internal conflict destroys our capacity 
for self-control – deep, unyielding and constant internal conflict produces a 
mental life in which self-control is no longer attainable – a psyche in which there 
is no potential for internal conflicts similarly precludes the possibility of self-
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control. In this way, internal conflict marks human agents out as distinct from 
beings, perhaps like God, whose mental life does not resemble ours because 
there is no potential for internal conflict, and whose agency is therefore not 
constituted by self-control.   
Further, I will argue in the first chapter of this thesis that being a human 
agent does not require that we exercise self-control at all times, or in all aspects 
of our lives. This is important primarily because it helps us to distinguish 
between our having the capacity for human agency and our acting in a way that 
manifests that agency. While there has been a lack of clarity in recent debates 
surrounding this distinction, I defend a view of self-control which describes a 
general capacity which human agents necessarily must have. Just as a surgeon 
who is not now practicing surgery or who only practices surgery from time to 
time, remains a surgeon nevertheless, a human agent retains their agency even if 
they are not acting in a way that manifests that agency at all times. However, 
there are some logical limits to this: we would be hard-pressed to call someone a 
surgeon who had never studied surgery and who had never performed a single 
surgery in her life, and it would be bizarre, I think, to call someone a human 
agent who had never acted in a way that manifested their agency at all.  
 
In the second chapter, I will argue that when it comes to real life, current analytic 
pictures of agency provide us with little insight into the practical difficulties in 
exercising the kind of self-control that these accounts see as necessary for 
human agency. While proponents of these accounts will sometimes acknowledge 
the possibility that self-control might be difficult to achieve under certain 
conditions, the extent and importance of these practical considerations are by 
and large not given enough robust philosophical consideration. The examples of 
external constraints most frequently cited by philosophers such as Frankfurt and 
Watson have only exposed a fraction of the kinds of constraints which human 
agents actually face on a daily basis, and my discussion in the second chapter of 
this thesis outlines the ways in which we are vulnerable to such constraints and 
thus seeks, to some extent, to address this explanatory gap.  
Drawing on fundamental insights in the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche 
about the vulnerable situation in which human agents necessarily find 
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themselves, I will argue that human agency requires vulnerability: that 
vulnerability is constitutive of human agency. I will argue that because of the 
difficulty we face in achieving self-control, our agency is necessarily vulnerable. 
Our ability to exercise self-control is easily undermined, and the constant 
willpower that it is necessary for us to assert in order to fight against corrupting 
forces at every turn is ultimately subject to dissolution. It is this necessary 
requirement of vulnerability which I suggest has not been adequately explored 
by self-control views of human agency found in the kind of philosophical 
accounts provided by philosophers such as Frankfurt and Watson. Following the 
insights of Nietzsche and the existentialists (particularly Simone de Beauvoir), I 
supplement the analytic self-control view of human agency, as presented in the 
first chapter, by discussing recent work in experimental psychology, cognitive 
science and behavioural economics. By combining insights from existential 
philosophers and recent work in the sciences I advance the view that human 
agency is difficult to achieve on account of our vulnerability. Importantly, I 
suggest that agency is not only threatened by such constraints, but that our 
agency only emerges in contexts in which it is threatened. Our vulnerability plays 
a crucial role in determining the conditions for self-control to emerge in the first 
place. Supplementing the self-control view of human agency in this way can help 
us delineate the boundaries between human agency and other, perhaps similar, 
kinds of agency which do not require vulnerability and which would not be 
considered difficult to achieve – perhaps the agency of disembodied paradisal 
beings, for which self-control is not necessary. I suggest, then, that the essential 
fragility of the human situation must be accounted for in our understanding of 
the distinct kind of agency exhibited by human beings.  
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Chapter One: A Self-Control View of Human Agency 
 
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external 
forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of 
other men’s acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be 
moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by 
causes which affect me, as it were, from outside.13 
 
In the above quotation, Isaiah Berlin expresses the familiar human desire for 
freedom as self-direction. Our ability to govern and control our own actions and 
behaviour is widely thought to be at least one of the distinguishing marks of our 
humanity, for this is in part what makes us – in Berlin’s terms – subjects rather 
than objects. We are human subjects to the extent that we are able to control and 
guide our own actions (exercise self-control), rather than being controlled by 
external forces. And this gives us a kind of freedom that is thought to make us the 
authors of ourselves and our lives. Being able to make our own choices and 
decisions about the actions we take and the lives we come to live as a result is 
what we most basically refer to as human agency. Typically, we believe we have 
the capacity for agency and behave accordingly. Despite the multiplicity of 
constraints that we face in our daily lives, we do experience ourselves as human 
agents, at least some of the time. That is, we believe that our actions are in some 
sense, and for the most part, under our own jurisdiction, and that in these 
matters we largely decide for ourselves. Further, for the most part we experience 
ourselves, in Berlin’s terms, as subjects in the face of multiple possible 
constraints. Berlin explains as follows: 
 
I am the possessor of reason and will; I conceive of ends and I desire to 
pursue them; but if I am prevented from attaining them I no longer feel 
master of the situation. I may be prevented by the laws of nature, or by 
accidents, or the activities of men, or the effect, often undesigned, of 
human institutions.14 
 
While we by and large experience ourselves as agents, we are also well aware of 
those times when our agency has been undermined. Our agency may be 
                                                 
13 I. Berlin, ‘Two concepts of Liberty’, in Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1969, p. 131. 
14 Ibid,  p. 135. 
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diminished by other agents as in cases of coercion or deception. We typically 
think that people who are brainwashed or threatened are unable to act 
intentionally or freely, and thus that their agency is in some way diminished. Our 
agency is also typically thought to be diminished by social or environmental 
constraints. In cases of repressive economic, social, political or cultural 
environments, for example, we think that people’s ability to act freely or 
intentionally is restricted, and in extreme circumstances altogether undermined. 
Perhaps the most obvious cases in which we would think of agency as 
fundamentally undermined – where control over oneself and one’s life are lost – 
are those of enslavement or imprisonment of the sort in which the human 
subject is treated deliberately as an object.  
Viktor Frankl’s famous Man’s Search for Meaning is an existential 
exploration of the psychological condition of prisoners in concentration camps 
during the Holocaust. In that book, Frankl presents us with a popular, although 
extreme view, which I go on to criticise in this thesis, about the effect of such 
circumstances on our agency. According to Frankl, being imprisoned in a 
concentration camp constituted one of the most extreme situations in which 
human agency could be seen as fundamentally undermined. However, in Frankl’s 
view, human agency is most fundamentally concerned with a kind of inner 
freedom or self-control, which he thinks remains available to us in even the most 
restrictive and oppressive circumstances, such as a concentration camp. At the 
very least, according to him, we have control over our internal mental and 
psychological states, and this is the kind of control with which external 
circumstances cannot interfere. He writes: 
 
Does man have no choice of action in the face of such circumstances? 
We can answer these questions from experience as well as on 
principle. The experiences of camp life show that man does have a 
choice of action. There were enough examples, often of a heroic nature, 
which proved that apathy could be overcome, irritability suppressed… 
And there were always choices to make. Every day, every hour, 
offered the opportunity to make a decision, a decision which 
determined whether you would or would not submit to those powers 
which threatened to rob you of your very self, your inner freedom; 
which determined whether or not you would become the plaything of 
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circumstance, renouncing freedom and dignity to become moulded 
into the form of the typical inmate.15 
 
This internal control focused picture of human agency has received attention in 
the analytic tradition of philosophy, and more in an important philosophically 
focussed biological discussion of agency.16 The picture of agency generated in 
this literature is explained in terms of self-control or behaviour modification – 
we exercise our agency when we exercise self-control or behaviour modification 
through the processes of critical assessment and evaluative deliberation. The 
most influential accounts of agency found in the philosophical tradition appear in 
the seminal works of Harry Frankfurt and Gary Watson. These philosophers have 
most influentially promoted views in which the attainment of self-control is 
constitutive of human agency, and the loss of self-control amounts to a 
breakdown, or undermining, of our agency.  
In this chapter, I outline both a biological picture of self-control and the 
structural accounts of human agency as developed by Frankfurt and Watson. 
While Frankfurt and Watson’s seminal self-control accounts provide us with a 
good foundation for an account of human agency, I will argue that they require 
some substantial revision and supplementation. In this chapter I put forward 
supplementations to the self-control view of human agency, drawing on work on 
the nature of human agency by philosophers such as Alfred Mele, Susan Wolf, 
Gerald Dworkin, and Mary Midgley as well as important psychological insights 
made by Sigmund Freud.  
Following Frankfurt, Watson and Mele, in this chapter I will defend a self-
control view of human agency, where self-control is construed as the ability to 
exercise sufficient motivational strength in order to ensure that intentional 
actions are performed in the face of competing desires. In addition, following 
Mele, I will argue that there are non-orthodox acts of self-control in which 
intentional action does not coincide with an agent’s so called ‘better judgements’. 
                                                 
15 V. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, Ilse Lasche, I. trans., Boston, Massachusetts, Beacon Press, 
2006, p. 74, my emphasis. 
16 See N. Murphy and W. Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?. H. Frankfurt ‘Freedom of the 
Will and the Concept of a Person’. H. Frankfurt, Identification and wholeheartedness’. H. 
Frankfurt, The Faintest Passion’. H. Frankfurt, ‘Taking Ourselves Seriously’. G. Watson, ‘Free 
Agency’. G. Watson, Agency and Answerability. A. Mele, Irrationality. G. Watson, Autonomous 
Agents. G. Watson. Motivation and Agency. G. Watson. Backsliding. G. Watson. ‘Autonomy and 
Neuroscience’.  
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Nevertheless, I will argue that such actions are not to be seen as agency 
undermining. Following Wolf and Dworkin, I will argue that an agent’s better 
judgements or intentional actions cannot be solely determined by third parties, 
such as in cases of mental manipulation or coercion. Further, I will argue that we 
must see human agency as something which emerges in varying degrees, and 
that being a human agent does not require that we exercise self-control at all 
times or in all aspects of our lives. Finally, following Midgley and Freud, I will 
argue that it is a necessary part of the self-control view of human agency that 
human agents experience internal conflict between their motivations and 
intentions. 
 
1.1 Self-Direction, Self-Control and Human Agency 
 
In this section I outline a plausible naturalist account of human agency which has 
found support in the biological sciences, drawing specifically on recent work by 
Nancey Murphy and Warren Brown. Though I will not defend naturalism itself in 
what follows in this thesis, I think it is important that an account of human 
agency can be formulated in broadly naturalistic terms. That is, we should be 
able to provide an account of human agency which does not require human 
agents to have supernatural or non-natural abilities. This, I think, is important if 
human agency is to be understood as distinct from any degree of agency we 
would attribute to non-human animals or supernatural beings such as celestial 
angels or god. Following this, I offer a view of human agency in what follows 
which takes biological as well as philosophical accounts seriously, and thus offer 
a robust view of human agency which naturalists could adopt or defend.  
The kind of self-direction attributed to human agents on the naturalist’s 
account accords in many ways with recent philosophical accounts of human 
agency, in which the distinctly human capacity Murphy and Brown describe can 
be understood in terms of self-control. I suggest here that we have reason to 
adopt something like the self-control view of human agency put forward by 
analytic philosophers such as Frankfurt and Watson, precisely because such 
views accord with the naturalistic picture of human agency presented by Murphy 
and Brown. On both Murphy and Brown’s naturalist/biological view as well as 
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Frankfurt and Watson’s self-control views, the ability for self-direction in order 
to achieve an intentional aim, rather than goal, is the defining characteristic of 
human agency. On the self-control view, the claim that a unique form of self-
direction is constitutive of human agency is still explained by an appeal to 
teleology, as with all self-directed behaviour. Mele explains that “teleological 
explanations of human actions feature aims, goals, or purposes of human 
agents.”17 For him, on a teleological view it is “a conceptual truth that an agent's 
acting intentionally at a time requires his having some relevant purpose or 
objective at that time.”18 Similarly, on the biological picture as proposed by 
Murphy and Brown, all self-direction is necessarily goal-directed, and in light of 
this, self-direction is exhibited in all living organisms on a spectrum which 
ranges from virtually non-existent to significantly less sophisticated than the 
kind of self-direction human beings exhibit. Moreover, on both the philosophical 
and biological accounts, the high level of self-direction human beings exhibit is 
expressed in our ability to govern and control our actions and behaviour, and on 
such accounts this is what makes us actors or human agents as distinct from 
other organisms. While the self-direction required for human agency and the 
kind of self-direction exhibited by other organisms along the spectrum proposed 
by Murphy and Brown, the self-direction required for human agency is distinct 
from other types of agency in virtue of its biological complexity (seen in our 
brain and neural functioning) as well as its psychological complexity (seen in our 
ability to set systematic and reflective goals and values for ourselves). 
 
Murphy and Brown have recently, and convincingly, combined cognitive science 
with philosophical thoughts on agency. They argue that on a continuum of the 
exhibited goal directed behaviour common to all organisms, human agents 
exhibit the most complex known example. For Murphy and Brown, the kind of 
activity exhibited by human agents is fundamentally rooted in the basic 
interaction between any organism and its environment (and this is true even for 
rudimentary organisms).19 Their project sketches what they call a “spectrum of 
                                                 
17 A. Mele, Motivation and Agency, p. 38. 
18 Ibid, p. 164. 
19 N. Murphy and W. Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?, p. 106. 
 18 
forms of action,”20 which reveals a gradient in the level of self-direction that we 
should attribute to organisms by taking into account the differences in the 
following: information about the environment which is available to the 
organism; the flexibility of behavioural responses which that organism is able to 
make to their environmental influences; and the complexity of the organism’s 
evaluative systems. Murphy and Brown argue that human activity is positioned 
at the most complex extreme of this gradient, saying that:  
 
conscious, deliberate, human action is a form of goal-directed activity 
involving the most complex analysis of environmental conditions, the 
largest number of response options, and the widest spatio-temporal 
scope for the evaluation of action possibilities and their 
consequences.21 
 
First, they argue that while all activity is goal-directed – “aimed toward solutions 
to problems [goals] created by interactions between internal states and 
environmental circumstances,”22 what varies between organisms is the 
“complexity of environmental analysis,” which the organism can make, and the 
“flexibility of behavioural responses available to organisms.”23  
Second, Murphy and Brown argue that all biological activity has an 
evaluational component, which they call “action under evaluation.”24 In most 
basic organisms, this simply refers to the fact that activity is part of a system in 
which behaviour can be corrected and modulated in relation to feedback 
received about the relationship between the outcomes of the behaviour and the 
goal of the activity. On Murphy and Brown’s picture, this capacity is represented 
by a comparator that “determines if the goal is being reached and makes 
appropriate adjustments in the organisation of ongoing behaviour.”25 What 
changes along the gradient of self-directed behaviour is the cause of the goals 
which direct the behaviour. For example, in a simple feedback system such as a 
thermostat, the goal is wholly set by something outside of the system itself. In 
contrast, the goals in simple biological organisms are set by evolutionary 
                                                 
20 Ibid, p. 106. 
21 Ibid, p. 107. 
22 Ibid, p. 106. 
23 Ibid, p. 106. 
24 Ibid, p. 107. 
25 Ibid, p. 107. 
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processes. In more complex organisms, with comparatively more complex 
nervous systems, the behaviour-environment interactions become relatively 
more complex. This complexity is realised in “nested hierarchies of feedback and 
evaluation,”26 and increases the ability of the organism to modify its own goals 
and moderate its own behaviour (through self-evaluation) which is initially set 
by biological determinism and the environment.27  
Third, Murphy and Brown argue that behaviours can be classified into 
three levels, which they claim to represent “milestones along a continuum of 
behavioural complexity”: namely, reflexive adaptability, unreflective adaptability 
and reflective adaptability. Reflexive behaviours include “responses that interact 
with environmental feedback, but according to fixed forms”.28 For example, 
simple behaviour in single celled organisms, such as protozoa, with a singular 
form of behaviour have limited sensory mechanisms and limited possible 
responses to the environment, but still exhibit goal direction (“finding nutrients 
and avoiding toxins”29), as well as action under evaluation (“modify the direction 
of swimming based on environmental feedback”30). Unreflective adaptability 
refers to “behaviours that are modified in form by remembered environmental 
feedback.”31 Such behaviour would be exhibited in animals which are considered 
to ‘imitate’ other animals behaviour, or animals who are successfully able to 
engage in ‘trial and error’ tasks.32 Finally, reflective adaptability refers to 
“behaviours that are modified off-line by reflection using images or symbols.” 33 
The use of images and symbols, as they are related to one another in a nexus of 
meaning is perhaps most widely associated with human behaviours, but there 
are less complex examples of reflective adaptability in the animal world. Murphy 
and Brown provide the following example: 
 
For a monkey to know the meaning of an alerting call is for it to have a 
strong learned association between an iconic representation of the 
                                                 
26 Ibid, p. 108. 
27 Ibid, p. 108. 
28 Ibid, p. 110.  
29 Ibid, p. 111. 
30 Ibid, p. 111. 
31 Ibid, p. 110. 
32 Ibid, p. 115. 
33 Ibid, p. 110. 
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particular call and an iconic representation of the threat of a leopard, for 
example.34 
 
While all three levels of behaviour are exhibited in both non-human and human 
organisms, the elaborate nested hierarchies of evaluative process, which are 
present in human cognition, can influence, modify or overrule behaviour arising 
at any of these levels – even those that are most basic. Murphy and Brown 
provide the following example:  
 
coughing may be a simple reflex reaction to obstruction of the airways, 
but concert-goers have learned to restrain coughing until the end of 
the piece. So, when humans cough between pieces, there is an added 
level of conscious permission that complicates analysis of the 
behaviour.35  
 
Murphy and Brown’s biological picture thus stresses the complexity of an 
important feature which is perhaps universally acknowledged as distinctive 
about an agent’s mental life: the capacity for critical self-reflection and  symbolic 
evaluation. From our own experience, it seems possible to say that a major part 
of what makes a human agent’s mental life so complex is the fact that, as humans, 
we not only have primary or brute responses to the world, usually in the form of 
beliefs and desires, but that we are able to asses those basic responses, form 
opinions about them, and often even change them. Murphy and Brown claim that 
while this capacity, exemplified in what they term the comparator, is present in 
all organisms, the human comparator is the most complex example because it 
results in the most complex examples of behaviour. When critically reflecting on 
our basic responses to the world, we evaluate whether or not we are motivated 
by our basic responses by checking those responses against our values, 
commitments, projects, aims and goals. Such processes of critical self-reflection 
and symbolic evaluation result in the most complex form of reflective 
adaptability. What Murphy and Brown explain as the comparator is what we 
typically take ourselves to be when we are exercising our agency. That is, when 
we refer to our own experience of ourselves as agents, what we are typically 
                                                 
34 Ibid, p. 121. 
35 Ibid, p. 110. 
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referring to is an experience of ourselves as comparators, i.e. active evaluators of 
our experiences.  
Similarly, it is our evaluation of our experiences which is central in recent 
philosophical accounts of human agency. The crucial capacities for self-reflection 
and symbolic evaluation are discussed in this literature in terms of a capacity for 
self-control. It is control over the self born from critical self-reflection and 
symbolic evaluation in particular that is taken to be constitutive of autonomous 
or free agency (encapsulated by what I refer to in this thesis as human agency). If 
the biological account of human agency is sufficiently similar to the self-control 
view of human agency presented in the philosophical literature, it would 
certainly give us good reason to adopt the self-control view, particularly if we 
are committed to naturalism. On the naturalist view, self-control is a complex 
example of the kind of intentionality exhibited by all other living things along a 
spectrum. Human agency remains on this spectrum, and yet is clearly distinct 
from other types of agency along that spectrum in virtue of the capacity for self-
control. Further, on the biological view, human agency remains distinct from the 
kind of agency perhaps exhibited by supernatural and disembodied beings, who 
may arguably hold a place on the self-direction spectrum, but who are to be 
considered distinct from human agents since human agents are necessarily 
embodied. In what follows I outline two influential accounts of human agency 
from the analytic tradition which centre on self-control and which are 
compatible with the biological view in the above respects.    
Two plausible and important philosophical accounts of human agency in 
which self-control plays a central role have been proposed by Harry Frankfurt 
and Gary Watson. Central to these accounts is the idea that to be in control of our 
own motivations, and the actions we take as a result, is what marks us out as 
distinct from the rest of the animal kingdom and is what makes us human 
agents. Both Frankfurt and Watson’s accounts highlight the role of self-control in 
human agency. And to this end, they outline the bare minimum necessary 
structural features of the mind, which allow us to control our initial responses to 
the world, as well as allowing us to perform actions that are calculated and 
controlled, rather than being largely out of our control. As their starting points, 
both Frankfurt and Watson take the basic assumption that as human agents we 
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characteristically not only have certain overarching or guiding principles and 
values (often referred to as ‘our better judgement’), but that we are able to 
assert some form of control over our choices and actions when our better 
judgement effectively guides our actions. On their accounts, when our better 
judgement guides our actions in spite of any motivation we may have to act to 
the contrary, we exercise the kind of self-control necessary for human agency.36 
 
In his paper ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’ Frankfurt 
distinguishes between what he calls first and second order desires; and further 
between first or second order desires and what he calls second order volitions. 
He claims that only once our second order volitions are aligned with our first 
order desires, both of which constitute our will, can we be seen to exercise the 
kind of self-control that is constitutive of human agency.  
On Frankfurt’s account, first order desires are largely determined by our 
initial response to the world. Typically, an agent will have a first order desire in 
the form of basic want as expressed in, for example, “I want to go for a jog now.” 
This kind of first order desire is often experienced in competition with other first 
order desires. For instance, an agent desiring to go out for a jog now might also 
find herself with the competing desire to watch a documentary now. In the face 
of this internal competition, some desires rather than others will successfully 
move us to perform corresponding actions at any given time. According to 
Frankfurt, first order desires that are effective in this way, or that would be 
effective if we were not physically prevented from acting in this way, are taken to 
constitute our will.37 For Frankfurt, a person’s will is also comprised of those 
desires “by which he will or would be motivated when or if he acts.”38  
Second order desires are the desires we have as a product of critical 
reflection and evaluative assessment of our first order desires, and thus have as 
their content a reflective assessment of a first order desire. For example, when 
                                                 
36 In important clarification of terminology is important here. Frankfurt refers to what I am here 
describing as human agency in terms of freedom of the will, while Watson refers to it in terms of 
free agency. The account of human agency I am putting forward based on the work of Frankfurt 
and Watson should be seen as neutral with regard to what position one may take in the free will 
debate. 
37 H. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, p. 8. 
38 Ibid, p. 8. 
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critically reflecting on our first order desire to go for a jog now, we may 
reflectively evaluate this desire and arrive at a higher order desire such as “I 
want to want to go for a jog now” or “I want to want to watch a documentary 
now”. Second order desires are, according to Frankfurt, the product of that 
characteristically human capacity for critical self-reflection on our initial 
responses to the world – or our first order desires – and are meant to explain the 
ability of human agents to have intentions and preferences about their own will. 
That is, by wanting our will to be different to what it happens to be, we are able 
to some extent to regulate it.  
Moreover, some second order desires are to be seen as what Frankfurt 
calls second order volitions. According to Frankfurt, a second order desire can be 
seen as a second order volition when, with regards to a specific first order desire, 
we want that first order desire to be our will. A second order volition, then, is a 
desire of the second order which corresponds with a desire of the first order that 
effectively moves us to action.39 For Frankfurt, second order volitions are agency 
conferring – that is, when our actual will mirrors the will which is endorsed by 
our higher order volition, we can be said to have the will we want to have. 
Frankfurt maintains that by having the will we want to have in this sense, our 
will is free in the way required for human agency because it is the result of our 
successful efforts at self-control. Frankfurt claims the following:  
 
The statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means […] that 
he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants […]. 
It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions, 
then, that a person exercises freedom of the will.40  
 
Frankfurt further notes that when our will mirrors our second order volitions, 
we are free from any factors that could be seen as agency undermining precisely 
because we are moved to action by something that we have endorsed for 
ourselves. Frankfurt says: 
 
                                                 
39 Ibid,  p. 10. 
40 Ibid, p. 15. 
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… since the will that moved him to action was his will because he 
wanted it to be, he cannot claim that his will was forced upon him or 
that he was a passive bystander to its constitution.41 
 
So, for Frankfurt, it is possible to say that we have control over our actions 
because we are human agents in the sense that we are able to exercise self-
control. Self-control is achieved, on Frankfurt’s account, when our second order 
volitions mirror our will. And, for him, we can be said to have the will that we 
want to have precisely because it is endorsed by us. According to Frankfurt’s 
initial account, then, what it means to have a free will is that our will is under 
control, in the sense that it is endorsed by our higher-order mental elements, 
which themselves have been formed in the light of rational critical reflection on 
ourselves.  
 
On Watson’s view, which is similar but not identical to Frankfurt’s, what is 
distinctive about human subjects is their ability to make rational evaluations 
about themselves and their situation in the world, and to form values in light of 
these deliberations which guide their actions when they are free agents.42 On 
Watson’s account, the values we have, as human agents, are a reflection of who 
we are, or are constitutive of what we could call our true or real selves. Thus, for 
Watson, when our actions reflect our values, they are attributable to us in the 
deep sense of attributability which is thought to underlie freedom, or free 
agency, precisely because our actions have been up to us in the relevant sense. 
Most importantly, for Watson, when we are able to act in accordance with our 
values in the face of various obstacles or constraints (such as those desires 
which, if acted upon, would undermine one or more of our rationally chosen 
values), we exercise that capacity which is the cornerstone of human agency, 
namely self-control. Similarly to Frankfurt’s account, then, Watson’s account 
tries to capture an intuition about human agency that focuses on self-control. 
This intuition is expressed succinctly by Richard Moran when he explains the 
following: 
 
                                                 
41 Ibid, p. 18. 
42 G. Watson, ‘Free Agency’. 
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It is the normal expectation of the person, as well as a rational demand 
made upon him, that the question of what he actually does desire 
should be dependent […] on his assessment of the desire and grounds 
he has for it. For the person himself, then, his motivated desire is not a 
brute empirical phenomenon he must simply accommodate, like some 
other facet of reality he confronts. For this sort of desire, as a 
“judgment-sensitive” attitude, owes its existence (as an empirical 
psychological fact) to his own deliberations and overall assessment of 
his situation.43 
 
Models of human agency, such as Watson’s, are sometimes referred to as 
partitioning accounts, which explain our agency as self-control via the notion of a 
partition within the psyche between motivational systems (consisting of the 
considerations which prompt a person to action) and evaluational systems 
(consisting of overarching principles and value systems). Watson claims that if it 
is possible for a discrepancy to exist between these two independent sources of 
motivation (desire and value), that it is possible for an action to be either free or 
unfree. Watson explains: 
 
The problem of free action arises because what one desires may not be 
what one values, and what one most values may not be what one is 
finally moved to get.44  
 
The question of whether or not we act freely is thus, in Watson’s opinion, focused 
on how we might be in control over what motivates us effectively – that is to say, 
what moves us all the way to action. Since there are, according to Watson, two 
sources or springs of motivation (namely desires and values), there arises the 
possibility of our being motivated to follow two distinct and potentially 
contradictory courses of action simultaneously – both from within our own 
mental complex. If either one of these distinct or contradictory motivations were 
to be effective in action, one motivation would be trumped by another 
motivation held by that same person. I may, for example, desire and be 
motivated to have chocolate cake, while at the same time value a healthy lifestyle 
and be motivated not to eat refined sugars. According to Watson, we act as free 
agents, or human agents, only when our values and principles (those motivations 
                                                 
43 R. Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2000, p. 115. 
44 G. Watson, ‘Free Agency’. 
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arising from our valuation system) are effective motivations, which is to say 
when they move us all the way to action. Our actions, then, are free when our 
motivational system mirrors our evaluational system. Watson explains, as 
follows: 
 
The possibility of unfree action consists in the fact that an agent’s 
evaluational system and motivational system may not completely 
coincide. Those systems harmonize to the extent that what determines 
the agent’s all things considered judgments also determines his actions 
[…]. The free agent has the capacity to translate his values into action; 
his actions flow from his evaluational system.45 
 
The suggestion of such a partition allows Watson to draw a distinction between 
free and unfree action. As such, this account helps us to establish precisely why 
we can distinguish between individuals who are coerced or compelled, and those 
who are suitably free from constraints which would otherwise diminish their 
agency. In cases in which a person has been coerced, or in some way compelled, 
his actions are unfree precisely because what he is motivated to do is in tension 
with what he has, himself, rationally evaluated to be the best course of action. 
Watson explains the way in which a kleptomaniac is unfree in the following way: 
 
What is distinctive about such compulsive behavior, I would argue, is 
that the desires and emotions in question are more or less radically 
independent of the evaluational systems of these agents.46  
 
What Watson makes explicit in the conditions he provides for free agency is that 
when we perform an action freely, it means that we are moved to action by our 
evaluating rational selves, or by our evaluational system. That is, the values and 
principles that form part of our evaluational system are a product of our own 
rational evaluations. Human agency, then, on Watson’s account, requires us to 
exercise control over our actions by always acting on our values or principles, or 
to exercise self-control. According to Watson, human agency is constituted by 
three factors. First, human agency requires that we have a point of view from 
which to judge the world, which can be said to constitute our point of view. 
Second, human agency requires that our point of view is to be identified with 
                                                 
45 Ibid,  pp. 215-216.  
46 Ibid, p. 220. 
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what he calls our evaluational system, as Watson explains: “One’s evaluational 
system may be said to constitute one’s standpoint, the point of view from which 
one judges the world.”47 Finally, human agency requires that we, in fact, do act on 
the dictates of our evaluational system.  
 
1.2 Constraint, Sanity and Procedural Independence 
 
In this section I argue that the classic accounts of the self-control view of human 
agency, provided by Frankfurt and Watson, require clarification. Apart from 
human agents being required to reflectively assess and endorse certain of their 
motivations over others, I will argue in this section that a human agent’s better 
judgements or intentional actions cannot be solely determined by third parties. 
Someone whose better judgement or intentional actions are determined solely 
by third parties are, I suggest, for the most part to be seen as lacking the kind of 
critical or evaluative freedom necessary to exercise human agency. Further, I 
suggest that being a human agent does not require that we exercise self-control 
at all times, or in all aspects of our lives. 
 
Self-control consists in guiding our actions and behaviours in light of our better 
judgement (or our critical reflections and evaluations), but there are times when 
certain constraints may trump our ability to form better judgements or to make 
our critical assessments in ways which would not allow us to exercise the degree 
of self-control necessary for human agency. All of us are subject to influence from 
external forces when assessing and choosing from a number of possible courses 
of action we might take, and so to some extent we must recognise that the self-
control necessary for human agency can never be wholly free from all external 
influence and constraint. For example, we are concerned with how other people 
will view our choices and actions, and this can have some effect on what we 
decide to do. But, at least some of the time, the external constraints we face play 
a largely insidious role – they undermine our ability to form intentions and 
choose courses of action which are in any relevant sense our own. In situations 
where we are so constrained that we act on motivations which are not in the 
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relevant sense our own (that is, as the product of our own evaluations and 
assessments), our freedom is typically taken to have been undermined and we 
are no longer responsible for ourselves in the sense required for human agency. 
We do not typically consider people who are subject to mental manipulation or 
coercion to be free or accountable for their actions because they have been 
unable to either act on or form their own better judgments or critical 
evaluations. We typically think that people who are brainwashed, or whose lives 
or loved ones are threatened, have had their agency most basically undermined; 
and, in such cases, people are no longer seen as controlling their own actions in 
any sense relevant for accountability. Rather, their actions are seen as controlled 
by their brainwasher or coercer.  
While to have self-control is to be in control of oneself, there is certainly 
more to being in control of oneself than having and exhibiting the power to 
master motivation that is contrary to one’s better judgement. If our better 
judgements rest on values generated and maintained by brainwashing, or are 
influenced by nefarious ideologies that we would not endorse if only we could 
see them clearly, we would exercise self-control according to Frankfurt and 
Watson’s views, but we do not seem to be in control of ourselves in a broader 
sense. In a broader sense such a person would be ruled, as Mele argues, 
ultimately, not by his ‘self’ but rather by his brainwasher, the insidious effect of 
ideology, or society at large.48  To be in the relevant sense accountable for our 
actions as agents, we must exercise self-control in this broader sense. However, 
the broader sense of self-control in which accountability is at stake should not be 
thought of here as also providing a basis for the ascription of moral 
responsibility.  
In her paper “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,”49 Susan Wolf 
offers the example of JoJo, “the favourite son of Jo the First, an evil and sadistic 
dictator of a small, undeveloped country.”50 In Wolf’s example, JoJo spends a 
great deal of time in the company of his father, who shows his son a sense of 
favouritism. JoJo thus “takes his father as a role model and develops values very 
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much like his Dad’s.”51 According to Wolf, when JoJo acts as his father did, for 
example by “sending people to prison or to death or to torture chambers on the 
basis of whim,” he is not constrained or coerced into action because his desires 
are wholly his own in Frankfurt and Watson’s sense – that is, his “actions are 
controlled by his desires and [his] desires are the desires he wants to have.”52 
However, and importantly, Wolf points out that given JoJo’s circumstances he 
cannot truly be said to be, in the relevant sense, accountable for his values that 
inform his better judgement. Wolf explains the following: 
 
In light of JoJo’s heritage and upbringing – both of which he was 
powerless to control – it is dubious at best that he should be regarded 
as responsible for what he does. It is unclear whether anyone with a 
childhood such as his could have developed into anything but the 
twisted and perverse sort of person that he has become.53 
 
Following Wolf’s view, the self-control view of human agency, as established by 
Frankfurt and Watson requires an additional element which would allow us to 
distinguish between those persons who are able to freely form their better 
judgement (or exercise critical reflection), and those who, although able to act in 
accordance with their better judgement, are unable to form their better 
judgement (or exercise critical reflection) freely.  
Here, I agree with Wolf that Frankfurt’s and Watson’s self-control views of 
human agency require supplementation. Given the complexity of the effects of 
constraints on our mental lives, an account of human agency must allow us to 
distinguish between JoJo and someone who can be seen as accountable for their 
action in the relevant sense. A person who is seen as accountable for their 
actions in the relevant sense here is someone who is judged by broader society 
to have acted without any agency undermining constraints influencing the 
chosen course of action. For someone to be held accountable, they need not be 
held morally responsible, although we may award praise or prescribe certain 
rehabilitative measures to someone who we would consider to be accountable. 
Any supplementation to Frankfurt and Watson’s self-control view of human 
agency, then, should explain how JoJo differs from a person who we would hold 
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accountable, and it should explain why we would attribute accountability to such 
a person rather than JoJo. 
 
A convincing candidate for just such supplementation has been proposed by 
Gerald Dworkin. In his paper ‘Autonomy and Behaviour Control,’54 Dworkin 
introduces the condition of ‘procedural independence’ as fundamentally 
important to discussions about the nature of human agency, and he continues to 
argue for the relevance of ‘procedural independence’ in his book The Theory and 
Practice of Autonomy.55 According to Dworkin, as individuals, we lack ‘procedural 
independence’ if we are unable to view our own situation clearly, for example, if 
we are in a threatening situation. In such cases, Dworkin points out that an 
“individual may identify or approve of his motivational structure because of an 
inability to view in a critical and rational manner his situation.”56 Dworkin also 
argues that we lack ‘procedural independence’ if we are subject to external 
forces which wholly determine our better judgement. He explains:  
 
the identification with his motivations, or the choice of the type of 
person he wants to be, may have been produced by manipulation, 
deception, withholding of relevant information, and so on. It may have 
been influenced in decisive ways by others in such a fashion that we 
are not prepared to think of it as being his own choice. I shall call this a 
lack of procedural independence.57 
 
If we are to be considered accountable for our actions in the sense relevant for 
human agency, then, in addition to the internal conditions involving what 
motivates us to act from within our own mental complex, our own better 
judgement and our critical reflection must also be suitably free from external 
influences which might be considered to undermine agency. Drawing on 
Dworkin’s negative account, what is needed to bolster Frankfurt and Watson’s 
accounts is the following twofold ‘procedural independence’ condition in which a 
human agent’s evaluative system is, firstly, not undermined by a faulty rational 
or critical ability, and secondly, is not formed purely as stipulated by some third 
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party, as in the cases of deception and manipulation, as well as in cases where 
certain relevant information is withheld. 
Wolf, however, proposes an alternative plausible supplementation for the 
self-control view of human agency in the form of an epistemic requirement for 
sanity. While Dworkin argues that what we need for accountability is another 
form of control over and above the kind of self-control described by Watson (in 
the form of procedural independence), Wolf denies that what we need for 
accountability is more control. Wolf argues that we do not need more or stronger 
control over ourselves, rather what is needed in addition to self-control is an 
epistemic condition in the form of sanity, which is utterly unlike a form of 
control. Over and above the ability to exercise self-control, Wolf proposes that 
human agents must also meet a sanity condition, which acknowledges that there 
is a particular kind of connection between our selves and the world. JoJo’s 
problem is that his upbringing is so bad that he has significantly lost the ability to 
grasp what is the case and what is not. His connection to the world has crucially been 
severed, and he is no longer sane (in Wolf’s sense). JoJo can explicitly endorse his 
father’s views, but he does so because he is fundamentally insane, which is to say that 
his father’s worldview is engraved into JoJo’s psyche. Wolf explains as follows: 
  
in order to be responsible an agent must be sane. It is not ordinarily in 
our power to determine whether or not we are sane. Most of us, it 
would seem, are lucky, but some are not. Moreover, being sane does 
not necessarily mean that one has any type of power or control an 
insane person lacks. Some insane people, like JoJo and some actual 
political leaders who resemble him, may have even complete control 
over their actions, and even complete control over their acting selves. 
The desire to be sane is thus not a desire for another form of control; it 
is rather a desire that one’s self be connected to the world in a certain 
way – we could even say it is a desire that one’s self be controlled by 
the world in certain ways and not in others.58 
 
For Wolf then, it is not enough for us to say that human agency requires the kind 
of motivational self-control proposed by Frankfurt and Watson, human agency 
requires that we are suitably free from constraints that prevent us from properly 
assessing the goals and values which guide and inform our better judgments. It is 
our agency itself which is undermined, for Wolf, when our situation in the world 
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prevents us from being sane, that is, prevents us from having an ‘accurate 
conception of the world’ and from having ‘blind or distorted forms of responses’ 
to the world. Wolf explains further as follows: 
 
Insofar as one’s desire to be sane involves a desire to know what one is 
doing – or more generally, a desire to live in the real world – it is a 
desire to be a controlled […] by perceptions and sound reasoning that 
produce an accurate conception of the world, rather than blind or 
distorted forms of response […]. [Furthermore,] one’s hope is that 
one’s values be controlled by processes that afford accurate 
conceptions of the world.59 
 
Sanity, then, is explicitly not a matter of control for Wolf. It’s a matter of seeing 
the world correctly. On Wolf’s account the difference between JoJo and the rest of 
us is not a matter of us having procedural independence and JoJo not having it. 
The difference is that JoJo is unable to see the world clearly, or to understand his 
proper connection to the world. It’s explicitly an epistemic problem, not a 
problem of control. Importantly, on Wolf’s account it is the content of what JoJo 
is exposed to that is the problem, not the extent or manner of the exposure. One 
attractive feature of Wolf’s view is that is it has the consequence that ‘normal’ 
people who simply inherit their world view from their parents or communities 
(like many of us) come out as sane agents.   
Wolf’s sanity condition, then, certainly provides a plausible candidate for 
supplementation to the self-control view established by Frankfurt and Watson, 
but it is important to note that through the sanity condition Wolf also aims at an 
understanding of human agency as a substantive rather than a purely formal 
concept. Like Frankfurt and Watson, I favour a formal concept of human agency – 
seeing Normativity associated with personhood, as I will argue in the second part 
of this thesis. Further, the deeper concern about the kind of control we have over 
our ability to critically reflect on our values and form our better judgment, can, I 
think, be accommodated in the formal self-control view of human agency without 
requiring us to understand human agency as a substantive notion if we follow 
Dworkin’s suggestion of procedural independence. My favouring of a formal over 
a substantive account of human agency, and thus my preference for Dworkin’s 
account, does not of course settle the dispute between Wolf and Dworkin on 
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whether procedural independence or sanity is the right sort of further ingredient 
needed for an account of human agency in addition to Frankfurtian/Watsonian 
self-control. The central concerns about human agency and personhood which I 
go on to address in this thesis are not influenced by whether we adopt Wolf’s or 
Dworkin’s approach to broadening our understanding of when an agent can be 
said to exercise self-control in the sense relevant for accountability – either 
supplementation could satisfactorily do the trick. Importantly, for my purposes 
here, on both Dworkin’s and Wolf’s account, a human agent whose better 
judgement or intentional actions are determined solely by third parties are, for 
the most part, to be seen as lacking the kind of critical or evaluative freedom 
necessary to exercise human agency, or to be accountable for their actions. 
 
Both Wolf’s and Dworkin’s additions to the classic self-control view of human 
agency given by Frankfurt and Watson, however, are more complicated than 
they might at first have seemed. It is far more difficult for us to delineate 
between cases in which accountability is lost, or in which ‘procedural 
independence’ or ‘sanity’ has been undermined, from those in which it is not.   
In everyday life, accountability is often formally assigned by a lawyer or 
jury in a court of law, and a country’s laws are to a large extent a reflection of the 
kinds of constraint which that society takes to undermine accountability.  
Similarly, popular literature and film often portray cases in which the 
audience or reader is asked to consider whether or not the protagonist is 
subjected to constraints which we would take to undermine their accountability. 
We typically tend not to hold accountable characters who have been coerced into 
action or who face science-fiction style scenarios in which they have been subject 
to extreme mental manipulation. For example, in John Frankenheimer’s thriller 
The Manchurian Candidate, we sympathise with the protagonist Raymond Shaw, 
who is brainwashed and subject to mental manipulation such that we take him to 
have been ‘programmed’ as a Soviet assassin in order to target a presidential 
candidate, rather than as someone who is accountable for having devised, of 
their own accord, a devious plan to commit murder.60   
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Further, we generally take people living under oppressive regimes61 to 
have a diminished sense of accountability for their choices and actions. History 
teaches us through illustrative cases – consider the Nuremburg Trials and the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) – that we tend to 
respond to those who commit various crimes in extreme social conditions in 
similar ways to those who have been coerced or manipulated – at least some of 
the time. In the Nuremburg trials, those in positions of power were punished, not 
the deluded German youth. Similarly, the hearings of the TRC served to promote 
the kind of understanding of the constraints faced by many of the perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity under the Apartheid regime, and through this 
understanding, to favour merciful mitigation in the form of amnesty over 
vengeance or strict retributivism. The TRC, moreover, sought to transform the 
actual structural and institutional problems which allowed for the perpetuation 
of human rights violations rather than simply dealing with individual 
perpetrators. In support of this intuitively attractive view of the limits of 
culpability, Simone de Beauvoir famously claimed that we do not: 
 
hate those youthful sixteen-year-old followers of Hitler in whom 
Nazism affirmed itself with such violence, but who never had the 
possibility of criticizing it. One reeducates children, the ignorant, those 
populations that are ill informed; one does not punish them.62 
 
On Wolf’s account, those very real cases of  the deluded German or South African 
youth are analogous to her fictional case of JoJo. She claims: 
 
we give less than full responsibility to persons who, though acting 
badly, act in ways that are strongly encouraged by their societies – the 
slave owners of the 1850s, the Nazis of the 1930s, and many male 
chauvinists of our fathers’ generation […]. If we think that the agents 
could not help but be mistaken about their values, we do not blame 
them for the actions those values inspired.63  
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Further, we also tend to think of certain environmental constraints as agency 
undermining. We take people who find themselves in life threatening, do-or-die 
situations to be less responsible for their choices and actions. We are, for 
example, less inclined assign accountability to people who engage in so-called 
‘survival cannibalism’ because we view their choices and actions as radically 
constrained – we see them as unable to exercise the kind of freedom associated 
with agency. Anthropologically speaking, the prevailing view in western society 
is that those engaged in ‘survival cannibalism’ are exempt from accountability for 
their choices and actions. In response to famous cases in which survivors of 
plane accidents in remote areas are forced to eat the bodies of their dead fellow 
passengers, such as the situation in 1972 in which 16 air accident survivors were 
stranded in the Andes, were deemed exempt by the public from accountability. 
 It is important to point out, however, that there is by no means broad 
consensus in any given society, let alone across different societies, about what 
the limits of accountability are. The effects of some external constraints on our 
agency are less intuitively easy for us to explain: where we draw the line when 
establishing whether certain factors preclude our holding someone accountable 
is largely blurred and sometimes flexible. Within the legal world there is much 
debate and argument amongst lawyers and in courtrooms about whether 
accountability should be assigned to a defendant, given the particulars of their 
situation. Similarly, popular literature and some writings in moral philosophy 
have challenged us to question whether all actions conducted in situations of 
circumstantial constraint are really to be forgiven. In the award-winning novel 
Life of Pi64, we are asked to imagine a ship-wreck situation, quite dissimilar to the 
1972 plane accident situation, in a salient way: in the Life of Pi situation, our 
protagonist is stranded on a life-boat with a character who many would deem a 
moral monster because, as the story could be interpreted, he murders fellow 
passengers in order to engage in ‘survival cannibalism.’  
In many cases certain choices made or actions undertaken by people in 
situations of extreme social constraint provoke a condemnatory reaction that is 
shared in western society. Such condemnatory response is largely a reaction to 
the kinds of actions in which these people have engaged. The perhaps 
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overwhelming social constraint present in Nazi Germany or Apartheid South 
Africa does little to conciliate the perceived monstrosity of characters such as 
Adolf Eichmann or Hendrik Verwoerd – and even to those lower ranking soldiers 
and civilians who committed seemingly unforgivable acts of gross human rights 
violations. Though we typically think that a person’s agency may be undermined 
by certain kinds of social constraints, it also appears that there are some firmly 
held intuitive boundaries to the range of choices and actions for which a person 
can be held accountable, even in the face of severely restrictive social 
constraints. Our intuitions about the extent of mitigation attained when someone 
is constrained by external circumstances vary, it would seem, not exclusively 
according to the level of constraint involved, but with respect to the kinds of 
choices and actions people make in these situations.   
Importantly, what our divided views about the role that external 
circumstances play in either diminishing or affirming accountability should tell 
us is that, for the most part, we intuitively struggle to delineate any 
comprehensive boundaries for our own agency in terms of accountability. 
Perhaps, it might be argued here, we ought simply to give up on some of our 
intuitions and simply draw the decisive boundaries. But this bullet is hard to bite. 
While analytic philosophical pictures have significantly helped us to understand 
the nature of human agency, insights from this tradition must be supplemented 
with an account which takes the lived experience of agency seriously, as well as 
an account in which culpability is socially determined. In taking our own 
intuitions about the boundaries of our agency seriously, we can, I think, arrive at 
some important insights about the nature of agency which supplement the 
analytic picture – and I go on to discuss these insights further in the second 
chapter. Drawing on what I have discussed in this section one insight seems 
important to point out here: in our experience, agency is the kind of thing that 
exists in degrees. We can be sometimes more or less subject to forces which 
seem to diminish our accountability for our choices and actions in the eyes of 
society. Mele argues that “[s]elf-control may be either regional or global,” and 
that “it comes in degrees.”65 I think that Mele rightly argues the following:  
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The fact that a scholar exhibits remarkable self-control in adhering to 
the demanding work schedule that he judges best for himself does not 
preclude his being weak-willed about eating. He may be self-controlled 
in one “region” of his life and weak-willed in another. And some self-
controlled individuals apparently are more self-controlled than others. 
Agents who have global […] self-control in all regions of their lives […] 
would be particularly remarkable, if, in every region, their self-control 
considerably exceeded that of most people.66 
 
It is a common experience as agents to find that while we may be self-controlled 
in some areas of our lives, we might completely lack self-control in others. And 
this should not be seen as a failure on our part. In fact, it might be important for 
us, within certain limitations, to relinquish self-control and allow ourselves to be 
guided by chance. Our participation in some of life’s most pleasurable activities, 
such as dancing or sex, are enhanced, rather than impeded, by ‘letting go’ and 
being out of control – guided in a mad frenzy by the beat of the music, or our 
lover’s touch. In the second part of this thesis I return to this idea, arguing that 
self-governance involves knowing when to let go of control.  
 
1.3 A Disagreement about Our Better Judgement 
 
In this section, following Mele, and contra Frankfurt and Watson, I argue that 
intentional actions need not always be in the service of our reflective better 
judgements. While Frankfurt and Watson maintain that the self-control required 
for human agency rests on our ability to act in accordance with our better 
judgements, I argue that an agent is more properly understood as someone who 
exercises self-control by mustering the motivational strength to perform 
intentional action in the face of competing motivations.    
Contrary to the views of self-control put forward by Frankfurt and 
Watson, Mele has, I think rightly, argued that a view in which “all intentional 
actions contrary to the agent’s better judgment are unfree,”67 is implausible. 
Mele summarises Watson’s argument as follows: “An agent’s succumbing to a 
desire contrary to his better judgment cannot be explained by his choosing not to 
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resist, nor by his making a culpably insufficient effort to resist.”68 On such a view, 
as Mele interprets it, there is “[o]nly one explanation [that] remains: the agent 
was unable to resist.”69 In other words, cases in which we act against our better 
judgement are cases in which we have no self-control and are therefore not 
acting as agents. In contrast to Watson’s view, Mele argues, first, that in our 
experience we are able to – and do – perform actions against our own better 
judgement, and second, that in such cases we do not always think that we have 
been constrained in any way. That is, we still think that we have acted freely or 
exercised our agency. Mele asks the following question: “Why do ordinary folks 
believe that there are (in my terminology, not theirs) core weak-willed 
actions?”70 And he provides the following answer: 
 
Why do ordinary folks believe that there are (in my terminology, not 
theirs) core weak-willed actions? Presumably, largely because they take 
themselves to have first hand experience of such actions and partly 
because some of their observations of—and conversations with—others 
indicate to them that they are not alone in this. It seems to them that, 
occasionally, they perform, in the absence of compulsion, intentional 
actions that are contrary to their J. They have, at such times, no feeling of 
being compelled. Indeed, they may feel free and uncompelled, and they 
may believe at the time of action that they are able to do what they judge 
best at the time.71 
 
Mele defends the popularly held view that a human agent can intentionally act 
against her own better judgement, and advances plausible cases in defence of 
this view. On Mele’s view, forming a better judgement on the basis of our critical 
reflection does not necessarily include a corresponding motivation or intention 
to act. For Mele, “it is very plausible that some agents who judge at t that it is best 
to A at t do not have a corresponding intention at t and intend a course of action 
that is at odds with that judgment.”72 He offers a first case, in brief, of the crack 
addict who “might judge (believe) it best not to use crack now, lack an intention 
not to use it now, intend to use it now, and intentionally use it now.”73 Recall that 
on Frankfurt and Watson’s views, when we act on desires or motivations that 
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run counter to our better judgement, our actions are not free and we are not 
exercising the self-control required for human agency. In the case of the crack 
addict, Watson takes the addict to be ‘unfree’ because, according to him “it is 
plain that in some situations [like that of the crack addict] the motivational 
systems of human beings exhibit an independence from their values which is 
inconsistent with free agency.”74 Watson says of the compulsive, such as the 
kleptomaniac, that “it is because his desires express themselves independently of 
his evaluational judgments that we tend to think of his actions as unfree.”75 For 
Frankfurt, the case of the addict presents us with what he calls the “unwilling” or 
non “wanton” addict, who forms a second order volition not to take drugs. In 
such a case, Frankfurt argues that: 
 
the unwilling addict may meaningfully make the analytically puzzling 
statements that the force moving him to take the drug is a force other than 
his own, and that it is not of his own free will, but rather against his will 
that this force moves him to take it.76 
 
On Mele’s view, however, we can “still choose, decide or intend” to act against 
our own better judgement. He advances a plausible case in favour of this view by 
presenting that of Drew, the weak-willed drinker. He illustrates Drew’s case as 
follows:  
 
Drew, who has had one shot of whiskey and needs to drive home soon, 
judges it best to switch now to coffee but neither chooses, decides, nor 
intends accordingly. She intentionally takes another whiskey.77  
 
According to Mele, in the case of Drew it is easy to see how her drinking another 
shot of whiskey is both intentional and free, and simultaneously against her 
better judgement. He explains the case of Drew in further detail as follows: 
  
She believes both that she can switch from whiskey to coffee now and that 
she can have another whiskey now instead; in Drew’s opinion, it is up to 
her which of these she does. She knows that it is risky to drive under the 
influence of two shots and she judges that, in light of the risk, her reason 
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for having a second shot—that she would enjoy it—does not justify having 
one. Although Drew judges that she should switch to coffee, she thinks 
“I’ve had a bit too much to drink before and all has gone well. I really 
should switch to coffee, but I’ll indulge myself. Just one more shot, then a 
cup of coffee, then I’ll drive home.” Still believing that it would be best to 
switch to coffee now, Drew decides to drink another shot and drinks one. 
She does not feel compelled to drink. She feels that she is deciding freely 
and that she is freely drinking the whiskey.78 
 
I agree with Mele that the case of Drew illustrates what is actually a commonly 
held view on which it is possible to act freely even when one does not act in 
accordance with one’s better judgement. Mele claims that his view of self-control 
best fits the common sense view of self-control. In a study of undergraduate 
students conducted by Mele himself at Florida State University, approximately 
half of the participants agreed that, in a case similar to that of Drew’s case (as 
well as the case of Bruce which I will discuss below) a person should be seen to 
have exercised self-control.79 Despite the disagreement about the role of our 
better judgement in exercising the kind of self-control associated with agency, 
Mele still subscribes to a view in which self-control is central to human agency. 
So why is the disagreement about better judgement so important? I think 
that this disagreement is important for understanding what a plausible self-
control account of human agency would look like. On Mele’s view, a version of 
self-control is still central to understanding free action or human agency. Mele 
distinguishes here, however, between what he calls “orthodox” cases of self-
control, in which “exercises of self-control serve the agent’s better judgment,”80 
and “unorthodox” exercises of self-control, in which exercises of self-control are 
against the agent’s better judgement. Here, he discusses the cases of Bruce and 
Alex. Bruce, he explains, “has decided to join some friends in breaking into a 
neighbor’s house, even though he judges it best on the whole not to do so.”81 
According to Mele, Bruce is afraid to perform the break-in and experiences 
“considerable trepidation” when he is about to do so. However, in spite of his 
fear, and importantly in spite of his better judgement, Bruce is able to master his 
fear, and thus exercise some form of self-control when he goes through with 
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picking the lock of the house. Contra Frankfurt and Watson, who view 
unorthodox exercises of self-control as impossible, since self-control requires us 
to act on our better judgment on their views, in Mele’s estimation, we can find an 
example in Bruce of the exercise of “self-control in the service of a decision that 
conflicts with his better judgment.”82  
Perhaps the case of Alex makes Mele’s point clearer. According to Mele’s 
example, Bob’s friend Alex “has proposed that they affirm their friendship by 
becoming blood brothers, because Alex is about to go away to prep school.”83 
Becoming blood brothers involves the boys cutting each of their own hands and 
“shaking their hands so that the blood will mingle.”84 Alex critically reflects on 
his reasons for accepting the proposal, as well as his reasons for not accepting 
the proposal in terms of his aversion to cutting himself. Finally, Alex judges that 
it would be best to go ahead with the ceremony “at once,” so that he might 
overcome his aversion. He forms the intention to “cut his hand with the knife 
straight away,”85 and thus reaches for his knife moving it toward his hand “with 
the intention of drawing blood.”86 What Alex fails to do, however, is to factor in 
the possibility that he might find the task of actually cutting his own hand 
difficult to perform because of his aversion to cutting himself. Mele explains that 
as he gets the knife close to his skin, “he intentionally stops” his movement of the 
knife towards his hand. By stopping the movement, Alex does not “implement his 
original choice,”87 but instead chooses to take the knife away and not perform 
the actions necessary for becoming blood brothers with Bob. In Mele’s example, 
however, this does not mean that Alex changes his mind about what his better 
judgement on the matter is. That is, “he has not changed his mind about what it is 
best to do.”88 In fact, we could imagine that Alex is quite plausibly “upset with 
himself for chickening out.”89 What is made clear by the case examples of Bruce 
and Alex is that we can think quite easily of plausible cases in which an agent 
may exercise unorthodox self-control. 
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That there are unorthodox exercises of self-control which are intentional 
or free (that is, which are also exercises of human agency) allows, I think, for the 
fact that while we may find ourselves acting intentionally against our better 
judgement, we still seem to experience our choices and actions in such cases as 
‘plausibly our own’ or as ‘stemming just from ourselves.’ Not only does this fit 
with our intuitions about the bounds of our own agency, but points to a deeper 
problem with the view adopted by Frankfurt and Watson.90 For Frankfurt and 
Watson, our better judgement constitutes the only legitimate aspect of ourselves, 
and all motivations or desires that run contrary to our better judgement are to 
be seen as ‘alien forces.’ Frankfurt says of such motives or desires that “its 
dominion is merely that of a tyrant. It has, for us, no legitimate authority.”91 
Furthermore, he says: 
 
Let us suppose that a certain motive has been rejected as unacceptable. Our 
attempt to immunize ourselves against it may not work. The resistance we 
mobilize may be insufficient. The externalized impulse or desire may 
succeed, by its sheer power, in defeating us and forcing its way. In that case, 
the outlaw imposes itself upon us without authority, and against our will.92 
 
Similarly, Watson says: 
 
Here the opposition is not between you and another, but between you – that 
is, your evaluative judgment – and your other desires. Here, the “other” is 
your own motivation. This kind of conflict presents an issue of self-control 
rather than deliberation because here insubordinate desires are to be 
resisted. In these circumstances, their claims lack authority.93 
 
Although our better judgement plays a large role in the constitution of who we 
take ourselves to be, there are a number of other important motivations and 
desires that inform, in many basic ways, who we are. In comparison to Frankfurt 
and Watson, I think Mele rightly argues that “[e]ven when one’s passions and 
emotions run counter to one’s better judgment, they often are not plausibly seen 
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as alien forces.”94 Take, for example, the case of Sue, who is a shopaholic despite 
her better judgement that it would be better to save for retirement and forgo 
needless purchases now. For Sue, shopping is an aspect of herself which informs 
her character and behaviour despite her better judgement. It is important to note 
here that the argument is not that we never act in accordance with our better 
judgement, or that our better judgement is not central to understanding human 
agency. Mele, rightly I think, is quick to point out that unorthodox cases of self-
control will be less common than those of orthodox cases: people “who make 
attempts at self-control will tend to do so much more often in support of their 
better judgements than in opposition to them.”95 The argument is that some 
motivations and desires that run counter to one’s better judgement can be 
integral aspects of agential life, even though, for the most part, we explain the 
self-control associated with human agency as guided by our better judgement. 
Mele says:  
 
A conception of self-controlled individuals as, roughly, people who 
characteristically are guided by their better judgments even in the face of 
strong competing motivation does not commit one to viewing emotion, 
passion, and the like as having no place in the self of self-control.96 
 
We might support Frankfurt and Watson’s arguments here by suggesting that it 
is a normative demand that our actions should correspond with our better 
judgement. Even if, descriptively, we can exercise unorthodox self-control, such 
exercises are not agency conferring. In cases where we exercise unorthodox self-
control we fail to do what good agents would do, and thus fail to be agents in 
Frankfurt and Watson’s sense. I think that this move is implausible for two 
related reasons: first, we would need further substantial argument that 
normative prescriptions for good agency should inform our descriptive accounts 
of human agency. Second, we would need further substantial argument that good 
agents are those who always act on their better judgement. These arguments are 
not given by Frankfurt and Watson, and in the face of our experience, as well as 
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Mele’s argument, I think that we should accept both orthodox and unorthodox 
exercises of self-control as exercises of human agency.97  
Further, that there are unorthodox exercises of self-control, which we 
associate with human agency, tells us that the kind of self-control central to 
agency fundamentally rests on a connection between, as Mele points out, 
“motivational strength and intentional action.”98 An agent exercises self-control 
when she is able to muster the motivational strength to perform intentional 
actions in the face of competing desires. This view of self-control which is 
centred on motivational strength allows us to make sense of cases in which a 
person exercises self-control in such a way that she acts contrary to her better 
judgement, and thus provides an important supplementation to Frankfurt’ and 
Watson’s accounts of self-control.  
 
1.4 Internal Conflict  
 
I argue in this section that the experience of conflicts between motivations and 
intentions on the part of a human agent is constitutive of self-control. That 
human agency requires internal conflict is an aspect of the self-control view 
which both Frankfurt and Watson to some extent discuss in their respective 
accounts. That internal conflict is required for agency, however, is an aspect of 
the self-control view of human agency which has, to some extent, been neglected 
in philosophical literature following the discussion and development of 
Frankfurt’s and Watson’s views. Drawing on both biological and psychological 
accounts of the nature of the mind, I defend in this section the claim that, on the 
self-control view, a human agent is someone who experiences conflict between 
her motivations and intentions. What makes the topic of human agency 
particularly interesting, is both the unique biological and distinctive 
psychological processes which underpin this complex human ability.  
                                                 
97 It is important to note that an unorthodox exercise of self-control, that is to say acting against our all 
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undermined. In cases where agency is undermined, as suggested here, there has been no motivational 
strength exercised on the part of the agent.   
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I opened the first section of this chapter with a discussion of a biological picture 
of human agency suggested by Murphy and Brown. For Murphy and Brown the 
complexity of our neural systems allows us far more control over our behaviour 
qua comparators than the control expressed by any other organisms along the 
intentionality gradient. Following this view, I have endorsed in this chapter a 
philosophical account of agency centred on self-control, which stresses the 
centrality and importance of our ability to modify and guide our behaviour 
through critical reflection and assessment. As humans, we experience a very rich 
and complex mental life. Not only are we capable of having many disparate 
thoughts and feelings, but we are also capable of reflecting on them, deliberating 
on them, and evaluating them. Following the biological picture sketched by 
Murphy and Brown, what is inherent in the expanding complexity and range of 
available response behaviours in human beings is the potential for conflict 
between the behavioural response options. In turn, the potential for this conflict 
to further complicate the task of critical-reflection and evaluation undertaken by 
agents themselves (qua comparators in Murphy and Brown’s terms) is greatly 
increased.  
Similarly, on both Frankfurt and Watson’s accounts, the presence of 
internal psychological conflict within an agent’s volitional system is an 
important part of understanding the nature of human agency. Although this 
aspect of the self-control view of human agency has received little attention in 
the recent literature developed from Frankfurt’s and Watson’s accounts, I argue 
that it is an important feature of human agency on their accounts.  
Inherent in the hierarchical structure of Frankfurt’s account is the 
potential for conflict between desires of various orders. On Frankfurt’s account, 
agents potentially experience not only conflict between their various first order 
desires, but also experience conflict between their various second order desires 
as well as between their first and second order desires. According to Frankfurt: 
 
There is much opportunity for ambivalence, conflict and self-deception 
with regard to desires of the second order… as there is with regard to 
first-order desires.99  
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To some extent similarly, for Watson not only is there potential for agents to 
experience conflict between their motivations and intentions, Watson argues 
that it is precisely the division between one’s motivational system and 
evaluational system that gives rise to internal conflict. According to Watson: 
 
 It is an essential feature of the appetites and the passions that they 
engender (or consist in) desires whose existence and persistence are 
independent of the person’s judgment of the good. The appetite of 
hunger involves a desire to eat which has a source in physical needs 
and physiological states of a hungry organism. And emotions such as 
anger and fear partly consist in spontaneous inclinations to do various 
things – to attack or flee the object of one’s emotion, for example. It is 
intrinsic to the appetites and passions that appetitive and passionate 
beings can be motivated in spite of themselves. It is because desires 
such as these arise independently of the person’s judgment and values 
[…] that a conflict between valuing and desiring is possible.100 
 
Psychologically speaking, not only are there tensions and conflicts between our 
brute or initial responses to the world, but also between the values and goals 
used in and for evaluation itself: we are what John Cottingham calls “conflicted 
beings” and “divided selves”. 101 Our internal tensions and conflicts give rise to 
psychological divisions which when successfully negotiated can be resolved or 
managed. It is the successful resolution of internal conflicts which, following 
Frankfurt and Watson’s accounts, allows for the exercise of the kind of self-
control required for freedom of the will or free agency, or what I call human 
agency. Unlike Frankfurt and Watson, Cottingham points out, I think rightly, that 
in order to fully understand the role internal conflict plays in our psyche, and 
thus for our agency, we must turn to some of the crucial insights of 
psychoanalysis. Cottingham says: 
 
The term ‘divided self’ is strongly suggestive of a psychoanalytic approach to 
understanding the human predicament; and my personal view is that this is 
precisely the direction we need to take, if we are tackling the problem of 
human conflictedness and its possible resolution […] In short I think a full 
account […] will sooner or later need to be receptive to some of the insights 
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into the human condition articulated over the last century or so by Freud 
and Jung their successors.102 
 
In what follows I will show that the claims about the divided nature of the human 
psyche evident on Frankfurt’s and Watson’s accounts accord with a plausible 
basic account of human psychology following the influential structural account of 
our psyche given by the father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud. I do not intend 
to defend a Freudian account in full here, but I will draw on some of the more 
foundational and less controversial aspects of Freud’s most basic psychological 
account of the structure of the human psyche. Importantly, I take Freud’s picture 
to mirror in important ways the pictures of the human psyche I have touched on 
in both the biological and philosophical accounts of human agency outlined and 
defended above.  
On both the self-control view of agency established by Frankfurt and 
Watson and the basic Freudian account, the structure of an agent’s mental 
apparatus is divided into a number of parts, each representative of different 
aspects of an agent’s mental life. In order to exercise agency, then, the agent, on 
these pictures, must bring these sometimes conflicting parts together to form 
coherent motivations and intentions, which are in turn manifested in action and 
behaviour. For Frankfurt, our first order desires need to be brought in line with 
our second order volitions, and for Watson, our motivational and evaluative 
systems need to be brought into line with one another.  
Similarly, Freud offers one of the most influential and, I think, nuanced 
psychological pictures of the structural features of the mind, or, as he calls it, an 
“individual’s mental apparatus.”103 By studying the data obtained through his 
professional interactions with ‘mental patients’, Freud claimed that he was able 
to draw conclusions not only about those with psychological problems, but also 
about the structures and operations of a healthy, or normal agent’s mind. 
According to Freud: 
 
If we throw a crystal to the floor, it breaks but not into haphazard 
pieces. It comes apart along its lines of cleavage into fragments whose 
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boundaries, though they were invisible, were predetermined by the 
crystal’s structure. Mental patients are split and broken structures of 
the same kind.104  
 
This quotation illustrates one of the central tenets of his picture of our mental 
apparatus: within the structure of the mind, there are certain predetermined 
divisions. In other words, the mind is necessarily divided into a number of parts, 
each of which, for Freud, had very specific features and functions, and played a 
crucial role in an agent’s psychological life. Throughout his writings, Freud was 
concerned with how each of these structures developed, and, more importantly, 
with the relationships and conflicts between them, as a human subject matured 
over time as a biological organism.  
For Freud, our primary or brute responses to the world, which define and 
govern our experiences in infancy and early childhood, are to be found in the 
structure of the id, which he called “the oldest of mental provinces or 
agencies.”105 In this structure, Freud claimed, we would find an individual’s 
reservoir of instincts, drives and wishes.106  
In contrast to the id, the ego is considered to develop and evolve in the 
course of maturation and growth through an individual’s interaction with the 
external world in which she finds herself. While the id is definitive of the early 
stages in life, the balance of power begins to shift as the ego develops. As the new 
mental structure, the ego develops and begins to take a prominent role by 
defining and governing the experiences of an individual. The ego, then, takes on 
the role of mediating between the demands and responses of the id and the 
external world in which an individual finds herself.107 According to Freud: 
 
Under the influence of the real external world which surround us, one 
portion of the id has undergone a special development […] a special 
organization has arisen which henceforward acts as an intermediary 
between the id and the external world. This region of our mental life 
has been given the name of ego.108 
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As the ego develops and evolves, the id remains unchanged, acquiring no “ego-
like functioning.” It is incapable of any reflection, deliberation, evaluation or 
value judgement.109 In short, the id is incapable of anything other than seeking 
satisfaction or expression in action and behaviour. Freud says of the id: 
 
We approach the id with analogies: we call it chaos, a cauldron full of 
seething excitations. We picture it as being open as its end to somatic 
influences, and as there taking up into itself instinctual needs which 
find their psychical expression in it [...]. It is filled with energy reaching 
it from the instincts, but it has no organization, produces no collective 
will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual 
needs […].110 
 
In contrast, the ego, on Freud’s picture is that specialised part of an agent’s 
mental apparatus which is capable of critical self-reflection and evaluation. 
Freud says that “[t]he ego can take itself as an object, can treat itself like other 
objects, can observe itself, criticize itself, and do Heaven knows what with 
itself.”111 In turn, the ego takes on an active role in self-direction and is capable of 
controlling whether and how the demands of the id will be assimilated into 
coherent motivations and intentions in light of its interactions with the external 
world. So, much like the picture of self-control discussed in the previous section, 
Freud claims that there is a structure in the mind (the ego), which is both capable 
of higher order or evaluative thought, and the reflective assessment of the lower 
order or brute responses that are found in the mind. Concordant with the 
pictures of self-control discussed previously, Freud maintains that self-control, 
and thus our capacity to act as an agent, rests on the fact that the assessing 
structure of the ego has the power to prevent the lower order or brute responses 
(id in Freud’s terms) from finding expression in the agent’s actions and 
behaviours when the demands of the external world are taken into 
consideration. According to Freud: 
 
As regards internal events, in relation to the id, it [the ego] performs 
that task by gaining control over the demands of the instincts, by 
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deciding whether they shall be allowed to obtain satisfaction, by 
postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favourable in 
the external world or by suppressing their excitations completely.112 
 
For Freud, in order to become an agent the contents of the id must be given some 
life or expression. After all, for him, the id itself provides the psychic energy 
necessary for action.113 However, in order to exercise self-control the contents of 
the id must be given expression through their assimilation into a coherent set of 
intentions for action and behaviour, as mediated by the ego. In this way, much 
like for Frankfurt and Watson, while Freud sees the ego as representative of our 
better judgement, he sees the id as representative of our brute responses. Freud 
claims:  
 
The ego develops from perceiving the instincts to controlling them; but 
this last is only achieved by the [psychical] representative of the 
instinct being allotted its proper place in a considerable assemblage, 
by its being taken up into a coherent context. To adopt a popular mode 
of speaking, we might say that the ego stands for reason and good 
sense while the id stands for the untamed passions.114 
 
The source of energy for action, which we might call motivation, is located in a 
part of our primal, instinctive and chaotic psyche. The energy given by the id 
must be channelled and directed by the ego, the task of which is to mediate 
between the conflicting demands of the id and the external world. On the 
Freudian account, exercising human agency rests on our being able to reconcile 
the demands of competing psychical forces: 
 
Thus, an action by the ego is as it should be if it satisfies 
simultaneously the demands of the id […] and of reality, that is to say if 
it is able to reconcile their demands with one another.115 
 
Like Plato’s analogy of the charioteer, in which the relationship between what he 
calls the various parts of the human soul is compared to the relationship 
between a charioteer and his horses, Freud compares the relationship between 
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the ego and the id to the relationship between a horse and its rider. The ego, like 
both the rider and Murphy and Nancy’s comparator, is capable of control by 
directing and guiding the powerful locomotive force beneath it. The id, however, 
or the “seething cauldron” of conflict, is at times too powerful and strong-willed 
for the ego to control. According to Freud:  
 
The ego must on the whole carry out the id’s intentions, it fulfils its 
task by finding out the circumstances in which those intentions can 
best be achieved. The ego’s relation to the id might be compared with 
that of a rider to his horse. The horse supplies the locomotive energy, 
while the rider has the privilege of deciding on the goal and of guiding 
the powerful animal’s movement. But only too often there arises 
between the ego and the id the not precisely ideal situation of the rider 
being obliged to guide the horse along the path by which it itself wants 
to go.116 
 
On Freud’s account, then, conflict within the psyche exists necessarily because of 
inconsistencies and tensions within the id itself. The id, in which contrary 
impulses exist side by side, is a structure in the mind which is not governed by 
reason. Freud says: 
 
The logical laws of thought do not apply in the id, and this is true above 
all of the law of contradiction. Contrary impulses exist side by side, 
without cancelling each other out or diminishing each other [...].117 
 
The ego must thus, in addition to harmonising the demands of the id with the 
external world, harmonise the competing demands found in the id itself. 
Furthermore, the psychological conflict is made difficult for an agent to manage 
because the ego has an allegiance to both the id and the external world. Freud 
says of the ego’s situation: 
 
Owing to its origin from the experiences of the perceptual system, it is 
earmarked for representing the demands of the external world, but it 
strives too to be a loyal servant of the id, to remain on good terms with 
it, to recommend itself to it as an object and to attract its libido to 
itself.118 
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The ego, we might say, is caught between a rock and a hard place: pressed 
between a demanding id, the locomotive energy of which is required for it to 
function, and the demands of an external world in which this locomotive energy 
must be discharged.  
Since each of the structures described by Freud provides us with possible 
motivations, the conflicts between the motivations which arise within these 
separate structures explain, in psychological terms, the possibility of internal 
conflict for human agents. We have all experienced being simply overwhelmed 
by some desire or motivation which prevents us from being able to exercise self-
control: we have all been overcome by the temptations we feel the pull of most 
strongly, giving in to the desires which are most strongly rejected by our better 
judgement, and finding ourselves from time to time wholly lacking in self-control 
or without any restraint. Most importantly, an interesting conclusion of Freud’s 
account is that the activity associated with agency seems to require that we 
experience conflict and constraint between our motivations. Indeed, without this 
internal conflict it is unclear that we would need to exercise the motivational 
strength central to self-control at all.  
Similarly, on biological grounds, or at least from the naturalist’s 
perspective, Mary Midgley has championed a view of human agency in which 
both self-control and internal conflict play a central role. According to her, self-
control or behavioural modification is not simply a structural feature of human 
agency, but rather the central activity in which we must actively engage in order 
to exercise our agency.119 For Midgley, the kind of mental or psychological 
activity associated with self-control is what she refers to as the “organisation of 
the inner crowd,”120 by which she means the ability to manage the conflicts that 
occur within our minds (such as conflicts between more than one desire, 
between desires and intentions and between intentions themselves).121 For her 
human agency requires an agent to experience psychological divisions and 
tensions, because, without them, there is no ‘inner crowd’ to control, and hence 
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the possibility for self-control itself cannot get off the ground. The kind of self-
control that I have argued is constitutive of human agency must involve, then, 
most fundamentally a response to internal division and constraint, making 
internal conflict central to understanding the kind of psychological activity we 
would associate with human agency. Because of this internal conflict and 
division, a large part of our mental activity qua agents requires, first and 
foremost, organisation and conflict resolution. Without our efforts to resolve 
these types of conflict, it would be impossible for us to successfully modify and 
direct our behaviour in the face of all the different desires, emotions, values and 
loyalties which may divide us. 
Importantly, I think that it would be a mistake to think of internal conflict 
as a merely contingent aspect of human agency. In what follows then I argue for 
an addition to the core of the self-control view of human agency as follows: 
human agency requires at the very least the possibility of a discrepancy between 
motivations and evaluations, and, in turn, the experience of internal conflict on 
the part of an agent. I argue here that on the self-control view of human agency: 
an agent is to be understood as someone who experiences conflict between 
motivations and intentions. 
   
For Watson there is a deep connection between self-control and internal conflict, 
and, for him, the possibility of internal conflict within our motivational structure 
is in fact necessary for the evaluative act of self-control, he argues: 
 
Thus, the relationship between evaluation and motivation is intricate. 
With respect to many of our activities, evaluation depends upon the 
possibility of our being moved to act independently of our judgment.122 
 
On Watson’s account, and similarly on Frankfurt’s and Midgley’s accounts, 
internal conflict is not only implicated in the capacity for self-control, it is in fact, 
as I see it, necessary for it. An individual could not exercise the capacity for self-
control at all unless she has something which needs to be controlled. Not only is 
internal conflict part of the biological and psychological story we can tell about 
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the nature of human agency, it is a constitutive part of human agency on a 
philosophical account as well. 
Freud was most interested in those deep, unyielding and constant 
internal conflicts which produced in his patients a psychic world in which the 
self-control required for human agency was no longer attainable. The 
psychoanalytic approach defended by Freud is intended, at least in part, to 
address the issue of overwhelming internal conflict in order to restore healthy 
psychic harmony for the patient to be able to regain their agency through a 
measure of self-control – or, as Midgley might put it, to bring patients to a point 
of recovery from which they could start to effectively manage the inner crowd. 
But just as surely as too much internal conflict destroys our capacity for self-
control, a psyche in which no internal conflicts are present at all necessarily 
precludes the possibility of self-control, and thus of human agency. In this way, 
internal conflict marks human agents out as distinct from beings, perhaps like 
that of a god or idealised ‘saint’, whose psychic life does not resemble ours, and 
whose agency does not most fundamentally require self-control.  
In the psychic life of a god there may be no conflicts between their 
motivations, intentions, goals, aims and desires. Certainly, for God (as he is 
traditionally conceived, in the monotheistic traditions, as omnipotent and 
omniscient) there is no disparity between his motivational system and his 
evaluational system. God’s “dependence of motivation upon evaluation is total, 
for there is but a single source of motivation: presumably his infinite goodness 
and wisdom, whatever that may mean.”123  
Similarly, in the case of a saintly being, who has the requisite internal 
division but experiences no such conflicts, she may sometimes find herself with 
motivations which run counter to her intentions; yet she has no struggle 
between her wayward motivations and her intentions when it comes to acting, 
that is, she has no internal conflict. While she acts as the self-controlled person 
would, her actions do not require exerting self-control at all or ever. She is a 
being, I think, who ought to be distinguished from human agents like ourselves. 
For a human agent, while there may be particular cases in which they are not 
conflicted (or are at least not struggling with internal conflict), we might still 
                                                 
123 Ibid, p. 31. 
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want to say that they retain self-control. As a general capacity the self-control 
necessary for human agency cannot be had without the very real possibility of 
internal conflict. This is an aspect of our agency which we share with neither 
non-human animals, nor beings perhaps like that of a god or an idealised ‘saint.’ I 
will return to this claim in the next chapter for further discussion. 
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Chapter Two: Vulnerability and the Difficulty of Self-Control 
 
Mortals immortal, immortals mortal, alive with respect to mortals’ death, 
dead with respect to their life.124 
 
The first humans, as Lucretius describes them, found life sweet. They left 
the “sweet shores” of life with sadness and looked to their departure with 
fear (V.988-93). The love of life, Lucretius claims, is natural in all sentient 
creatures, and so all creatures go to death with reluctance. But these “first 
men” do not stop […] to reflect on their finitude. They do not wonder about 
their own fragility, or find agony in the mere knowledge of the “mortality 
of life.” The Epicurean gods, on the other side, have (as the poem describes 
them) reflection without vulnerability, thought about the universe without 
anxious fear and concern. In between are actual human beings, the only 
beings both vulnerable and reflective, who go through life in the grip of a 
fear of the natural condition of their own existence, straining to understand 
and also to improve their condition through the reflective capacity that is 
also the source of much of their agony. 125 
 
In the second epigraph to this chapter, drawn from Martha Nussbaum’s paper 
‘Mortal Immortals’, Nussbaum defends the view that our vulnerability is 
essential for understanding our situation in the world, our experience as agents 
in the world, and what constitutes value from our perspective. In that paper, 
however, Nussbaum explicitly defends at length only two aspects of this view, 
namely that vulnerability is essential for understanding our situation in the 
world and that vulnerability is central to our understanding of what value 
consists in for us.  
 Nussbaum argues in ‘Mortal Immortals’ that “the structure of human 
experience, and therefore of the empirical human sense of value, is inseparable 
from the finite and temporal structure within which human life is actually 
lived.”126 She argues that it is “[o]ur finitude, and in particular our mortality, 
which is a particularly central case of our finitude, and which conditions all our 
other awareness of limit, [that] is a constitutive factor in all valuable things’ 
having for us the value that they in fact have.”127 It is this finitude, made most 
poignantly manifest in our mortality, that is also a source of a deeper 
                                                 
124  Heraclitus, as quoted in M. Nussbaum, ‘Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on Death and the Voice of 
Nature’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 50, no. 2, 1989, p. 303. 
125 Ibid, pp. 304-305, my emphasis. 
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vulnerability. This vulnerability is not only contingently necessary for the 
emergence of human experience as we know it, but it is constitutive of that 
experience. Further, she claims that it is this vulnerability which frames our 
understanding of what the valuable things are for us, arguing that “the removal 
of all limit, of all constraint of finitude in general, mortality in particular, would 
not so much enable these values to survive eternally as bring about the death of 
all value as we know it.”128. She argues that it is precisely our vulnerability which 
distinguishes our lived experiences, and thus the determination of our values, 
from that of immortal and invulnerable beings such as the ancient Greek gods. 
That human vulnerability is central to our understanding of ourselves and of our 
values in this way is movingly motivated for by Nussbaum when she says: 
   
In these constraints we live, and see whatever we see, cherish whatever we 
cherish, as beings moving in the way we actually move, from birth through 
time to a necessary death. The activities we love and cherish would not, as 
such, be available to a godlike unlimited being.129  
 
Central to this line of argument, for Nussbaum, is the importance of the empirical 
nature of our understanding of value, and thus Nussbaum claims that any 
exploration following this line of argument “will have to be empirical, bringing 
forward parts of human experience and using them (rather than some alleged a 
priori principles) to establish that our concept of value is in fact the way we say it 
is.” 130 Further, and importantly, she says that this kind of phenomenological or 
empirical exploration “will also need to be deep and probing, going beneath first 
impressions and automatic everyday responses, to elicit our deepest judgments 
about what matters.”131 Following Nussbaum’s recommendation here, as well as 
the broader line of argument brought out in the second epigraph to this chapter 
– namely, that vulnerability is central to our understanding of our agency in the 
world – I discuss, in this chapter, what can be seen as contingently necessary 
requirements for human agency in terms of vulnerability and difficulty. Further, 
again following Nussbaum’s lead, I argue that difficulty and vulnerability are not 
only background causal requirements for agency but are constitutive of human 
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agency. It is precisely this requirement for difficulty and vulnerability that 
distinguishes our unique human agency from that of both other living beings, 
and invulnerable, unfailing beings such as the gods.  
 
In the previous chapter, I outlined and defended a self-control view of human 
agency. While a great deal of debate has been generated by the self-control 
picture of agency, somewhat less attention has been paid to the more practical 
issues involved in actually exercising agency of this kind. Of course, theoretical 
pictures are useful and interesting in their own right, but an important added 
bonus would be if they helped us to better understand our practical situation. 
When it comes to practical situations, robust and interesting pictures of agency 
such as those provided by Frankfurt and Watson, provide little insight into the 
difficulty that is personally experienced by each of us when we attempt to 
exercise the kind of self-control they describe. Practically speaking, there are a 
very great number of obstacles we face which make it difficult for us to perform 
the task of effectively using the product of our better judgement or reflective 
evaluations to guide our actions and behaviour. These obstacles are not limited, 
as the philosophical literature often seems to suggest, to the bizarre cases, 
cooked up in thought experiments, of brainwashing and mental manipulation. 
Rather, they are present in everyday experiences that human agents face. 
In the previous chapter, I mentioned that one extreme situation in which 
such constraints might be observed is within the walls of a concentration camp. 
Recall here Frankl’s extreme, and I think incorrect view, on which even in 
situations of extreme constraint, such as those in Auschwitz, we should not see 
human agency as having been undermined by the constraints people would have 
faced there. According to Frankl: 
 
Even though conditions such as lack of sleep, insufficient food and 
various mental stresses may suggest that the inmates were bound to 
react in certain ways, in the final analysis it becomes clear that the sort 
of person the prisoner became was the result of an inner decision, and 
not the result of camp influences alone. Fundamentally, therefore, any 
man can, even under such circumstances, decide what shall become of 
him – mentally and spiritually.132 
                                                 
132 V. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 74. 
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While Frankl briefly touches on the idea that it would, in fact, be very difficult to 
maintain one’s inner liberty in the environment of a concentration camp, he goes 
on, I think erroneously, to suggest that while it would be difficult, it is something 
that any of us could do, practically speaking. He writes:  
 
It is true that only a few people are capable of reaching such high 
moral standards. Of the prisoners only a few kept their full inner 
liberty and obtained those values which their suffering afforded, but 
even one such example is sufficient proof that man’s inner strength 
may raise him above his outward fate.133 
 
Frankl suggests that although the psychological and physical influences of our 
living conditions can rob us of our inner freedom, we can also overcome these 
influences and retain our agency in the face of them. In this chapter, I explore in 
more depth Frankl’s basic idea that agency may be difficult to exercise under 
certain conditions. I argue, however contra Frankl, that it is far more 
commonplace than he suggests that the circumstances in which we find 
ourselves place us under such an enormous amount of pressure to act and 
behave in certain ways, that it becomes very difficult or ultimately impossible to 
truly exercise the kind of self-control required for human agency. Experiencing 
hunger, fear, lack of sleep or pain, is often the source of unreflective behaviour, 
over which we experience little control. Moreover, having to exercise such 
vigilant self-control in these kinds of situations can also diminish our 
willpower,134 resulting in the kind of behaviour which goes against our own 
better judgements or intentions. When we are able to exercise self-control, in the 
face of constraints of this type, we are aware of the immense effort involved, 
which often leaves us feeling emotionally, psychologically and sometimes even 
physically drained, and therefore less capable of exercising self-control.  
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Here I argue, contra Frankl, that recent work in the fields of behavioural 
economics and experimental psychology provide us with everyday examples in 
which people act against their own better judgements or critical evaluations 
without even realising that their agency has been diminished by their situation. 
More importantly perhaps, such work  provides us with further examples of 
everyday situations in which our better judgements or intentions are themselves 
systematically tainted by the influence of external forces of which we are largely 
unaware. In the second chapter of this thesis, then, I highlight the difficulty of 
achieving the kind of self-control required for human agency on formal analytic 
accounts by revealing the extent and systematic depth of the kinds of constraints 
we in fact face. I think that the difficulty we face in attempting to exercise self-
control allows us to make a crucial observation about the nature of human 
agency which is not yet fully captured in formal analytic accounts, such as those 
discussed in the first chapter: namely that human agency is difficult to achieve on 
account of our vulnerability. I argue that the kind of self-control necessary for 
human agency is difficult to achieve because we are vulnerable in a number of 
distinct ways. First, our human bodies are vulnerable, and because we are 
embodied, self-control is difficult to achieve. Second, we are vulnerable to 
situational constraints, and because we are in large part constituted by our 
situation, self-control is difficult to achieve. Third, we are cognitively vulnerable, 
and since we employ flawed heuristics and have cognitive biases, self-control is 
difficult to achieve. Finally, as divided beings we are subject to internal 
vulnerability, because we experience internal conflict between motivations and 
intentions, self-control is difficult to achieve. 
If we are vulnerable, it is important to ask if there is anything we can do 
about this vulnerability: might there be ways to improve our chances of self-
control, improve our agency, and thus extend our freedom? I will argue that we 
can answer this question, to some extent, in the affirmative, and thus we can 
make some practical suggestions for improving our self-control. However, as 
suggested above, I maintain that vulnerability is constitutive of human agency, 
and thus any attempt to wholly eradicate vulnerability would also serve, on my 
view, to eradicate human agency.  
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In defence of Nussbaum’s view expressed in the second epigraph to this chapter 
that “human beings [are] the only beings both vulnerable and reflective, who go 
through life in the grip of a fear of the natural condition of their own existence, 
straining to understand and also to improve their condition through the 
reflective capacity that is also the source of much of their agony”, I argue in what 
follows that we can gain valuable insight into the nature of human agency  from 
the existentialist philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche and Simone de Beauvoir, both 
of whom explore the psychology and phenomenology of agency respectively. 
Following the insights from both Nietzsche and Beauvoir, as well as the evidence 
from experimental psychology and behavioural economics, I argue that on the 
self-control view of human agency, both self-control and vulnerability are 
necessary for human agency. I argue here that we must supplement the self-
control view of human agency, as discussed in the first chapter, in an important 
way: human agency should be seen as difficult to achieve on account of our 
vulnerability. 
 
2.1 Vulnerability and Difficulty  
 
What is called “freedom of the will” is essentially the affect of superiority 
with respect to something that must obey: “I am free, ‘it’ must obey” – this 
consciousness lies in every will, along with a certain straining of attention, 
a straight look that ﬁxes on one thing and one thing only, an unconditional 
evaluation “now this is necessary and nothing else,” an inner certainty that 
it will be obeyed, and whatever else comes with the position of the 
commander. A person who wills –, commands something inside himself 
that obeys, or that he believes to obey. But now we notice the strangest 
thing about the will – about this multifarious thing that people have only 
one word for. On the one hand, we are, under the circumstances, both the 
one who commands and the one who obeys, and as the obedient one we 
are familiar with the feelings of compulsion, force, pressure, resistance, 
and motion that generally start right after the act of willing. On the other 
hand, however, we are in the habit of ignoring and deceiving ourselves 
about this duality by means of the synthetic concept of the “I.” 
[…]“Freedom of the will” – that is the word for the multi-faceted state of 
pleasure of one who commands and, at the same time, identiﬁes himself 
with the accomplished act of willing. As such, he enjoys the triumph over 
resistances, but thinks to himself that it was his will alone that truly 
overcame the resistance. Accordingly, the one who wills takes his feeling 
of pleasure as the commander, and adds to it the feelings of pleasure from 
the successful instruments that carry out the task, as well as from the 
useful “under-wills” or under-souls – our body is, after all, only a society 
constructed out of many souls –. L’effet c’est moi: (The effect is I) what 
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happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy 
community: the ruling class identiﬁes itself with the successes of the 
community.135 
 
In my introduction I discussed that my engagement with the writings of Harry 
Frankfurt which had first drawn my attention to the nature of the relationship 
between human agency and personhood, but there is more to this story. While 
reading the writings of Harry Frankfurt I found myself simultaneously reading 
Friedrich Nietzsche. Perhaps it was merely this parallel reading of these two 
influential philosophers that alerted my attention to a common ground they 
seem to share in their discussions of the nature of human agency and 
personhood. In this section, I will argue that that the account of human agency 
developed in Nietzsche’s writings, at least according to one plausible reading of 
Nietzsche, accords in many ways with the self-control view of agency built on the 
basic Frankfurtian framework as outlined in the first chapter.  
 In what follows in this section, I highlight two of Nietzsche’s suggestions 
about the nature of human agency which lack clarity and exposition in 
Frankfurt’s account (and similarly in Watson’s account, as well as much of the 
literature on human agency developed in response to their accounts). I defend 
throughout this chapter Nietzsche’s suggestions that human agents are 
vulnerable and that human agency is difficult to achieve. In drawing on 
Nietzsche’s works here I rely to a large extent on my own reading of Nietzsche, 
which I have found support for in recent Nietzsche scholarship. While some of 
Nietzsche’s more controversial claims might have put many readers permanently 
off Nietzsche’s philosophy, I think that there are important claims (particularly 
about the nature of human agency) made by Nietzsche which nevertheless 
warrant our attention.         
Although Nietzsche’s sceptical views on freedom have been seen as 
controversial in many philosophical circles, it has recently and convincingly been 
argued by a number of philosophers136 that Nietzsche does advance a positive 
account of freedom or an idea of agency in his discussion of his character the 
Sovereign Individual, as well as in his concept of self-overcoming. In this section I 
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Oxford University Press, 2009. 
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show that Nietzsche asserts, in part through his characterisation of the Sovereign 
Individual, that some form of self-control is required for the project of becoming 
an agent. It is important to note before delving into Nietzsche’s account that 
reference to the Sovereign Individual is only explicitly made by Nietzsche in On 
the Genealogy of Morals Section II, and might thus not represent the only picture 
of agency which could be drawn from Nietzsche’s writings. In this section, and 
the sections which make reference to the Sovereign Individual that follow in this 
thesis, I have drawn on his conception of the Sovereign Individual in the 
Genealogy, but have tried to put forward a picture of the Sovereign Individual 
which draws on ideas and claims from other parts of Nietzsche’s work for 
supplementation and explanation. Further, while I realise that it would take a 
great deal of interpretive argument (for which there is not much room here) to 
claim that there is a definitive and explicit notion of agency in Nietzsche’s work, 
this project is in part an attempt to tease out at least one plausible reading of 
Nietzsche’s thoughts about this concept. This is not the place to deal in depth 
with exegetical matters. Rather, what I will do here is defend an account of 
human agency which was fuelled by my readings of Nietzsche. Whether my 
interpretation of Nietzsche is actually correct is not my central concern here.  
 
Similarly to the self-control view of agency sketched in the previous chapter, 
Nietzsche emphasises self-governance or self-control in both the motivational 
and evaluative senses. This is made “particularly prominent in [his] later works 
like Twilight of the Idols.”137 Much like the agent on the self-control view sketched 
in the first chapter, Sovereign Individuals, on Nietzsche’s account, are thought of 
as actively asserting control over or governing themselves from the inside, thus 
mastering conflicting inclinations and motivations. For Nietzsche, agents form 
values on the basis of their brute desires. But these values are not simply formed 
on the basis of all of these desires. This process involves, for the agent, selecting 
and affirming or endorsing some desires over others with which they may be in 
conflict. This process also resembles the picture of agency given in analytic 
accounts, as sketched above, in which our intentions guide our deliberations 
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about what motivations to endorse and act upon. For Nietzsche, mastering or 
controlling our conflicting motivations in the service of the values we endorse is 
a fundamental part of exercising our agency. Nietzsche explains as follows: 
 
Indeed, where the plant ‘man’ shows himself strongest one finds 
instincts that conflict powerfully […] but are controlled.138 
 
It is our ability to master and control conflicting desires that, for Nietzsche, 
similarly to Midgley, most fundamentally represents our ability to overcome 
ourselves: in order to follow through on our intentions, we must overcome those 
conflicting desires and inclinations that would otherwise motivate us to act 
against our intentions, which are also, importantly, our own (this is what 
Nietzsche refers to as self-overcoming). In Nietzsche’s view, if we are not able to 
control our inner conflicts (at least some of the time), we are not capable of 
exercising our agency or becoming Sovereign Individuals. In agreement with 
Gemes’ recent discussion of Nietzsche on agency, I argue that if we are not able 
to exercise our agency, it is a most dangerous threat to our sovereignty because 
it undermines our right to make promises, something which is perhaps the 
defining characteristic of the Sovereign Individual qua agent. In The Genealogy of 
Morals, Nietzsche says:  
 
We discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign individual, like only to 
himself […] autonomous and supramoral […] [I]n short, the man who 
has his own independent, protracted will and the right to make 
promises – and in him a proud consciousness […] of his own power 
and freedom, a sensation of mankind come to completion. This 
emancipated individual, with the actual right to make promises, this 
master of free will, this sovereign man.139 
 
For Nietzsche, the Sovereign Individual has the right to make promises precisely 
because he is able to exercise the kind of self-control central to the self-control 
view of agency outlined in chapter one. Gemes explains, that for Nietzsche, one 
cannot have agency in any genuine sense if one is “merely tossed about willy-
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nilly by a jumble of competing desires.”140 For Nietzsche, unless you are able to 
exercise control over yourself, “you cannot stand surety for what you 
promise.”141 If you are unable to master your conflicting motivations, you cannot 
be sure that you will honour your promise when it comes to acting on it, since 
you may well act on a conflicting or contrary inclination at any time. If you 
cannot stand surety for your promises, Nietzsche thinks that you have not 
earned the right to make promises at all. Furthermore, unless you have the right 
to make promises, you cannot be an agent or, in Nietzsche’s terms, a Sovereign 
Individual. 
It is, of course, interesting to note the similarities between Nietzsche’s 
sometimes controversial account of agency and the accounts proposed more 
recently by analytic philosophers. There is, however, something particular that 
comes out of Nietzsche’s account about the difficulty of motivational self-control, 
which I think requires closer examination. For Nietzsche, the difficulty involved 
in exercising self-control reveals the essential vulnerability of our agency. 
Nietzsche’s suggestion here is intuitively plausible. The difficulty of fighting 
inclinations, which go against our own better judgement, is something that is 
close to home for most of us, and something that we understand from our own 
experience as agents. We have all been overwhelmed by the temptations that we 
feel the pull of most strongly, given in to the desires which are most strongly 
rejected by our better judgement, and found ourselves from time to time wholly 
lacking in self-control or without any restraint. When our intentions are 
informed by our better judgement, then, it will be particularly difficult for us to 
act intentionally.  
Following Nietzsche’s lead, and the lead of existentialists such as 
Beauvoir, I will argue in this chapter that self-control is difficult for us to achieve 
because we are vulnerable; and yet, we can only have self-control because we are 
vulnerable.  
Typically, vulnerability refers to the inability of something to hold up 
under the effects of an adverse environment - someone is vulnerable because 
they are threatened, and thereby susceptible to harm. Human agency is 
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vulnerable because it is susceptible to damage, compromise or dissolution and I 
will argue in what follows that human agents are vulnerable in a number of 
different, though interrelated, ways. First, I argue that because human agents are 
embodied, the fact of their embodiment makes their agency difficult to achieve 
and that human agency is vulnerable as a result. Second, I argue that the 
situations in which agents find themselves can make self-control difficult to 
achieve. Human agency thus comprises what I call situational vulnerability. 
Third, I argue that human agents are prone to cognitive constraints, which puts 
their ability to exercise self-control at risk, thus making human agency 
vulnerable. Finally, I argue that because human agents are subject to internal 
conflict, self-control is difficult to achieve, and thus human agency comprises 
what I call internal vulnerability.  
Importantly, my discussion of vulnerability here should not be taken to 
mean that we are in any way defective because we are vulnerable. On the 
contrary, I argue throughout this thesis that vulnerability should be seen as both 
an obstacle to our agency, as well as, and importantly, the condition for the 
possibility of human agency. 
In what follows in this chapter, I will outline what I take to be our primary 
vulnerabilities, and identify the ways in which these vulnerabilities put our 
agency at risk. I will then argue that these risks to our agency can, to some 
extent, be mitigated, but that on the self-control view, human agency must 
nevertheless be understood as both difficult to achieve and as essentially 
vulnerable.   
 
2.2 Self-Control and Embodiment 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the inclusion of internal conflict in the self-
control view of human agency allows us to distinguish between the different 
kinds of agency we would consider animals, supernatural beings and human 
beings to have. I argued above that the philosophically interesting concept of 
human agency is at stake in the self-control view. That is, the notion of human 
agency applies only to human beings, as distinct from non-human animals and 
non-human supernatural beings. In line with these arguments, I suggest in this 
 67 
section that our necessary embodiment is an important part of the story we can 
tell about human agency.   
The claim that embodiment is crucial for understanding human agency 
might attract some initial criticism. It might, for instance, be argued by some that 
what in fact most interestingly defines us as human beings is our remarkable 
mental life – that is everything but the body. Recall here Frankl’s talk of the inner 
freedom he takes to be central to human agency. I do not wish to bring into 
question the importance of the kind of inner freedom associated with our mental 
life, which Frankl discusses (and which has largely been the focus of my 
discussion on agency in the previous chapter). Instead, I stress in this section the 
equally important role that embodiment plays in our understanding of what a 
human is qua human being, and thus I stress the fact that our embodiment is 
important for understanding the nature of human agency. The fact of our 
embodiment has most influentially been discussed by Beauvoir in her 
phenomenological account of the human condition. Given this, I draw inspiration 
from her phenomenology to explore the extent to which embodiment is a 
fundamental aspect of human agency. Following Beauvoir’s insights, contra 
Frankl, our bodies cannot be seen as simply a mode of transportation for our 
mental qualities, rather the fact of our embodiment is intricately linked to those 
mental qualities and is equally integral to our experience of ourselves as human 
agents. Following this, I argue that it is because of human embodiment that we 
are subject to what I call bodily vulnerability. Our bodies themselves are 
vulnerable things: they are prone to injuries and sickness, grow old and die. 
Because human agents are embodied, I suggest, their ability to exercise self-
control is constantly at risk and the self-control required for human agency is 
difficult to achieve. We are vulnerable because we are what Beauvoir explains as 
‘embodied subjects’: we are inextricably linked to our body, and our body is 
vulnerable.  
 
In breaking with the traditional Cartesian picture suggested by Frankl, existential 
phenomenologists – such as Beauvoir – take embodiment as central to our self-
constitution, and the fact of our embodiment as crucial for understanding our 
experience of ourselves as human subjects. For the existential phenomenologists, 
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our unique way of being in the world is explained by our mental qualities and 
capacities, as well as embodiment, which is fundamentally integral to this 
situation. We live as embodied agents and so our actions in the world are, to 
some extent, determined by our bodies in terms of their functions, 
manifestations and limitations. Our being embodied allows us to act in the world 
because it is through our bodies that we can interact with objects in the world: 
our bodies enable action and thus, to some extent, being embodied allows for the 
very possibility of human agency in the first place. For Beauvoir, being embodied 
enables us to express our mental life (comprising our values, projects and goals) 
in the world (to which the construction of our mental lives is a response; and in 
which our goals and projects must be acted out). To this extent, embodiment is 
crucial to our agency on a phenomenological picture. 
Further, the body, for Beauvoir, is not merely a thing like other objects in 
the world. For us, according to Beauvoir, the body ‘is a situation in its own right’.  
Beauvoir explains:  
 
In the perspective I am adopting—that of Heidegger, Sartre, and 
Merleau-Ponty—if the body is not a thing, it is a situation: it is our 
grasp upon the world and the outline of our projects.142  
 
The body is not an object in the world, but positions us – as embodied subjects – 
in the world. While our embodiment allows us to express ourselves in action in 
the world, it also presents us with certain material facts about ourselves that 
directly constrain the types of actions we are able to perform.  
Some of our bodily functions are not part of our conscious experiences —
digestion and the circulation of blood happen, for the most part, behind the veils. 
Typically, we are made aware of some of these otherwise hidden bodily 
functions when things go wrong, as in when we experience the pain of 
indigestion or suffer from an illness. Other bodily functions, however, constitute 
a significant aspect of our embodied situation, and thus inform, in part, our lived 
experience as embodied subjects. That we must eat, sleep, urinate and defecate, 
and that we are prone to illness, harm and death, are facts about our general 
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embodied situation that we must manage and accommodate in our day to day 
lives. We must factor them in to the formation of the projects and goals that 
inform how we choose to live. We are all well aware that we cannot escape 
having bodies and thus bodily functions. But because we do not always have full 
control over our bodily functions, we experience a certain sense of anxiety with 
regards to our bodies. We are anxious, I think, because we recognise our bodily 
vulnerability, and we see our bodily vulnerability as a threat to our agency.   
Because our bodies require certain things to survive, and because our 
bodies can be damaged, we are made vulnerable to the extent that we can both 
be deprived of our bodily needs and be injured. It is because of our bodies that 
we experience fear, which is perhaps one of the strongest motivations 
experienced by all living, embodied things. Threats of deprivation, harm and 
death are more important considerations and stronger motivators for people 
than is suggested by authors like Frankl, and, similarly, philosophers such as 
Frankfurt and Watson.143 Because our bodies are so easily threatened, our 
agency is also threatened precisely because we are more susceptible to tactics of 
coercion and manipulation which centre on bodily harm and deprivation. 
Experiencing hunger, fear, lack of sleep, or pain, is often the source of 
unreflective behaviour. Extreme situations, like being imprisoned in a 
concentration camp may highlight the difficulty most clearly. Even Frankl admits 
that under such extreme circumstances the examples of people capable of 
actually maintaining their agency are not common – recall he claims that “Of the 
prisoners only a few kept their full inner liberty.”144 Interestingly, it seems that 
there is, in part, a biological explanation for this. Drawing on recent work by 
Baumeister and Gailliot, I argue that our ability to exercise self-control, as 
expressed in the previous chapter, is effected directly by the fact that we are 
embodied, and thus, because of our biological limitations. On Baumeister and 
Gailliot’s view:  
 
                                                 
143 Perhaps it might be argued here that it would be unfair to say that these philosophers 
underestimate the power of these forces. It might, be argued that they acknowledge their power, 
but do not attach much significance to them. In either case, however, there is room in this respect 
for supplementation and deeper exploration in their accounts of human agency, which I explore 
in this chapter.  
144 V. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 76. 
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Self-control (or self-regulation) is the ability to control or override 
one’s thoughts, emotions, urges and behaviour. Self-control allows for 
the flexibility necessary for successful goal attainment […].145 
 
Furthermore, on Baumeister’s “energy model,” self-control “refers […] to 
conscious efforts to alter [one’s own] behaviour, especially restraining impulses 
and resisting temptations.”146 Baumeister and Gailliot’s model thus maps on 
directly to the kind of self-control central to the self-control model of agency I 
defended in the first chapter. Importantly, on Baumeister and Gailliot’s picture 
“self-control relies on glucose as a limited energy source” and “requires a certain 
amount of glucose to operate unimpaired.”147 They argue, I think convincingly, 
that “[t]he human body is undeniably an energy system, and its very life depends 
on ingesting energy and then using it to fuel activities, including complex 
psychological abilities,”148 which include, specifically, self-control. Their research 
shows that the correlations between the body’s glucose levels and the 
individual’s ability to exercise self-control are dependent on one another in 
fundamental ways, showing that “decrements in self-control are caused in part 
by low glucose,” and that “restoring glucose to higher and optimal levels should 
replenish the ability to exert self-control.”149  
What is important about these studies is that they show how our ability to 
exercise the self-control associated with agency is directly linked to our 
embodiment –specifically to our blood glucose levels. What this means is that for 
the ordinary person, their efforts to exercise agency rely on an energy source 
that is depleted in the process of exercising self-control, thus making subsequent 
efforts at self-control more difficult to perform. For the ordinary person, access 
to sufficient food at appropriate times may be enough to broadly replenish 
energy stores which are necessary to exercise self-control, but even then, this 
may not always be the case. Baumeister and Gailliot give the following example: 
“Most obviously, dieting essentially involves restricting one’s caloric intake, and 
there may be an ironic conflict in which the dietary restriction produces lower 
                                                 
145 M. Gailliot, R. Baumesiter, N. DeWall, J. Maner, E. Plant, D., Tice, L. Brewer, and B. Schmeichel, 
‘Self-control Relies on Glucose as a Limited Energy Source: Willpower Is More Than a Metaphor’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 92. no 2., 2007, p. 325. 
146 R. Baumeister as quoted by A. Mele, Backsliding, p. 105. 
147 M. Gailliot, et al., ‘Self-Control Relies on Glucose as a Limited Energy Source’ p. 325. 
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glucose, which in turn, undermines the willpower needed to refrain from 
eating.”150 Those of us who have worked long hours without breaking to refuel, 
or have been on a diet, know how difficult it can become to resist temptations or 
control our urges and impulses while under these conditions.  
 
Our bodies are vulnerable, and our agency is vulnerable because we are 
embodied. In this section I have shown that our embodiment thus poses a threat 
to our ability to exercise the kind of self-control associated with agency on the 
self-control view. Similarly, our embodiment makes human agency difficult to 
achieve. In this section I have shown only, however, that vulnerability and 
difficulty must at least be contingently necessary requirements for human 
agency. Later in this chapter I will argue for the deeper constitutive claims that 
vulnerability is constitutive of human agency, and that human agency should 
thus be thought of as difficult to achieve. 
 
2.3 Self-Control and Situation 
 
In the previous section I spoke about agency as vulnerable because the body is a 
situation in its own right. Being embodied is what enables action, and by 
extension agency, but our being embodied also renders our agency vulnerable. In 
this section, I focus on the following interrelated claim made by existentialists 
such as Beauvoir: the body is also always in a situation. As Beauvoir puts it, we 
are “part of the world of which [we are] a consciousness.”151 We not only live as 
embodied agents, using our bodies to express our intentions in action in the 
world, but our bodies are also engaged in a relationship with the world. We can 
retreat to the inner realms of our consciousness, but we cannot fully escape or 
transcend our material existence in this world. Recall Frankl’s suggestion that 
the concentration camp inmate was able to escape the external constraints of his 
situation by maintaining his inner liberty, that is, control over his internal mental 
and psychological states. For Beauvoir, the possibility of this retreat from the 
world is never absolute precisely because we nevertheless continue to be in the 
                                                 
150 Ibid, p. 334.  
151 S.. Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, Frechtman, B., trans., New York, Citadel Press, 1948, p. 7. 
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world – we always exist as bodies “crushed by the dark weight of other 
things.”152  
Similarly, perhaps one of the most important insights garnered from 
research in social psychology is that we are profoundly influenced by the 
situations in which we find ourselves. Though initially the point seems obvious, 
or perhaps even trivial, further research in social psychology has shown that, in 
practice, we find it difficult to estimate the influence of situation on an 
individual’s behaviour and actions. When we are asked to explain the actions of 
other people, we typically underestimate the role that situation plays in 
informing their actions. We also typically overestimate the role that character or 
personality plays. So pervasive are these findings in social psychology that this 
cognitive bias is now referred to as the “fundamental attribution error”153 or the 
“correspondence bias.”154 Philosophers, it seems, are not immune to this 
cognitive bias. For this reason, the extent of the impact that situations in which 
we find ourselves have on our ability to exercise agency is, I think, 
underexplored on accounts of agency such as Frankfurt and Watson’s (and in the 
philosophical discussions of agency following their work).  
Work in experimental psychology, particularly in the experiments 
conducted by Milgram155 and Zimbardo,156 provide us with insight into the 
effects of situation on our ability to exercise the kind of self-control required for 
agency on the self-control view. Their experiments provide us with evidence 
about how people come to act against their own better judgements or intentions 
without even realising that their agency has been diminished by their situation. 
Importantly, these experiments provide us with further examples of situations in 
which our critical reflection is tainted by the influence of external forces. In this 
section, then, I argue that our agency is vulnerable because our ability to exercise 
                                                 
152 Ibid. 
153 L. Ross, and R. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology, New 
York, McGraw-Hill, 1991. 
154 D. T. Gilbert, and E. E. Jones, ‘Perceiver-Induced Constraint: Interpretations of Self-Generated 
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156 C. Haney, C. Banks, and P. Zimbardo, ‘A Study of Prisoners and Guards in a Simulated Prison’, 
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self-control can be jeopardised by the situations in which we find ourselves – 
typically even without our own realisation.  
 
In the Stanford Prison Experiment, Zimbardo and his research team created “a 
prison-like situation in which the guards and inmates were initially comparable 
and characterized as being ‘normal-average’.”157 The aim of the simulation was 
to “observe the patterns of behaviour which resulted, as well as the cognitive, 
emotional and attitudinal reactions which emerged,”158 in psychologically 
comparable persons in the scenario of imprisonment. Participants were paid a 
sum of money in return for work in the experiment in the role of either a guard 
or prisoner. In the simulated environment of a prison, prisoners were kept in 
barred cells and given activities similar to those given to prisoners in real 
prisons, in an attempt to give prisoners an experience which would produce 
“qualitatively similar psychological reactions”159 to imprisonment which genuine 
imprisonment would elicit. The participants randomly assigned to be prisoners 
were told that they would have many of their civil rights (excluding only physical 
abuse) removed. However, “no other information” was given “about what to 
expect nor instructions about behaviour appropriate for a prisoner role.”160 
Similarly, while the guards were given the task of maintaining a “reasonable 
degree of order within the prison necessary for its effective functioning,”161 they 
were not given any further details about how this task was to be carried out; 
“they were intentionally given only minimal guidelines for what it meant to be a 
guard,” and were told only that there was a “categorical prohibition against the 
use of physical punishment or physical aggression.”162  
The findings of the experiment are some of the most influential findings 
from research in social psychology. Reflecting on the Stanford Prison Experiment 
25 years after the study, Zimbardo summarises his findings as follows: 
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The outcome of our study was shocking and unexpected to us, our 
professional colleagues, and the general public. Otherwise emotionally 
strong college students who were randomly assigned to be mock 
prisoners suffered acute psychological trauma and breakdowns. Some 
of the students begged to be released from the intense pains of less 
than a week of merely simulated imprisonment, whereas others 
adapted by becoming blindly obedient to the unjust authority of the 
guards. The guards, too – who also had been carefully chosen on the 
basis of their normal-average scores on a variety of personality 
measures – quickly internalized their randomly assigned role. Many of 
these seemingly gentle and caring young men, some of whom had 
described themselves as pacifists or Vietnam War “doves,” soon began 
mistreating their peers and were indifferent to the obvious suffering 
that their actions produced. Several of them devised sadistically 
inventive ways to harass and degrade the prisoners, and none of the 
less actively cruel mock-guards ever intervened or complained about 
the abuses they witnessed. Most of the worst prisoner treatment came 
on the night shifts and other occasions when the guards thought they 
could avoid the surveillance and interference of the research team.163 
 
From the observed behaviour of the guards we could draw moral insight about 
human nature. We might, for instance, remark on the ease with which the guards 
fell into aggressive and hostile behaviour. Zimbardo reports on the guards’ 
behaviour as follows: 
 
Despite the fact that guards and prisoners were essentially free to 
engage in any form of interaction (positive or negative, supportive or 
affrontive, etc.), the characteristic nature of their encounters tended to 
be negative, hostile affrontive and dehumanizing […]. Although it was 
clear to all subjects that the experimenters would not permit physical 
violence to take place, varieties of less direct aggressive behavior were 
observed frequently (especially on the part of the guards). In lieu of 
physical violence, verbal affronts were used as one of the most 
frequent forms of interpersonal contact between guards and 
prisoners.164 
 
I will not remark on the moral insights we could draw here about human nature, 
though there are certainly interesting parallels to be drawn with Hanna Arent’s 
notion of ‘the banality of evil,’165 on which Zimbardo himself draws in later 
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works such as The Lucifer Effect.166 Here I would like to draw attention to the 
insight that situational influences on human behaviour can cause ‘normal-
average’ personality types to behave in uncharacteristic ways. That is, the 
situation in which we find ourselves can influence not only our ability to act in 
accordance with our reflective intentions or better judgement, but the formation 
of those intentions and critical reflection itself. For the guards, their 
uncharacteristic behaviour was not explicitly required of the situation – for 
instance, the observed behaviour changes were not required in order to meet the 
objective of an effectively run prison, nor required for personal safety – in which 
case we could easily make sense of the otherwise ‘normal-average’ personality 
type’s’ behaviour in the situation. From the experiment, however, we see a 
change in both the guards and prisoners’ characteristic behaviour due to 
situational factors which seemed to operate largely beyond their control. As 
Zimbardo puts it, “[t]he extremely pathological reactions which emerged in both 
groups of subjects testify to the power of the social forces operating.”167 So 
powerful were the forces operating that both guards and prisoners thought of 
life outside of the experimental situation as suspended. Participants began to 
assume their roles in private spaces, seemingly internalising the effects of their 
situation well beyond what would be expected of them in a research experiment, 
thus reflecting more than mere “public conformity or good acting.”168 Zimbardo 
explains the results as follows: 
 
When the private conversations of the prisoners were monitored, we 
learned that almost all (a full 90 per cent) of what they talked about 
was directly related to immediate prison conditions, that is, food, 
privileges, punishment, guard harassment, etc. Only one-tenth of the 
time did their conversations deal with their life outside the prison […]. 
The excessive concentration on the vicissitudes of their current 
situation helped to make the prison experience more oppressive for 
the prisoners because, instead of escaping from it when they had a 
chance to do so in the privacy of their own cells, the prisoners 
continued to allow it to dominate their thoughts and social relations. 
The guards too, rarely exchanged personal information during their 
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relaxation breaks. They either talked about “problem prisoners,” other 
prison topics, or did not talk at all.169  
 
Zimbardo explains the results further, as follows: 
 
The most dramatic evidence of the impact of this situation upon the 
participants was seen in the gross reactions of five prisoners who had 
to be released because of extreme emotional depression, crying, rage 
and acute anxiety. The pattern of symptoms was quite similar in four 
of the subjects and began as early as the second day of imprisonment 
[…] only two said that they were not willing to forfeit the money they 
had earned in return for being “paroled.” When the experiment was 
terminated prematurely after only six days, all the remaining prisoners 
were delighted by their unexpected good fortune. In contrast, most of 
the guards seemed to be distressed by the decision to stop the 
experiment and it appeared to us that they had become sufficiently 
involved in their roles that they now enjoyed the extreme control and 
power which they exercised and were reluctant to give it up […]. None 
of the guards ever failed to come to work on time for their shift, 
indeed, on several occasions guards remained on duty voluntarily and 
uncomplainingly for extra hours – without additional pay.170  
 
Recall here my previous chapter’s discussion of Susan Wolf’s character JoJo, the 
evil dictator’s son. A large part of what I think is doing the work in her example 
of JoJo is the fact that the corrupting force which he is subject to what appears to 
be an explicitly corrupting force: the influence of his “heritage and upbringing”171 
on his ability to exercise critical reflection and form his better judgements and 
intentions without being influenced, is significantly impeded by his father’s 
brainwashing. Wolf claims that what goes wrong in JoJo’s case is that he is not 
“connected to the world in a certain way,” which she explains only as “a desire 
that one’s self be controlled by the world in certain ways and not others.”172 It 
seems, however, that precisely which ways are understood as corrupting in this 
way and which ways are not, is still up for debate. The evidence from 
experiments in social psychology suggest some of the less intuitive and subtle 
ways in which a person’s agency, like JoJo’s, is threatened by situational factors. 
Some of the major influences on subjects in the Stanford Prison Experiment are 
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typically, but I think wrongly, thought of as less corrupting of our agency because 
they are less obviously corrupting.  
In the Stanford Prison Experiment, one of the major influencing factors on 
the prisoners and guards behaviour during the experiment was their attire. The 
research reveals that a seemingly low risk situational factor, such as how one is 
dressed, can have a dramatic impact on behaviour. In the experiment, both 
guards and prisoners were assigned uniforms: the guards’ uniform consisted of 
“plain khaki shirts and trousers, a whistle, a police night stick (wooden batons), 
and reflecting sunglasses which made eye contact impossible,” while the 
prisoners’ uniform consisted of “a loose fitting muslin smock with an 
identification number on front and back, no underclothes, a light chain and lock 
around one ankle.”173 Interestingly, concentration camp uniforms outfitted by 
Nazis in the Second World War functioned similarly as identity erasers, and the 
uniform of domestic workers donned in Apartheid South Africa constituted those 
workers as subservient. Remarking on the influence this uniform was intended 
to have on participants, Zimbardo says: 
 
The outfitting of both prisoners and guards in this manner served to 
enhance group identify and reduce individual uniqueness within the 
two groups. The khaki uniforms were intended to convey a military 
attitude, while the whistle and night-stick were carried as symbols of 
control and power. The prisoners’ uniforms were designed not only to 
deindividuate the prisoners but to be humiliating and serve as symbols 
of their dependence and subservience.174  
 
And this is precisely the effect that the uniforms had on the subjects in the 
experiment. Remarking on the effect of the uniform on the prisoners, Zimbardo 
reports that the “ill-fitting uniforms made the prisoners feel awkward in their 
movements; since these ‘dresses’ were worn without undergarments, the 
uniforms forced them to assume unfamiliar postures, more like those of a 
woman than a man – another part of the emasculating process of becoming a 
prisoner.”175 Consequently, “prisoners adopted a generally passive response 
                                                 
173 A Haney, C., Banks, and P. Zimbardo, ‘A Study of Prisoners and Guards in a Simulated Prison’,  
p. 8. 
174 Ibid, p. 8. 
175 Ibid, p. 8. 
 78 
mode” culminating in “extreme emotional depression” and “acute anxiety.”176 
Zimbardo further remarks on the effect of the uniform on the guards by claiming 
that the guards immediately adopted a “very active initiative role in all 
interactions” typically characterised by domination and aggression. Importantly, 
Zimbardo says: 
 
 [A] video-taped analysis of total guard aggression showed a daily 
escalation even after most prisoners had ceased resisting and prisoner 
deterioration had become obvious to them. Thus, guard aggression 
was no longer elicited as it was initially in response to perceived 
threats, but was emitted simply as a “natural” consequence of being in 
the uniform of a “guard” and asserting the power inherent in that role 
[…] [A]nother guard who detained an “incorrigible” prisoner in 
solitary confinement beyond the duration set by the guards’ own rules 
[…] conspired to keep him in the hole all night while attempting to 
conceal this information from the experimenters who were thought to 
be too soft on the prisoners.177 
 
Similar results with regards to these intuitively less explicitly corrupting forces 
are at play in the results from the famous Milgram Experiment. In the Milgram 
Experiment, which was designed to test a subject’s obedience to authority, 
subjects were deceived into thinking that they had been recruited by Yale 
University to participate in a study of the “effects of punishment on memory.” 
Under the gaze of an actor whose role assumed that of a ‘scientist,’ the subject 
assigned the role of ‘teacher’ was instructed to administer electric shocks to the 
‘learner’ when he incorrectly answered questions. The ‘learner,’ who was really 
an actor, and not receiving any actual electric shocks, was introduced to the 
‘teacher’ as just another recruit for the Yale research on punishment and 
learning. The ‘teacher’ was then falsely led to believe that their positions at 
teachers or learners had been randomly assigned. The ‘teacher’ subject was 
placed into a separate room with the ‘scientist’ and two machines: the machine 
with which the subject was to communicate with the victim, who was in another 
room, and a machine used to administer the electric shocks, both of which the 
subject was expected to operate. The machine to administer the electric shocks 
had clearly marked voltage levels (ranging from 15 to 450 volts) and verbal 
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designations ranging from “Slight Shock to Danger: Severe Shock.” The ‘teacher’ 
was expected to increase the voltage administered to the ‘learner’ for incorrect 
answers. As the experiment progressed, the ‘teacher’ was expected to administer 
shocks reaching the most severely painful voltage. The verbal reactions of the 
‘learner’ to the electric shock could be heard by the teacher, and increased in 
volume and intensity as the voltage of the shock was increased (though in reality 
the actor playing the learner was merely pretending to scream in increasing 
pain). Milgram explains the interesting position the ‘teacher’ subjects found 
themselves in, in terms of an internal conflict, as follows: 
 
The subject is placed in a position in which he must respond to the 
competing demands of two persons: the experimenter and the victim. 
The conflict must be resolved by meeting the demands of one or the 
other; satisfaction of the victim and the experimenter are mutually 
exclusive. Moreover, the resolution must take the form of a highly 
visible action, that of continuing to shock the victim or breaking off the 
experiment.178 
 
Reporting on the findings from his experiment, Milgram says that “[o]ne might 
suppose that a subject would simply break off or continue as his conscience 
dictated. Yet this is very far from what happened.”179 Milgram explains what the 
results showed, as follows: 
 
the sheer strength of obedient tendencies manifested in this situation. 
Subjects have learned from childhood that it is a fundamental breach 
moral conduct to hurt another person against his will. Yet, 26 subjects 
abandon this tenet in following the instructions of an authority who 
has no special powers to enforce his commands. To disobey would 
bring no material loss to the subject; no punishment would ensue. It is 
clear from the remarks and the outward behaviour of many 
participants that in punishing the victim they are often acting against 
their own values, subjects often expressed deep disapproval of 
shocking a man in the face of his objections, and others denounced it as 
stupid and senseless. Yet the majority complied with the experimental 
commands.180 
 
The results from the Milgram Experiment, similar to those of the Stanford Prison 
Experiment, show the tremendous impact of situational factors, which are often 
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thought of as less explicitly corrupting, on behaviour – the way people around us 
are dressed and the influence of authority. Although there has been some 
criticism of the conclusions of these experiments, the basic conclusions discussed 
here remain relatively uncontroversial.181 From my discussion in this section I 
think that we can conclude that the corruptive potential of our situation is 
gradated, and while those forces which seemingly operate at the lower end of the 
scale are typically taken to be less corruptive, they are nevertheless significant 
factors which influence our behaviour and threaten to undermine our agency in 
ways which are equally effective and deleterious as those operating at the upper 
end of the scale. What the Stanford Prison Experiment and the Milgram 
Experiment partly show us is that even the seemingly smallest modifications in 
physical and social settings can have powerful effects on our behaviour. 
Furthermore, these seemingly less corrupting forces are far more difficult for us 
to identify, and thus to overcome, in everyday life. The evidence from 
experiments in social psychology suggests that there are implicitly far more 
every-day, routine, and commonly experienced ways in which our situation 
influences the formation of our better judgements and our critical reflection.  
 
Self-control, it would seem, is more difficult for us to achieve than is commonly 
suggested on analytic philosophical accounts such as Frankfurt and Watson’s, 
given the pervasive and corrupting potential of circumstances beyond our 
control. It is our situation in the world, I have suggested in this section, which 
makes our agency both vulnerable and difficult to achieve. Our situation in the 
world poses a threat to our ability to exercise the kind of self-control necessary 
for human agency on the self-control view. In this section I have shown only, 
however, that vulnerability and difficulty must at least be contingently necessary 
requirements for human agency. Later in this chapter I will argue for the deeper 
constitutive claims that vulnerability is constitutive of human agency, and that 
human agency should thus be thought of as difficult to achieve. 
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informative for my philosophical investigation into the nature of human agency.     
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2.4 Cognitive Limitations for Self-Control 
 
In the related fields of cognitive science and behavioural economics, recent 
research has increasingly exposed a number of flawed heuristics and cognitive 
biases which affect a person’s decision making ability – or their ability to form 
their better judgments or intentions. Research in these fields has shown that 
there are predictable flaws in our judgements, which lead to actions caused by an 
identifiable “mental error,” namely, the employment of a flawed heuristic 
mechanism resulting in cognitive bias.182 In this section I will argue that because 
human agents employ flawed heuristics and have cognitive biases, their ability to 
exercise self-control is at risk and thus human agents are to be seen as 
vulnerable in light of this cognitive vulnerability. 
 
In their now seminal paper “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” 
Tversky and Kahneman, who could be considered the fathers of behavioural 
economics, explain the role of flawed heuristics and biases in judgement and 
decision making, as follows: 
 
A substantial body of research in cognitive psychology and decision 
making is based on the premise that these cognitive limitations cause 
people to employ various simplifying strategies or rules of thumb 
(heuristics) to ease the burden of mentally processing information to 
make judgments and decisions. These simple rules of thumb are often 
useful in helping us deal with complexity and ambiguity. Under many 
circumstances, however, they lead to predictably faulty judgments 
known as cognitive biases.183 
 
In the previous section, I argued that part of what makes human agency a 
philosophically interesting topic is the fact that, as human beings, we have very 
complex mental lives. This complexity is important because it gives rise the 
mental conditions that are necessary for us to exercise the kind of self-control 
central to human agency. But, this complexity is also the possible source of the 
inability to exercise self-control because our brains employ various mental 
shortcuts to deal with the level of complex mental processing required. These 
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mental shortcuts are manifest in our daily lives in the form of cognitive biases, 
which inform our critical reflection and evaluative judgements in ways that are 
not under our conscious control. Tversky and Kahneman explain cognitive biases 
as follows: 
 
Cognitive biases are mental errors caused by our simplified 
information processing strategies. It is important to distinguish 
cognitive biases from other forms of bias, such as cultural bias, 
organizational bias, or bias that results from one’s own self-interest. In 
other words, a cognitive bias does not result from any emotional or 
intellectual predisposition toward a certain judgment, but rather from 
subconscious mental procedures for processing information. A 
cognitive bias is a mental error that is consistent and predictable.184 
 
The well known example they give of a cognitive bias is our ability to make 
judgements about the apparent distance of objects, which they explain as 
follows: 
 
The apparent distance of an object is determined in part by its clarity. 
The more sharply the object is seen, the closer it appears to be. This 
rule has some validity, because in any given scene the more distant 
objects are seen less sharply than nearer objects. However, the 
reliance on this rule leads to systematic errors in estimation of 
distance. Specifically, distances are often overestimated when visibility 
is poor because the contours of objects are blurred. On the other hand, 
distances are often underestimated when visibility is good because the 
objects are seen sharply. Thus the reliance on clarity as an indication 
of distance leads to common biases […]. This rule of thumb about 
judging distance is very useful. It usually works and helps us deal with 
the ambiguity and complexity of life around us. Under certain 
predictable circumstances, however, it will lead to biased judgment.185 
 
Drawing on this work in flawed heuristics and cognitive biases, behavioural 
economists, such as Dan Ariely, maintain that is our ability to exercise rational 
reflection, because our rationality is itself a “bounded rationality.”186 He argues 
that “while we have the capacity for rational choice and behaviour we are also 
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deeply flawed,”187 and that our errors in mental processing can be easily 
predicted. He explains: 
 
The conclusions from behavioural economics suggest that the ways in 
which we are irrational are neither random, nor senseless. They are 
easily explained because they are also systematic, and since we repeat 
them again and again, we are also predictably irrational. We make the 
same types of mistakes over and over, because of the basic wiring of 
our brains […]. Behavioural economists believe that people are 
susceptible to irrelevant influences from their immediate 
environment, irrelevant emotions, short-sightedness and other forms 
of irrationality.188 
 
In Predictably Irrational, Ariely explores the ways in which flawed heuristics and 
cognitive biases influence the decisions we make and the actions we take in our 
daily lives. Among other things, he argues that “what we think, often with great 
confidence, influences” our “decisions in daily life,”189 but that it is quite often not 
what actually influenced those decisions. In daily life, he argues that when it 
comes to efforts at self-control – such as dieting, shopping and saving money – 
we are less in control than we typically take ourselves to be. For Ariely, we act on 
the basis of flawed heuristics or cognitive biases far more often than we like to 
think. Because these flawed heuristics and biases take place in our brains beyond 
our conscious rational control, the effect of a flawed heuristic or cognitive bias on 
our agency is deleterious.   
 For example, Ariely discusses the role of the “decoy effect,” and the 
“asymmetric dominance effect,” on daily decision making practices. He explains 
that we typically rely on comparisons when making assessments and choices – 
our choices are generally made in a context in which we can compare at least one 
option with another. Thus, our ability to form intentions or better judgements 
relies, to some extent, on our ability to effectively assess and choose between our 
options by comparing them with one another. Furthermore, according to Ariely, 
“we not only tend to compare things with one another but also tend to focus on 
comparing things that are easily comparable – and avoid comparing things that 
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cannot be compared easily.”190 As Ariely puts it, “[w]e always compare jobs with 
jobs, vacations with vacations, lovers with lovers and wines with wines.”191 The 
heuristic mechanism, which helps us to sort through the many choices we have 
to make, breaks down when we are faced with choices with which we need to 
compare options that are not easily compared. It is the resultant cognitive bias 
from this flawed heuristic which makes us particularly vulnerable to what is 
called the decoy effect.  
Ariely uses the example of shopping for a house and being shown three 
different, though equally priced, options by a real estate agent. Two of the houses 
are similar in features (style A), while one has unique features (contemporary 
style B), quite different from the first two. One of the A style houses (-A), 
however, is in need of a new roof.192 Because the comparison between A and B 
represents such different options, the choice between them is difficult, and, by 
comparison, the choice between A and -A is relatively simpler. According to 
Ariely’s research, because it is easier for us to compare the two A style houses, 
we predictably, and reliably, dismiss the B style house because we do not have 
another B style house with which to compare it. In the example, house -A 
represents what can be seen as the “decoy.” House –A thus “creates a simple 
relative comparison with (A) look better, not just relative to A, but overall as 
well.”193 It is precisely our vulnerability to this decoy effect that marketing gurus 
and salesmen alike strive to exploit. As much is illustrated in Ariely’s example of 
Sam, a television salesman: 
 
Take Sam the television salesman. He plays the same kind of trick on 
us when he decides which televisions to put together on display: 
36-inch Panasonic for $690 
42-inch Toshiba for $850 
50-inch Philips for $1,480 
[…]. In this case, Sam knows that customers find it difficult to compute 
the value of different options. (Who really knows if the Panasonic at 
$690 is a better deal than the Philips at $1,480?) But Sam also knows 
that given three choices, most people will take the middle choice […]. 
So guess which television Sam prices as the middle option? That’s right 
– the one he wants to sell!194 
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Ariely’s sampling is but a drop in the ocean of the literature on flawed heuristics 
and biases that has developed over the last half century. While he discusses a 
host of other cognitive biases and flawed heuristics, which influence our choices 
and behaviours, what is crucial for my discussion here is that the mental 
processes resulting in our choices or actions occur beyond our control – 
unconsciously and systematically. It is true of course that not all of our cognitive 
biases will necessarily result in us making unwanted judgements. For example, 
even if I was biased by Sam’s decoy, it might be the case that the Toshiba fits the 
exact requirements for the television set that I set out to buy in the first place – 
even if I have fallen prey to the decoy effect, I  still choose an option I really want 
to choose, all things considered. Moreover, I might be the sort of person who 
enjoys allowing a salesperson to influence their decisions about what to 
purchase (salespeople may have our best interests at heart after all, might they 
not?). 
 However, there certainly are times when our cognitive biases lead us to 
“have an unwanted judgment, emotion, or behaviour because of mental 
processing that is unconscious or uncontrollable.” That is to say, “the person 
making the judgment [would] prefer not to be influenced in the way he or she 
was.”195 Wilson and Brekke, rather aptly I think, have termed this phenomenon 
“mental contamination.”196 They claim that the analogy of contamination is 
useful for discussing cognitive biases because:  
 
it focuses on the difficulty of avoiding many biases. Something that is 
contaminated is not easily made pure again, which we believe is an apt 
metaphor for many mental biases. We argue that, because of a lack of 
awareness of mental processes, the limitations of mental control, and 
the difficulty of detecting bias, it is often very difficult to avoid or undo 
mental contamination.197  
 
Unlike physical contamination, which, for the most part, is easily detected 
through the observable symptoms in the body such as a runny nose when sick 
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with the flu, mental contamination rarely results in such easily observable 
symptoms, and this makes mental contamination difficult for us to detect, and 
thus difficult to overcome. According to Wilson and Brekke: 
 
The same is often true, of course, in the physical realm: People cannot 
directly observe the processes that cause physical contamination, such 
as the invasion of their cells by rhinoviruses. In the physical realm, 
however, they are often observable symptoms of contamination, even 
when the process of contamination is unobservable. Although people 
cannot observe rhinoviruses, a stuffed-up nose tells them they have a 
cold. If one is wondering whether a gallon of milk is fresh or spoiled, a 
quick whiff will reveal the answer. There are seldom such observable 
symptoms, such as smell, temperature, or physical appearance, 
indicating that a human judgment is ‘spoiled’ […].  
Sometimes, we acknowledge, there are clues that a judgment has 
been contaminated. This is most likely when people have an 
unexpected reaction to a stimulus. If Jim enjoys a movie much less than 
he expected, he might be suspicious that he was influenced by the 
people behind him slurping their drinks […]. These clues are not 
definitive, however, and can be misleading. Jim has no way of knowing 
how he would have felt about the movie in the absence of the slurping 
noises […]. Furthermore, it is likely that many cases of mental 
contamination do not have such large effects that people have very 
unexpected reactions. It is probably more common for the effects to be 
subtle (e.g., giving a favourite student a B instead of a C). In these 
cases, the bias is likely to go completely unnoticed, without a moment’s 
doubt about the validity of the judgment.198 
 
The problem of detection is further compounded by the fact that the mental 
processing, which results in an error of judgement, largely occurs unobserved by 
the person making the judgement – that is, unconsciously. Unconscious sources 
of judgement such as flawed heuristics and biases are therefore difficult for us to 
detect in and for ourselves. As Wilson and Brekke explain further: 
 
One difference between mental and physical contamination, however, 
concerns their ease of detection. It is much more difficult to detect 
mental contamination, particularly at the individual level. 
One impediment to such recognition is people’s limited access to 
their mental processes […]. Despite the stormy history of the literature 
on unconscious processing, the idea that people are unaware of a 
substantial amount of their mental processing has a firmer toehold in 
social and cognitive psychology than ever before. Because of this 
limited access, mental processes leading to contamination can occur 
unobserved.199 
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The detection problem emphasises the difficulty of eliminating the effects of 
unconscious mental processing on our choices and actions because our lack of 
awareness of cognitive biases means that we do not take any of the necessary 
steps to debias ourselves (if debiasing is possible). As Wilson and Brekke argue, 
“[t]he fact that mental contamination is difficult to detect makes it hard to avoid 
or eliminate, for the simple reason that if people are unaware that their 
judgment is biased, they will not try to debias it.”200  
Interestingly, Marilyn Friedman suggests, I think convincingly, that others 
around us might be better positioned to point out the effects of our biases on our 
choices and actions.201 With someone else’s assistance, we might then sidestep, 
to some extent, the problem of detection, and thus improve our chances of 
overcoming bias: biases identified by third parties may be easier to overcome, 
precisely because they are easier to detect when we have a little help from our 
friends. Friedman explains as follows: 
 
For good psychological reasons, each person’s unaided thinking cannot 
be trusted to discern its own biases. One’s own thinking – explicit and 
implicit, avowed and tacit – is not fully transparent to oneself. Biases 
are recognisable, for example, in the particular moral problems which 
attract or which escape one’s attention, by the metaphors chosen to 
express oneself, and by one’s reactions to different sorts of persons. 
The beneficiaries, victims, observers, and so on, of one’s behaviour 
may be better situated than oneself to discern biases hidden behind 
one’s articulated moral attitudes, because they can comprehend those 
avowals contextually in the light of one’s related actions and 
practices.202 
 
However, even with the possibility of help from some third party in identifying 
our biases, cognitive biases are notoriously difficult to overcome. Even when we 
have identified a particular bias, it will sometimes be impossible for us not to be 
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unduly influenced in our decisions and actions by certain cognitive biases. 
Analogously, while we might be fully aware of an optical illusion, we cannot 
overcome its effects. Tversky and Kahneman explain: 
 
Cognitive biases are similar to optical illusions in that the error 
remains compelling even when one is fully aware of its nature. 
Awareness of the bias, by itself, does not produce a more accurate 
perception. Cognitive biases, therefore, are, exceedingly difficult to 
overcome.203 
 
Similarly, Wilson and Brekke argue that the effects of mental contamination on 
behaviour are so efficacious that they are notoriously difficult to overcome. They 
explain, as follows:  
 
Even if people are aware that an unwanted mental process is tainting 
their judgments and recognize the direction and magnitude of the 
resulting bias, they need to be able to control their responses 
sufficiently to correct the bias. Unfortunately, however, a considerable 
amount of recent research suggests that people’s ability to control 
their thoughts and feelings is limited. Although people can stop certain 
kinds of mental operations from occurring, such as simple arithmetic 
operations, many other kinds of mental processes are extremely 
difficult to control once they are set in motion, especially those that 
occur outside awareness. Thus, avoiding mental contamination by 
stopping a sequence of thoughts or mental operations is unlikely to be 
a consistently successful strategy. 
Once a mental process has run its course, resulting in a belief 
(e.g., ‘Hernandez’s paper is of C quality’) or feeling (e.g., sadness), it is 
very difficult to erase that belief or feeling. Beliefs and feelings change 
as people gain new information, of course. Reading a glowing letter of 
recommendation can change one’s mind about a job applicant, and 
sadness can change to euphoria on the receipt of good news. It is very 
difficult, however, to erase a belief or feeling, in the absence of new 
information, by sheer will.204 
 
Wilson and Brekke’s argument, I think, serves to highlight the ways in which our 
cognitive vulnerability contributes to the difficulty of achieving the kind of self-
control associated with agency on the self-control view. In light of these cognitive 
concerns, our ability, as human agents, to exercise self-control must thus be seen 
as vulnerable. In this section I have shown only, however, that vulnerability and 
difficulty must at least be contingently necessary requirements for human 
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agency. Later in this chapter I will argue for the deeper constitutive claims that 
vulnerability is constitutive of human agency, and that human agency should 
thus be thought of as difficult to achieve.  
 
2.5 Self-Control and Internal Conflict 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that a human agent is someone who 
experiences conflict between motivations and intentions. I argued that self-
control is not simply a structural feature of human agency, but rather the central 
psychological activity in which we must actively engage on an ongoing basis in 
order to be agents. In addition, I argued that this psychological activity requires 
that we experience conflict and constraint. On the one hand, this internal 
complexity allows for human agency. On the other hand, as I will argue in this 
section, the presence of internal conflict makes the self-control required for 
human agency difficult to achieve. Such difficulty is a consequence of two distinct 
reasons, both of which allow me to argue that the very conditions which give rise 
to human agency in terms of internal conflict, make our agency itself vulnerable. 
In this section I argue that because internal conflict is central to human 
psychology, the self-control necessary for human agency is difficult to achieve 
and human agents are vulnerable. It is because of our internal division that we 
are subject to what I call internal vulnerability. Because human subjects 
experience internal conflict between motivations and intentions, our self-control 
is constantly at risk. 
 
2.5.1 The Fight for Self-Control is not Fought on Even Ground 
 
In the first chapter, I argued, following Midgley, that the kind of mental or 
psychological activity associated with self-control amounts to an “organisation of 
the inner crowd.”205 That is, we are able to manage the conflicts (for example, 
between and amongst our different desires and intentions206), which occur within 
our own mental complex. Midgley suggests, I think rightly, that it is in fact 
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notoriously difficult to achieve effective management of the inner crowd. In part, 
this difficulty is due directly to the presence of internal constraints, which arise 
within our own psyche. There are a number of elements, which arise within our 
own psychological make-up, that provide examples of internal constraints to our 
ability to exercise self-control, and that threaten our ability to effectively manage 
the inner crowd. We have all been overwhelmed by some desire or motivation 
which prevents us from being able to exercise self-control. When we are able to 
exercise self-control, in the face of constraints of this type, we are aware of the 
immense effort involved. In research from behavioural economics, George 
Lowenstein has most influentially argued that the affect of what he calls “visceral 
factors” on our choices and actions bring into question the extent of control we 
have over those choices and actions. In Lowenstein’s view, then, when organising 
the inner crowd, we are often unable to control how much certain desires or 
inclinations motivate us, which thus limits our ability to exercise the self-control. 
According to Lowenstein, visceral influences undermine our self-control more 
often than we typically assume they do.  
His research suggests that the effect of visceral factors on our behaviour 
can be ranked along a gradient according to intensity – ranging from having a 
limited effect on behaviour to a fully determinative effect on behaviour regardless 
of the person’s better judgements or intentions. According to Lowenstein: 
 
People often act against their self-interest in full knowledge that they 
are doing so; they experience a feeling of being “out of control” [Due 
to] “visceral factors,” which include drive states such as hunger, thirst 
and sexual desire, moods and emotions, physical pain, and a craving 
for a drug one is addicted to. At sufficient levels of intensity, these and 
other visceral factors, cause people to behave contrary to their own 
long-term self-interest, often with full awareness that they are doing 
so.207 
 
And again, he says: 
 
The overriding of rational deliberation by the influence of visceral 
factors is well illustrated by the behavior of phobics who are typically 
perfectly aware that the object of their fear is objectively 
                                                 
207 G. Loewenstein, ‘Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior’, Organizational Behaviour 
and Human Decision Processes, vol. 65, no. 3, 1996, pp. 272-273. 
 91 
nonthreatening, but are prevented by their own fear from acting on 
this judgment.208  
 
At the low extreme of this gradient, weak visceral factors have less impact on 
behaviour, and self-control can still be exercised. For example, “someone who is 
slightly sleepy might decide to leave work early or to forgo an evening’s planned 
entertainment so as to catch up on sleep.” However, this person could also just as 
easily take a stimulant and stay awake for the movie, planning to go to bed 
straight after the show. At the high extreme of this gradient, though, the effect of 
a visceral factor is so powerful that it can be seen to undermine a person’s ability 
to exercise the kind of self-control necessary for agency. Lowenstein says: 
 
Finally, at even greater levels of intensity, visceral factors can be so 
powerful as to virtually preclude decision making. No one decides to 
fall asleep at the wheel, but many people do.209 
 
Of course, we should expect visceral factors to influence our behaviour in a 
number of ways. As Lowenstein puts it, “[r]ational choice requires that visceral 
factors be taken into account. It makes good sense to eat when hungry, to have 
sex when amorous, and to take pain killers when in pain.”210 He goes on to 
emphasise that, “[i]ncreases in the intensity of visceral factors, however, often 
produce clearly suboptimal patterns of behaviour,”211 such as those which go 
against our better judgement, but over which we are not able to exercise self-
control. Because of the powerful effect of some visceral factors, our ability to 
manage our inner crowd is made difficult: some of the competing desires and 
motivations on which we critically reflect can overpower the judgements and 
intentions based on those reflections.  
 
2.5.2 In Every Victory of Self-Control there Lies Defeat  
 
Recall that in the first chapter I outlined a basic account of human internal 
conflict which can be drawn from Freud. On Freud’s account, the mind is seen as 
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inherently motivationally divided; and following Freud I argued that a 
constitutive feature of human agency is the ability to respond to this internal 
conflict in order to act intentionally. Similarly, as sketched in section 2.1, 
Nietzsche argues that human agency involves responding to internal conflict in 
order to perform intentional action. According to Nietzsche, moreover, asserting 
our agency through self-control is often simultaneously a great victory and a 
frustrating defeat. When we are motivated by our better judgement, we succeed 
only in defeating a part of ourselves that we recognise as perhaps motivating us 
to do otherwise.  For Nietzsche, the condition for “self-overcoming” necessary for 
agency is at once a “self-negating and yet self-identifying and self-affirming, 
state.”212 In order to explain Nietzsche’s idea further, I will return to what I noted 
at the beginning of this chapter. That is, Nietzsche agrees that the fundamental 
psychological steps involved in exercising the kind of self-control necessary for 
agency requires that, as agents, we form values on the basis of our basic 
responses to the world or brute desires. This process, in turn, for the agent, 
involves selecting and affirming or endorsing some desires over others with 
which they may be in conflict. However, Nietzsche notes that, if we are to 
genuinely affirm or endorse some desires over others, we must, at the very least, 
acknowledge the fact that the satisfaction of our endorsed desires precludes the 
fulfilment of other desires. If we do not acknowledge these conflicting desires as 
our own desires, which now cannot reach fulfilment, in a very important sense, 
we deceive ourselves about ourselves, and are thus guilty, as Nietzsche puts it, of 
ressentiment. For him, ressentiment is, at least in part, a psychological condition 
which results in a fractured and damaged individual, who lacks integrity and 
sovereignty. The “man of ressentiment” fails to understand that the genuine 
endorsement of a value requires the acknowledgment that in his fulfilment of a 
value, he has other desires which then remain unsatisfied, but that these desires 
are no less his own. By denying that these desires are his own, he deceives 
himself about himself. The man of ressentiment fails to acknowledge that certain 
of his own desires cannot be fulfilled, and in doing so, fails to understand the 
implications of the endorsement of a value on his life. He thus fails, according to 
Nietzsche, to genuinely endorse the value at all. Reginster explains, as follows:  
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There is no genuine endorsement of a value, therefore, without the 
acknowledgment of those of our desires which conflict with its 
realization. To acknowledge the presence of conflicting desires and to 
accept the fact that they have to be left unsatisfied demands 
unflinching honesty with ourselves. But the required honesty is 
precisely what the “man of ressentiment” lacks.213 
 
Not only, then, are we subject to internal struggles, but the resolution of these 
struggles, through the process of critical reflection and the formation of our 
better judgement, involves our coming to terms with the reality of this 
resolution. In all victories resulting in self-control, we manage simply to defeat 
another part of ourselves. On the one hand, of course, we might see this victory 
over ourselves as worthwhile – it gives us agency, control and freedom. On the 
other hand, there is some part of us that is defeated, denied and repressed. If we 
are not then sometimes guilty of ressentiment, which challenges our agency in 
fundamental ways,214 then we are, in some sense, both liberated and frustrated 
by exercising self-control. We have all felt this frustration build and break in 
moments where self-control escapes us or when we act in bold defiance of our 
intentions (particularly when they align with our better judgement as in cases of 
orthodox self-control) with some secret satisfaction. To have control over all this 
places enormous pressure on any agent, and, again, shows the fragile internal 
situation we must navigate in order to exercise our agency. 
 
In light of both 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, our agency can be seen as vulnerable when our 
internal constraints make the kind of self-control necessary for agency on the 
self-control view difficult to achieve. Furthermore, and I think interestingly, this 
difficulty and vulnerability is the direct result of the complexity of our mental 
lives, which provides the very conditions which make self-control possible in the 
first place. Drawing on this, in the next section I argue that we can offer some 
normative prescriptions for improving our agency in the face of this difficulty 
and vulnerability. 
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2.6 Improved Self-Control  
 
In this section, I will argue that not only is a robust account of the self-control 
view of agency achieved by making these additions, but the inclusion allows for 
the potential for us to develop strategies to improve our agency. If we can 
identify the ways in which our agency is vulnerable, as well as the factors which 
make our agency difficult to achieve, we can begin to formulate action-guiding 
agential principles. In this section, then, I turn my attention to some of the ways 
in which we might improve our self-control. In doing so, I will offer some basic 
action-guiding practices. My suggestions here are undoubtedly only a start, and 
there remains considerable room for research in the future on this topic.  
 
We devote time and effort to finding ways to overcome our vulnerability 
because, to some extent, we are already aware, in our daily lives, that our ability 
to exercise the kind of self-control necessary for agency is vulnerable. As Alfred 
Mele puts it: 
 
If the popularity of self-help manuals and therapy is any indication, 
irrational behaviour is remarkably common. People eat, spend, smoke, 
and so on much more (or less) than they think they should, and they 
spend much time and effort attempting to bring their behaviour into 
line with their better judgments.215  
 
According to Mele, there are a number of ways we can learn to exercise self-
control more effectively, even in the face of the constraints which make our 
agency vulnerable. Mele points out the following: 
 
In normal agents, a capacity for self-control is not a mental analogue of 
brute physical strength. We learn to resist temptation by promising 
ourselves rewards for doing so, by vividly imagining undesirable 
effects of reckless conduct, and in countless other ways. Our powers of 
self-control include a variety of skills—and considerable savvy about 
which skills to use in particular situations.216 
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Part of what makes us rational is the struggle against irrationality, so 
irrationality is ineradicable, although, in most cases but perhaps not in all, we 
should fight it when it appears. Similarly, there are a number of active steps 
people can take to improve their chances of successfully exercising the kind of 
self-control necessary for agency. Employing techniques to reduce the impact of 
factors such as bodily, situational, cognitive and internal vulnerability might help 
to reduce the extent to which our agency is vulnerable. Here, as with many 
things, understanding is the crucial first step.  
Recall my discussion of Baumeister’s research on the ‘energy model’ of 
self-control. Baumeister suggests that our ability to exercise the kind of self-
control associated with agency is directly linked to our blood glucose levels. His 
research, as I have already indicated, suggests that a decrease in blood glucose 
levels makes self-control more difficult to achieve. However, further research has 
shown that we can mitigate the potentially deleterious effects of low blood 
glucose levels on our decision-making by, for example having a snack. In their 
research, Shai Danzinger, Jonathan Levav and LioraAvnaim-Pesso, found that 
eating food, and thereby restoring blood glucose levels, increased parole officers’ 
ability to make fair judgements in cases where they had to make numerous 
parole decisions in a day.217 Much like Baumeister’s research, Danzinger et al. 
show that “self-control operates on the basis of a limited recourse, akin to energy 
or strength, that can become depleted through use,” and that the “performance” 
of self-control “grow[s] worse during consecutive or continuous efforts, just as a 
muscle becomes tired.”218 Here, Baumeister’s research has further implications 
for our ability to exercise self-control: his research shows that the ability to 
exercise self-control in the face of temptations or influences from external forces 
becomes stronger with increased use. Mele argues that the results from this 
research provide “encouraging news”219 for those of us who want to learn to 
exercise self-control more effectively, because the results show that self-control 
improves with practice. In Baumeister’s research, “[p]articipants who exercised 
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self-control in various ways over a two-week period later displayed significantly 
more self-control than a control group.”220 By keeping our blood glucose levels at 
the right level, and importantly, by training our willpower as we would train a 
muscle for added strength and endurance, it seems that we can improve the 
success of our efforts at self-control, and so learn to exercise our agency more 
effectively. 
As we know from our own experiences, and the experiences of others, we 
typically already do adopt some strategies for resisting temptations from 
external forces (such as situational forces discussed in section 2.3) and internal 
forces (such as the effect of visceral factors discussed in section 2.5). Drawing on 
Baumeister’s research, Mele argues that we are better at exercising self-control 
when the stakes are high. He claims that research shows that we implicitly rank 
the importance of successfully exercising self-control in any situation, and that 
we are likely to keep energy in reserve in order to assist our motivational 
strength when important issues of self-control arise.221 But, Mele also argues that 
there are a number of active techniques we can learn and employ when resisting 
temptations, thereby improving our self-control.  
Recall, from section 2.5, my discussion of Lowenstein’s research on the 
effect of visceral factors on decision making. According to Lowenstein, the effect 
of strong visceral factors resulting in severe behavioural disorders, such as 
phobias, has a deleterious effect on self-control. Mele, however, argues that there 
are steps we can take to mitigate the potentially deleterious effects of visceral 
factors with even extreme levels of intensity, at least some of the time. 
Furthermore, Mele argues that the attempts we make to mitigate the potentially 
deleterious effects of visceral factors will themselves require that we exercise 
self-control. One of the conclusions we can draw from Mele is that we are able to 
exercise our agency with greater effect and frequency if, first, we are actively 
involved in the process of monitoring and evaluating our internal mental lives, 
and second, if we are aware of the ways in which visceral factors impact our 
internal states. By using the case of Wilma, Mele argues the following: 
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Wilma, who suffers from agoraphobia, has been invited to her son’s 
wedding in a church several weeks hence. Her long-standing fear of 
leaving her home is so strong that were the wedding to be held today, 
she would remain indoors and forgo attending. Wilma is rightly 
convinced that unless she attenuates her fear, she will not attend the 
wedding. And there is a clear sense in which she is now more strongly 
motivated to remain at home on the wedding day and miss the 
wedding than to attend it: her current motivational condition is such 
that, unless it changes in a certain direction, she will [stay home] […]. 
Further, Wilma believes that, owing to her motivation to remain in her 
house indefinitely, she probably will miss the wedding.222 
 
Mele argues that in the case of Wilma, there is no reason to think that she will in 
fact miss the wedding. Mele claims that if Wilma’s desire to attend the wedding is 
something she values enough, it may give her the motivational strength to take 
active steps to actualise it, as well as to overcome the visceral effect of her phobia 
on her behaviour in the future. Mele says: 
 
it certainly is conceivable that, under the conditions described, she 
does not have an intention to miss the wedding and, indeed, intends to 
do her best to reduce her fear so that she will be in a position to attend. 
Furthermore, there is no good reason to hold that because Wilma is 
now more strongly motivated (in the sense identified) to stay home on 
the wedding day than to attend the wedding, she also is more strongly 
motivated to refrain from trying to attenuate her fear than to try to 
attenuate it. She sees her fear as an obstacle to something she values 
doing, and the strength of any desire she may have to refrain from 
trying to attenuate her fear may be far exceeded by the motivational 
strength of her fear itself and exceeded, as well, by the strength of her 
desire to try to bring it about that she is in a position to leave her 
house on the wedding day and attend the wedding.223 
 
Similar to the case of Wilma the phobic, Mele comments on the case of the addict, 
who can also take active steps to realise that in the future he will have the 
motivational strength to overcome the force of the visceral effect from his 
addiction.224 Mele’s argument seems intuitively convincing here. Wilma could, 
for example, make appointments with a psychiatrist who specialises in helping 
people overcome their phobias. By doing so, she would commit herself to a 
course of action which would ensure that in the future she will be able to 
overcome the influence of these visceral factors, which currently prevent her 
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from being able to perform actions that either promote her values, or that track 
her intentions, such as going to her son’s wedding. Similarly, the addict might 
book himself into a rehabilitation centre or join a rehabilitation program.  
According to Mele, in cases of less extreme (or moderate) influence from 
visceral factors, their unwanted influence can be counteracted with the following 
divided strategies: internal and external. Mele says: 
 
We may stem an embarrassing flow of sympathy for a character in a 
film by reminding ourselves that he is only a character. The mother 
who regards her anger at her child as destructive may dissolve or 
attenuate it by vividly imagining a cherished moment with the child. 
The timid employee who believes that he can muster the courage to 
demand a much-deserved raise only if he becomes angry at his boss 
may deliberately make himself angry by vividly representing injustices 
he has suffered at the office. These are instances of internal control. 
Many emotions are subject to external control as well—control 
through one’s overt behavior. Ann defeats moderate sadness by calling 
her brother. Bob overcomes modest fears by visiting his coach for an 
inspirational talk.225 
 
Importantly, any of the strategies suggested here, once employed, involves an 
exercise of self-control, and are thus useful tools for extending and improving 
our agency, at least some of the time. 
 
2.7 Contingently Necessary Requirements and Constitutive Claims 
 
So far in this chapter I have shown, through the insights from Nietzsche and 
Beauvoir, as well as the evidence from experimental psychology and behavioural 
economics, that vulnerability and difficulty are a crucial part of the story we can 
tell about human agency. In the previous chapter, I argued that being a human 
agent does not require that we exercise self-control at all times, or in all aspects 
of our lives. Having argued that agency is vulnerable in the face of various 
constraints lends further support for this claim. A drop in blood glucose levels, or 
the influence of external forces such as visceral factors, makes our agency 
vulnerable in certain circumstances, but this does not at face value give us reason 
to think that vulnerability and difficulty are anything more than contingently 
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necessary requirements for the achievement of human agency. In this section, 
then, I argue that difficulty and vulnerability are not only contingently necessary 
requirements for agency but are constitutive of human agency. Following 
Nussbaum’s lead, I argue that it is precisely because vulnerability is constitutive 
of human agency, that our agency can be understood as distinct from that of 
other sentient beings. I argue here that we must supplement the self-control 
view of human agency as it was described in the first chapter, since both self-
control and vulnerability are constitutive of human agency. 
 
Recall the picture sketched by Nussbaum in the epigraph to this chapter in which 
human beings are to be seen as: “the only beings both vulnerable and reflective, 
who go through life in the grip of a fear of the natural condition of their own 
existence, straining to understand and also to improve their condition through 
the reflective capacity that is also the source of much of their agony.”226 On this 
picture, human agency (our reflective capacity) is described by Nussbaum as 
what distinguished us from the ‘first men’ and also the gods. She argues that “for 
many, if not for all, of the elements of human life that we consider most valuable, 
the value they have cannot be fully explained without mentioning the 
circumstances of finite and mortal existence.”227 For Nussbaum, fragility and 
vulnerability is necessary for understanding what constitutes value, at least from 
our point of view. Nussbaum argues that it is only our finite and vulnerable 
position from which we have to enquire after the nature of our own values, and 
that this is the only position from which we could come to an understanding of 
values that would be of use or interest to us. What constitutes value for us is 
distinct from what constitutes value from an immortal or invulnerable position, 
such as would be the position of the gods. She argues that: 
 
We are not attempting to show that an immortal existence could not have 
value, beauty, and meaning internal to itself […] What we are attempting 
to show is the extent to which our values would be absent in that life [… 
This is] the only perspective on value from which we can coherently 
proceed, in asking a question for ourselves: for in asking about ourselves 
there is not much point in asking whether a certain life seems good from 
the point of view of creatures that we have no chance of ever being, or 
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rather creatures becoming identical to which we would no longer be 
ourselves.228 
 
Nussbaum convincingly argues that what constitutes value from our point of 
view, and what constitutes value from the god’s point of view are distinct from 
one another because one requires and the other lacks vulnerability. For 
Nussbaum this distinction is important because, she thinks, what we are 
interested in when asking questions about the nature of value is what constitutes 
value for us – that is, from our own experience and from our understanding our 
situation in the world as limited, finite and mortal beings. The values we would 
arrive at from adopting the perspective of the gods, and denying the role of 
vulnerability which is so central to our lives, would according to Nussbaum “be 
so entirely different from ours that we cannot really imagine what they would be. 
Nor, if we could, would they be of any immediate importance for us.”229 In 
support of this claim, Nussbaum argues that fragility and vulnerability are 
necessary for understanding what the virtues of human life are. Further, she 
argues that it is precisely because fragility and vulnerability are constitutive of 
human virtuous activity, that the virtuous activity of the gods can be 
distinguished from that of human agents. Nussbaum explains as follows: 
 
Beyond this, we begin to discover that many of the virtues we prize 
require an awareness of the limits and needs of the human body that will 
be absent, as such, from a being who can never die. Moderation, as we 
know it, is a management of appetite in a being for whom excesses of 
certain sorts can bring illness and eventually death; who needs to deal 
with other beings similarly constituted, for whom the stakes are similarly 
high. Political justice and private generosity are concerned with the 
allocation of resources like food, seen as necessary for life itself, and not 
simply for play or amusement. The profound seriousness and urgency of 
human thought about justice arises from the awareness that we all really 
need the things that justice distributes, and need them for life itself. If that 
need were removed, or made non-absolute, distribution would not matter 
in the same way and to the same extent; and the virtue of justice would 
become optional or pointless accordingly […] The closer we come to 
reimporting mortality – for example, by importing the possibility of 
permanent unbearable pain, or crippling handicaps – the closer we come 
to a human sense of the virtues and their importance. But that is the point: 
the further mortality is removed, the further they are.230 
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Following the spirit of Nussbaum’s argument I believe that human agency, as it is 
understood on the self-control view, requires difficulty and vulnerability because 
this is what allows us to distinguish human agency from the kind of agency 
which might be exhibited by supernatural, immortal and invulnerable beings 
such as the gods. Such beings would perhaps be capable of performing actions in 
the world, but the character and quality of such agency would be so different and 
foreign to our own that it must be considered as distinctive.  
Further, according to Nussbaum’s sketch, vulnerability is both the source 
of our reflective capacity, and a constraint on it. In section 2.5 above I argued that 
our agency must be seen as vulnerable in relation to internal constraints that 
make the kind of self-control associated with agency difficult to achieve. This 
difficulty and vulnerability is the direct result of the complexity of our mental 
lives, which provides the very conditions which make self-control possible in the 
first place. I think that one of the broad conclusions we can draw from this is that 
the constraints to our agency, as discussed in this chapter, rather than being seen 
as barnacles on the surface of agency, are themselves a necessary part of what it 
means to exercise human agency at all. Being able to exercise human agency 
positively requires these constraints because our agency is something that can 
only be achieved by working at it. Indeed, human agency is an achievement 
which can only be had if it can also be lost.  
On the one hand, we require the presence of real and significant obstacles 
that threaten our agency in order to exercise our agency in the first place. On the 
other hand, we must also recognise the difficulty faced by any human agent in 
attempting to overcome those very obstacles. In recognising this, it becomes 
clear not only that it is difficult for everyone to be practically capable of always 
maintaining their agency, but also, importantly, that we understand the ease 
with which we so often fail in our own attempts to do so. This realisation should, 
I think, be profoundly disturbing for any reader who fully grasps it, for being 
awakened to the possibility that you yourself might not exercise your agency (at 
least some of the time) is bound to be unsettling. Though it may serve, at first, to 
unsettle us, I argue that we ought to supplement the conception of agency found 
in analytic accounts accordingly; our agency, I suggest, must necessarily be seen 
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as a struggle between control and dispersion, making us permanently vulnerable 
to dissolution.  
Similarly, Nietzsche saw the struggle for self-control as incessant and 
relentless. For him, we face this struggle on an on-going and global basis. 
Nietzsche claims that “there results no settled state” about the psychological 
“resistance” that we face. For him, “the resistance must be constantly 
overcome.”231 Here, the difficulty lies in keeping up our momentum under the 
strain of relentless opposition from conflicting desires and motivations, without 
ever arriving at a state in which we have fully mastered it all, or one  in which we 
could rest and be absolved from the internal struggle. In this sense, Nietzsche 
points out that to be a human agent, who is self-controlled, is not something that 
we can ever take for granted about ourselves. Indeed, we must consistently fight 
for, and struggle with both self-control and vulnerability. In the Twilight of the 
Idols, Nietzsche claims to “understand freedom as the Romans and Venetians did, 
as ‘something one has and does not have, something one wants, something one 
conquers.’”232 If Nietzsche is right, and I think his claims hold sway here, the very 
nature of our agency is necessarily vulnerable in the face of such relentless 
internal opposition and struggle. 
 
2.8. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this first part of my thesis I have advanced a view of human agency in which 
both self-control and vulnerability are constitutive of human agency.  Human 
agency, I have argued, is distinct, on such a picture from the kind of agency we 
would attribute to non-human animals and supernatural, disembodied or 
invulnerable being such as gods.  
 
In the first chapter I argued for and defended a version of the self-control view of 
human agency. On such a view, I argued, an agent is to be understood as 
someone who can muster the motivational strength to perform actions which 
are, by and large, informed by what might be called her ‘better judgment’. I 
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argued further that someone can only be considered to exercise their agency if 
they are suitable free from constraints which affect either their ability to act or 
their ability to exercise critical reflection, that is, to form their better judgments 
or plan their intentions. People whose better judgement or intentional actions 
are determined solely by third parties are to be seen, I argued, as lacking the 
kind of critical or evaluative freedom necessary to exercise agency. Finally, I have 
argued in the first chapter that a human agent is someone who experiences 
internal conflict between motivations and intentions. As such, I have argued that 
self-control is to be understood as the ability to muster the motivational strength 
to act at time t in the face of competing motivations to perform other possible 
actions at time t.  
In the second chapter my attention turned to some of the more 
interesting implications of the intersection between the following: the self-
control view of human agency, as described in the first chapter, Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s somewhat controversial claims about human agency, and results of 
experiments in psychology and behavioural economics. While the structural and 
theoretical frameworks provided by Frankfurt and Watson are useful tools in 
explaining and understanding the mechanisms involved in the exercise of human 
agency, I think it is important to stress that this kind of behavioural or self-
control theory is far from perfect in practice. Thus, I have argue that a more 
robust understanding of the nature of human agency must take into account the 
practical fact that not all of our attempts to modify our motivations and 
behaviours will be successful, and that many of our attempts will require a great 
amount of effort and difficulty in their achievement. Furthermore, while, as 
Murphy and Brown suggest, we may well be capable of restraining a cough until 
the end of a performance, it is far from clear that we will always be able to do so. 
Addictions, phobias, compulsions, reflex reactions and conditioned responses 
motivate people to behave in ways in which it is unclear whether there could be 
any way that they could really avoid doing those things. Finally, taking my lead 
from Freud and Nietzsche, I argued that the inner life of the human agent is 
typically more properly characterised as divided, and, importantly, psychological 
unity and stability are definitive of our agency only insofar as it is the outcome of 
our own efforts to achieve and preserve it, and these efforts are never complete.  
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Part Two: Human Agency, Personhood and Normativity 
 
In the opening of ‘Conditions of personhood,’233 Daniel Dennett claims that what 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood has not yet clearly been 
established in philosophical literature, saying: 
 
One might hope that such an important concept, applied and denied so 
confidently, would have clearly necessary and sufficient conditions for 
ascription, but if it does, we have not yet discovered them. In the end there 
may be none to discover. In the end we may come to realize that the 
concept of a person is incoherent and obsolete.234  
 
Despite this sceptical opening, Dennett goes on to outline six conditions which he 
claims are necessary for personhood. The necessary conditions for personhood which 
Dennett provides can be summarised as follows: 
 
(1) Rationality – a person is a rational being,235 
(2) Consciousness – a person is a conscious being,236 
(3) Recognition by the broader community of persons – “whether something 
counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude taken toward it, a 
stance adopted with respect to it”,237 
(4) Reciprocation of the personal stance – a person must be capable of adopting a 
personal stance towards other persons,238 
(5) Verbal communication – a person must be capable of complex verbal 
communication,239 
(6) Self-consciousness – a person is “conscious in some special way: there is a 
way in which we are conscious in which no other species is conscious”.240 
 
Interestingly on Dennett’s account conditions (2) and (6) map on quite clearly to 
the self-control view of human agency defended in the first part of this thesis. 
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Condition (5), while contentious, could be substituted by Murphy and Brown’s 
reflective adaptability, which as I described in the first chapter refers to 
“behaviours that are modified off-line by reflection using images or symbols,”241 
and thus be seen to accord with the self-control view of agency. What is most 
interesting, and plausible, about Dennett’s suggestion is that human agency, 
understood in terms of the self-control view outlined in part one above, is 
represented as necessary but not sufficient for personhood.  
Similarly, in ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ Harry 
Frankfurt not only outlines what he takes to be most distinctive about our 
agency, but also what he takes to be most distinctive of our personhood. 
Personhood, for Frankfurt, is a term which was misappropriated by P.F 
Strawson, because on the Strawsonian view a person is defined merely as 
something which has both a body and a mind. Frankfurt argues that Strawson 
fails to discuss self-control or human agency in his analysis of personhood, and 
thus fails to describe personhood sufficiently. Contrary to Strawson then, 
Frankfurt outlines what he takes to be most distinctive about our personhood, 
outlining certain characteristics and abilities which he claims are “essential to 
persons” or “uniquely human”, as primarily defined by our human agency. On 
Frankfurt’s account human agency is taken to be what constitutes our 
personhood because it gives us the kind of control over ourselves that is thought 
to distinguish us from the rest of the animal kingdom. However, in his account of 
personhood Frankfurt, not unlike Dennett, seems to suggest that human agency, 
understood in terms of self-control, is necessary but not sufficient for 
personhood.  
In the second part of this thesis, following Frankfurt and Freud, I will 
argue that personhood should be understood in terms of more than human 
agency, and that to equate human agency with personhood is to misunderstand 
the broader implications of the concept of personhood. The concept of a person, I 
will argue, is intricately linked to the concept of what it means to be a subject. 
Since our understanding of ourselves as persons involves the notion of 
subjectivity, I will argue that our discussion of personhood must include more 
complex psychological activities than those discussed when talking about human 
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agency. While human agency is required for personhood, persons have deeper 
and more psychologically complex internal conflicts to manage – and it matters, 
normatively speaking, how they are managed. Although self-control is central to 
our understanding of human agency, it is not sufficient for an understanding of 
what our personhood amounts to. To be a person in the fullest sense, then, I 
suggest is only partially constituted by self-control, and by extension, human 
agency. 
 Importantly, Frankfurt suggests in his work that while human agency, at 
least according to the self-control view defended in part one above, is a formal 
rather than a substantive notion, personhood should be understood in 
substantive rather than formal terms. Following this, Frankfurt proposes a 
normative prescription for personhood in the form of ‘wholeheartedness’ and its 
corollary of ‘externalisation and dissociation’. For Frankfurt through making a 
decisive commitment to a second order volition we become wholehearted, and in 
so doing we exercise our agency well. 
 To some extent following Frankfurt I argue that personhood is to be 
understood in substantive terms, and that we can thus offer normative 
prescriptions for personhood. However, I argue against Frankfurt’s normative 
prescription for personhood in the form of wholeheartedness. In the third 
chapter, drawing on insights from psychological horrors prevalent in the literary 
Gothic tradition, as well as the philosophical writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Simone de Beauvoir and Mary Midgley, I argue that personhood normatively 
requires integration within a volitional complex, rather than wholeheartedness.  
Following this, I argue, in the fourth chapter, for three further normative 
prescriptions for personhood.  
First, I argue contra Frankfurt, that exercising our agency well lies not in 
what we might call wholehearted wholeheartedness, but in its opposite, 
ambivalence. Following Nussbaum’s discussion of value pluralism in The 
Fragility of Goodness, I argue against Frankfurt that a commitment to value 
pluralism entails a normative prescription for personhood in the form of 
ambivalence.  
 Second, following Nussbaum, I argue that it is an epistemic normative 
requirement for personhood that we recognise our own human fragility and our 
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vulnerability to things over which we have no control. While it seems clear that 
agency is necessary to our understanding of what it means to be a person, to be a 
person also normatively requires that a certain epistemic consideration is 
fulfilled: to exercise our agency well requires that a person recognise their own 
limits and vulnerabilities. According to Nussbaum, the ability to recognise the 
extent to which circumstances, events and other persons play a role “in the 
planning and conduct of our lives,”242 contributes to our ability to live well, and 
should this be seen as a normative requirement for personhood. While our 
ability to govern and control our own actions, behaviour and lives as agents 
indeed separates us from the rest of the animal kingdom, I will argue that it is 
our uniquely human ability to recognise our vulnerability, which, in turn, defines 
for us as persons an epistemic normative requirement.  
Finally, I argue for a normative requirement for personhood in the form of 
authenticity. While traditional accounts of personhood provide us with the 
conditions under which we gain control over our lives, to live well, I suggest, is to 
be engaged in the art of living. The authentic life is a life worth living because it is 
beautiful, and I argue that authenticity seen in this way provides a normative 
requirement for personhood. 
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Chapter Three: Self-Governance, Wholeheartedness and Integrity 
 
 In the first part of this thesis, I argued that, on the self-control view of human 
agency, internal conflict is an essential feature of our mental lives as agents. I 
argued that because of necessary structural divisions in the mind, conflicts 
between desires, intentions and motivations are pervasive features in the 
psychological life of the human agent. Following this, I argued that part of our 
mental activity qua agents involves achieving a measure of control over these 
conflicts, which is what Mary Midgley refers to as the “organization of the inner 
crowd.”243 If we are to take this account seriously, however, I think there are 
further important questions we must ask about the nature of the self behind the 
self-control view of human agency. Most importantly: what, or perhaps more 
precisely ‘who,’ is doing the organising?  
In the philosophical literature this question has in part been raised as an 
objection to Frankfurt’s hierarchical self-control view of human agency, and has 
been formulated in what is known as the “regress problem.”244 On hierarchical 
accounts of agency such as Frankfurt’s, self-control is achieved when there is an 
authenticating exchange between first order desires and second order volitions: 
through critical reflection, second order volitions authenticate first order 
volitions, and in so doing give us the requisite ownership over our actions which 
result from authenticated first order desires. What does the work on Frankfurt’s 
account is the idea that our initial responses to the world are controlled by our 
reflections on these responses, which are in turn controlled by our higher order 
responses. Essentially, this means that our initial responses to the world are 
authenticated by other higher order elements, which themselves exist within 
our psyche. The problem with this, it has been suggested, is that it is unclear 
what exactly authenticates those ‘higher’ elements within our psychological 
make-up which are responsible for authenticating the elements which we take 
to be our initial responses to the world (our first order desires). If our second 
order volitions are not themselves an authentic expression of who we are as 
particular persons, they must, in turn, be subject to a similar process of 
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authentication. What we require, then, is a seemingly infinite chain of 
authenticating elements and processes, as Robert Noggle puts it: 
 
No finite chain of authenticating elements can provide an account of 
how any element is made authentic, because no element can be the last 
member of the chain if every member must be authenticated by some 
other element.245 
 
The regress problem, then, pertains to the possibility of ownership over our 
motivations, which seemingly requires recourse to continually higher levels of 
the self within the mind which endorse the more basic levels. 
In addressing the regress problem, Frankfurt has supplemented his 
original account of self-control outlined in “Freedom of the Will and the Concept 
of a Person”. Frankfurt suggests that over and above the self-control required for 
human agency, there is a deeper and more complex psychological story that we 
can tell about our personhood. This more complex psychological story, for 
Frankfurt, involves the introduction of a psychological process which he calls 
‘identification’. For Frankfurt, through the process of ‘identification’ with a 
second-order volition, a person exercises over and above self control, self-
governance because she is in control of her higher order, as well as her first 
order desires. Through self-governance, for Frankfurt, we not only gain control 
over our mental lives, but we claim ownership of it through identification. With 
the introduction of this process, Frankfurt claims that his account of personhood, 
seen as a supplement to his account of human agency in terms of self-control, 
explains how we can “without arbitrariness terminate a potentially endless 
sequence of evaluations,”246 and in so doing avoid the regress problem. 
In this chapter, following Frankfurt, Midgley and Freud, I argue that to be 
a person in the fullest sense is only partially constituted by self-control, and by 
extension, human agency. Personhood involves, over and above self-control, self-
governance, which is reflective of a deeper kind of self-mastery.  
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Importantly, Frankfurt suggests in his work that while human agency, at 
least according to the self-control view defended in part one above, is a formal 
rather than a substantive notion, personhood should be understood in 
substantive rather than purely formal terms. Following Frankfurt, in this chapter 
I argue that not only are persons responsible for the management of what 
Midgley calls the inner crowd, but it matters greatly to persons how internal 
conflicts are managed. That is, there are ways of managing the internal crowd 
which can be thought of as better than others, and as persons, we are thus 
subject to normative prescriptions for exercising our agency well.  
However, in this chapter I challenge the normative prescription for 
personhood suggested by Frankfurt in the form of what he calls 
‘wholeheartedness’. In my argument against Frankfurt, I take issue with the role 
he sees the process of ‘externalisation’ or ‘dissociation’ playing in our becoming 
‘wholehearted’. For Frankfurt, in the process of achieving self-governance, while 
some desires are endorsed and some volitions identified with, others must be 
externalised, and we must dissociate ourselves from them. Drawing on insights 
from psychological horrors prevalent in the literary Gothic tradition, and the 
philosophical writings of Nietzsche and Midgley, I argue against Frankfurt’s 
normative prescription in favour of a normative requirement for personhood in 
the form of integrity. Integrity, on my account, amounts to a kind of wholeness of 
self which Midgley describes elegantly as follows: 
 
human freedom centres on being a creature able, in some degree, to 
act as a whole in dealing with its conflicting desires[…] and the 
conflicting desires themselves are of course not the whole story. They 
must belong to a being which in some way owns both of them, is aware 
of both, and can therefore make some attempt to reconcile them. 
The more clearly the being is aware of the clash, and the more it 
can on occasion, distance itself from any of its impulses, feeling itself to 
be a whole that contains them all, the freer it becomes. This distancing 
does not mean taking flight to an entity immune from the conflict. Only 
misguided attempts at self-control are made in that way. The 
endeavour must be to act as a whole, rather than as a peculiar, isolated 
component coming into control the rest of the person. Though it is 
only an endeavour – though the wholeness is certainly not given ready 
made and can never be fully achieved, yet the integrative struggle to 
heal conflicts and to reach towards this wholeness is surely the core of 
what we mean by human freedom.247 
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Contra Frankfurt, I argue that personhood requires integration of competing 
motivations and desires throughout one’s life rather than wholeheartedness. 
 
3.1 Self-Governance, Identification, and Wholeheartedness 
 
Frankfurt’s account of personhood is in large part formulated in response to 
what I discussed above in terms of “the regress problem.” In attempting to 
answer the regress problem, Frankfurt supplemented his original account of self-
control with an account of self-governance, for which the process of what he calls 
‘identification’ is required. Recall that, on Frankfurt’s account of human agency, a 
second order volition is formed in the volitional complex when we want a set of 
corresponding first and second order desires to effectively determine our will – 
or what we actually do in the world. When we act on a second order volition, for 
Frankfurt, we exercise human agency because our will has been endorsed by 
ourselves, and not merely imposed on us by external forces or commands. 
Frankfurt’s process of identification supplements this account, answering the 
question at the heart of the regress problem, ‘how are we to deal with conflicts 
which arise between our second order volitions themselves?’ Frankfurt suggests 
in his account of personhood that we should resolve such conflicts by making 
what he calls a decisive commitment to one of our competing second order 
volitions. In making a decisive commitment we become what Frankfurt calls 
‘wholehearted’. Further, for Frankfurt, if we are unable to make a decisive 
commitment, we exhibit ambivalence. For Frankfurt, the ambivalent person 
vacillates between volitions, and this manifests in their lives as inconsistency in 
action as well as the inability to form a coherent picture of themselves as 
subjects.  
For Frankfurt, the ambivalent person experiences a tension within his 
own volitional complex. That is, the ambivalent person can be seen to have 
second order volitions which contradict each other and aim to promote mutually 
exclusive actions on the part of that person. When a person is ambivalent, in the 
Frankfurtian sense, they are not able to exercise their agency well because there 
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is “no unequivocal answer to the question of what the person really wants.”248 
The ambivalent person is volitionally conflicted, and thus, despite having 
engaged in the process of critical reflection on her first order desires, she has no 
one particular point of view from which to act, or which could even be seen as 
her point of view. In order for a person to know what she really wants, and thus 
to act in a manner reflecting her primary wants, she must, according to 
Frankfurt, “selectively identify” with one of her second order volitions.249 By 
identifying with a second order volition, the person makes that volitional desire 
a constitutive part of herself: she fully internalises that volition in just such a way 
as to make it relevantly her own.  
Frankfurt claims that, by identifying with a second order volition, we need 
not appeal to a further higher volitional order; a person who identifies with a 
second order volition would find that no “further accurate inquiry”250 on the 
matter would result in her arriving at a conflicted sentiment with regard to that 
volition. That is to say, a person who selectively identifies with a second order 
volition need not make an appeal to a possible higher order volition, because, if 
she did, she would find the same consensus all the way up. When we have truly 
identified with a second order volition, we have no “endogenous desire to be 
volitionally different,”251 and thus it can be said that we are exercising self-
governance, that is, a deeper kind of control than the self-control required for 
human agency. What is distinctive about us as persons, then, is that we play an 
active role in the resolution of internal conflicts, which are necessary for human 
agency on the self-control view. While human agency requires internal conflict 
and constraint, a person is also someone who actively engages with and manages 
that internal conflict. Frankfurt claims: 
 
If there is an unresolved conflict among someone’s second-order 
desires, then he is in danger of having no second order volition; for 
unless the conflict is resolved, he has no preference concerning which 
of his first-order desires is to be his will. This condition, if it is so 
severe that it prevents him from identifying himself in a sufficiently 
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249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid, p. 169. 
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decisive way with any of his conflicting first-order desires, destroys 
him as a person.252 
 
On Frankfurt’s account then, a person must actively engage with the internal 
conflict central to exercising self-control. Moreover, if we do not engage with 
conflict, we become what he calls a “wanton.” Frankfurt describes the “wanton” 
in the following terms: 
 
The Wanton addict cannot or does not care which of his conflicting 
first-order desires wins out. His lack of concern is not due to his 
inability to find a convincing basis for preference. It is due either to his 
lack of the capacity for reflection or to his mindless indifference to the 
enterprise of evaluating his own desires and motives […]. Since he is 
moved by both desires, he will not be altogether satisfied by what he 
does no matter which of them is effective. But it makes no difference to 
him whether his craving or aversion gets the upper hand. He has no 
stake in the conflict between them and so, unlike the unwilling addict, 
he can neither win nor lose the struggle in which he is engaged.253 
 
For Frankfurt, I think correctly, a wanton is not a person precisely because he 
fails to play an active role in organising the inner crowd. Frankfurt puts it 
succinctly as follows: “When a person acts, the desire by which he is moved is 
either the will he wants or a will he wants to be without. When a wanton acts, it 
is neither.”254 What Frankfurt is suggesting here is that, over and above 
controlling which of our desires move us to action, as persons, we must also care 
about which of our desires move us to action.  The wanton is someone who no 
longer cares which direction her life takes because she does not care which of 
her desires she acts on. Since she no longer cares what kind of actions she takes, 
she no longer cares what kind of person she is, what kind of life she is leading, 
and what kind of impact she is having on the world. Given that she no longer 
cares who she is, or what she does, she is no longer any particular person at all, 
she is really no one.  
On Frankfurt’s account, then, it is only through active engagement with 
our internal conflicts that we can come to have the requisite ownership, required 
of persons, over our psychic lives. On his account, ownership of our motivations 
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is not simply given, but must be achieved. The process of achievement itself is 
the primary activity in which those who we consider to be persons are engaged. 
Through the process of critical reflection, in which our motivations are evaluated 
and assessed (the process required for agency on the self-control view), our 
motivations can become our own in a very deep sense–as constituent parts of 
ourselves. If who we are is constituted by the motivations which we have 
reflectively assessed, then, according to Frankfurt, who we are is constituted by 
ourselves. By being the kinds of creatures who actively engage with our internal 
conflict we express ourselves as particularly human subjects. Similarly, in The 
Ethical Primate Midgley’s argues that persons are able to step back from the 
internal conflicts required for human agency and to manage and organise them. 
Recall that Midgley says: 
 
human freedom centres on being a creature able, in some degree, to 
act as a whole in dealing with its conflicting desires […] and the 
conflicting desires themselves are of course not the whole story. They 
must belong to a being which in some way owns both of them, is aware 
of both, and can therefore make some attempt to reconcile them.255 
 
Further, according to Frankfurt, when we have selectively identified with one of 
our volitions, we not only exercise self-governance, but we can be said to be 
wholehearted with respect to that volition. What it means to be wholehearted, 
then, is that at the volitional level, a person has to be “resolutely on the side of 
one of the forces struggling within him [or her] and not on the side of any 
other.”256 For Frankfurt, the process of identification is important because the 
volitions about which we are wholehearted are sanctioned and adopted by 
ourselves, which makes them “intentional and legitimate.”257 According to 
Frankfurt:  
 
Their force is now our force. When they move us we are therefore not 
passive. We are active, because we are being moved just by 
ourselves.258 
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Similarly, Frankfurt says: 
 
Suppose we are thoroughly wholehearted both in what we are doing 
and in what we want. There is no respect in which we are being 
violated or defeated or coerced. Neither our desires nor the conduct to 
which they lead are imposed upon us without our consent or against 
our will.259 
 
So, for Frankfurt, personhood requires, over and above the self-control necessary 
for agency, the kind of self-governance in which we constitute ourselves as 
particular individuals. When we are wholehearted with respect to our second 
order volitions we are fully directed and governed by our true or real selves and 
we have constituted our self through identification. By including the notions of 
identification and wholeheartedness, then, Frankfurt claims that he is able to 
avoid the regress problem in his account of personhood.   
Frankfurt’s suggestion that it is the person themselves who can be said to 
manage internal conflicts, and that it is through self-governance that the person 
is responsible for the formation of her ‘self’ as an agent, seems initially plausible 
because it taps into our intuitions about our own subjectivity. As human subjects, 
we experience our lives from our own particular point of view. Richard Moran 
calls this “the specifically first person authority from which, in normal 
circumstances, a person claims to speak his mind,”260 while Watson calls it “one’s 
standpoint, the point of view from which one judges the world.”261 As human 
selves, we experience our own consciousness in a personal realm – the realm of 
our own subjective experience. The fact that we are aware of our own subjective 
experiences is what we most basically mean when referring to ourselves as self-
aware beings. A seemingly important aspect of what it is to be a self-aware 
individual is that we are never uncertain of who our conscious experiences 
belong to – they belong to me, they are mine. When I talk about myself, then, 
what I refer to is, at least in part, the collection of conscious experiences which I 
take as belonging to me, that is to say, the conscious experiences which are my 
own. Typically, when I refer to myself I also refer to a number of things other 
than simply my conscious experiences: I refer to my thoughts, actions, character 
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traits, beliefs, goals, and preferences. The question of who I am, of who my self is, 
thus refers to a complex set of aspects, all of which I take as belonging, in some 
sense, to me. Who I am, then, can be said to be defined in contrast to what is not 
me, that which is outside, or other, to me. 
On Frankfurt’s account there are times when elements within our own 
psychological make-up – forces that are at work within our own psyche – arise 
and motivate us to act or behave in ways that we do not to take to be an 
authentic expression of who we are. Such behaviour is not, he thinks, our own. 
For Frankfurt, there are a number of elements which arise within our own 
psyche that we experience as being “alien” to us. When someone acts on a desire 
or impulse that is taken to be alien in this sense, Frankfurt thinks we would 
describe them, as we often do, as “not being themselves,” or as acting “in spite of 
themselves.” Frankfurt explains, as follows: 
 
Sometimes we do not participate actively in what goes on in us. It 
takes place, somehow, but we are just bystanders to it. There are 
obsessional thoughts, for instance, that disturb us but that we cannot 
get out of our heads; there are peculiar reckless impulses that make no 
sense to us, and upon which we would never think of acting. There are 
hot surges of anarchic emotion that assault us from out of nowhere 
and that have no recognizable warrant from the circumstances in 
which they erupt.262 
 
Certainly, phobias, compulsions, reflex reactions and conditioned responses 
motivate people to behave in ways in which it is unclear whether there could be 
any way that they could really avoid doing those things. It is even less clear 
whether or not we would attribute these kinds of behaviours to ourselves. That 
is, it is unclear whether we would think of them as an expression of that which 
we truly want to be doing. We refer to people who act from compulsions and 
phobias, as victims of mental states which they themselves have had no control 
over. For example, we would almost never hold someone accountable for the 
accidents they cause while undergoing myotactic reflexes – even if such 
accidents might have regrettable consequences. Intuitively, at least, there do 
seem to be cases in which the forces at work within our psyches arise and 
motivate us to act in spite of our best attempts at self-governance. From time to 
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time, in our experience, we simply find ourselves overwhelmed by some desire 
or motivation which prevents us from being able to exercise self-control.263 We 
have all been overwhelmed by the temptations we feel the pull of most strongly, 
given in to the desires which are most strongly rejected by our better judgement, 
and found ourselves being overcome by a seemingly alien, but irresistible force 
from within. Moran explains this experience, as follows:  
 
Some desires […] may be experienced by the person as feelings that 
simply overcome him. They simply happen. On some occasions their 
occurrence may be inexplicable to him, and their inexplicability in such 
cases need not diminish their force. Like an alien intruder, they must 
simply be responded to, even if one does not understand what they’re 
doing there or what the sense of their demand is.264 
 
Experiences such as these, in which our self-governance is seen as undermined 
by the forces at work in our own psyche, force us, I think, to probe deeper into 
the claim that, through critical reflection, we are able to evaluate and assess our 
motivations, and, in so doing, constitute our self in its entirety. I will pick up on 
this concern in the following section in more detail.  
 
3.2 Externalisation and Dissociation 
 
What is most plausible about Frankfurt’s account of personhood is that 
personhood is to be understood in substantive terms. On Frankfurt’s account, 
personhood can be thought of as exercising our agency well through self-
governance, and this suggestion is particularly plausible if we revise Frankfurt’s 
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views on what self-governance amounts to. Importantly, on Frankfurt’s account, 
since personhood is to be understood in substantive terms, he argues that we 
can offer a normative prescription for personhood in the form of 
‘wholeheartedness’. In this section I take issue with Frankfurt’s normative 
prescription for wholeheartedness which he argues requires ‘externalisation and 
dissociation’. For Frankfurt, in the process of achieving wholeheartedness, while 
some desires are endorsed and some volitions identified with, others must be 
externalised, and he suggests that we ought to dissociate ourselves from them. In 
this section I problematise Frankfurt’s suggestion that we ought to practice 
dissociation and externalisation, and ultimately, as I argue in what remains of 
this chapter, reject Frankfurtian wholeheartedness in favour of a normative 
prescription for personhood of integrity. 
 
Above I discussed Frankfurt’s idea that there are times when elements within 
our own psychological make-up-– forces at work within our own psyche – arise 
and motivate us to act or behave in ways that we do not understand as authentic 
expressions of who we really are. That is, Frankfurt suggests, we think that such 
behaviour is not our own. Some of our desires and volitions, as Frankfurt 
suggests, are only to be considered as ours in the same strictly literal way that a 
nervous tic is considered ours; they occur within our bodies but we do not take 
them to be an expression of what we, ourselves, actually desire or volitionally 
will. Recall that Frankfurt says: “Sometimes we do not participate actively in 
what goes on in us. It takes place, somehow, but we are just bystanders to it.”265 
In a similar vein, Watson explains: 
 
One measure of the strength of a desire is their capacity to claim one’s 
consciousness, direct one’s fantasies, break one’s concentration on 
other things. One finds it difficult to keep one’s mind on one’s work 
because one keeps thinking of one’s lover, or of the chocolate cake in 
the pantry, or of the cigarettes at the market. The objects of these 
desires tend to demand or dominate one’s attention, despite oneself.266 
 
And Watson says again: 
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Just as the bouncer can force you out of the room contrary to your will, 
so your appetites and impulses might lead you where you do not 
‘really’ want to be.267 
 
On such a picture, these alien or rogue desires and volitions are therefore 
external to us because we do not accept them as legitimate reasons for 
performing acts that we would otherwise consider true expressions of who we 
actually are. For this reason, Frankfurt claims that “even if an externalized desire 
turns out to be irresistible, its dominion is merely that of a tyrant. It has for us no 
legitimate authority.”268 He says, in a passage from “Taking Ourselves Seriously,” 
the following: 
 
Let us suppose that a certain motive has been rejected as 
unacceptable. Our attempt to immunize ourselves against it may not 
work. The resistance we mobilize may be insufficient. The externalized 
impulse or desire may succeed, by its sheer power, in defeating us and 
forcing its way. In that case, the outlaw imposes itself upon us without 
authority, and against our will.269 
 
On Frankfurt’s view, we react with hostility to encounters with these alien forces 
within us. We want to disown and reject them because we do not think that they 
belong to us, and we wish to regain a measure of self-governance by ridding 
ourselves of them. Similarly, Marilyn Friedman explains her experience of this 
phenomenon, as follows: 
 
There are times for example when I feel wholly consonant with my 
motivations, fully satisfied with the choices to which they may move 
me; at other times, my motivations feel alien and, although they do not 
cease to move me, nevertheless, I want to be free of them as I would 
want to be free of a fever, an ache, a disturbing or painful condition 
that causes me grief and is not, in any way, my “self.”270 
 
On this view, it is our reaction to this experience, the hostility and sincerity with 
which we disavow the alien forces erupting within us, which highlights one of 
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the ways in which we come to experience the self as other. J. David Velleman 
describes this reaction as illuminating a kind of self-division in which the 
fundamental divide between the self and the other is internal to us. That is, it 
occurs within our own psyche. He says: 
 
Among the goings on in a person’s body, some but not others are due 
to the person in the sense that they are his doing. When he 
distinguishes between those which are his doing and those which 
aren’t, he appears to do so in terms of their causes, by regarding the 
former but not the latter as caused by himself. Yet even when he 
disowns them, he ends up disowning parts of his own body and mind, 
as if the boundary between self and other lay somewhere inside the 
skin.271 
 
We might find ourselves asking the following question: “[c]ould that really have 
been me who thought or felt or did those things?” Our reply is only that it “could 
not really have been me,” because it is not, “in any way, my self.”272  
The natural question arising here is what are we to do with these rogue 
elements? Or perhaps, more properly, how are we to manage this internal 
conflict? In answer to these questions, Frankfurt provides the following 
normative prescription for personhood: we must dissociate ourselves from 
certain unwanted or unacceptable desires and volitions in order to be 
wholehearted and thus exercise self-governance. According to Frankfurt, when 
we encounter any rogue elements within our own psyche we must strive to 
“dissociate ourselves from them,” rather than attempting to incorporate them 
into our conception of ourselves, saying: 
 
That is, we dissociate ourselves from them and seek to prevent them 
from being at all effective. Instead of incorporating them, we 
externalize them […]. They are outlawed and disenfranchised. We 
refuse to recognise them as grounds for deciding what to think and 
what to do […] even if an externalized desire turns out to be 
irresistible, its dominion is merely that of a tyrant. It has, for us, no 
legitimate authority.273 
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In a similar vein, Watson argues that in cases where we come up against rogue 
desires that undermine our self-governance, we are to resist and reject such 
elements as being part of our true or real self. According to him: 
 
The possibility I have in mind is rather that what one is disposed to say 
or judge is temporarily affected by the presence of the desire in such a 
way that, both before and after the “onslaught” of the desire, one 
judges that the desire’s object is worth pursuing (in the circumstances) 
whether or not one has the desire. In this case one is likely, in a cool 
moment, to think it a matter for regret that one had been so influenced 
and to think that one should guard against desires that have this 
property.274 
 
Both Frankfurt and Watson suggest that what is central to the notion of our true 
or real self is who we take ourselves to be, regardless of the presence of rogue or 
unwanted desires, motivations or volitions. They also agree that we must 
actively externalise all aspects of ourselves that are contrary to who we take 
ourselves to be, for such aspects are not legitimately part of our self-constitution. 
If we are unable to externalise these rogue motives and impulses, which do not 
stem from our real selves, Frankfurt and Watson argue that our self-governance 
is undermined. According to Frankfurt and Watson, through dissociation and 
externalisation, we declare that these rogue elements are external to us, and, as 
such, we declare that certain elements of ourselves are not constitutive of our 
true or real selves. For them, by rejecting and resisting the allegedly rogue 
elements of our mental empire, we take responsibility for determining the 
boundaries of our true or real selves. In short, we declare that this is precisely 
where the boundary between self and other lies. 
In her paper ‘Autonomy and the Split-Level Self,’ Friedman explains the 
move made by Frankfurt and Watson when she says that “[s]plit level self 
theorists tell us, in varying ways, that critical reflection [rational deliberation and 
evaluation] is more ‘truly of the self’ than unassessed motivation.”275 Friedman 
further explains this move as follows: 
 
It is also sometimes claimed that the higher level self which does the 
critical reasoning [or makes rational deliberations and evaluations], is 
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the “true” self, a status which is evidently supposed to be what 
guarantees that critical assessment makes motivation truly self 
selected, and hence, the basis of autonomous choice.276 
 
Importantly, she goes on to ask what exactly such theorists mean when they 
claim that some element of the psyche is “more truly of the self” than any other 
element of that whole psyche. I agree with Friedman when she claims that the 
notion of isolating certain elements in our own psychological make-up, and 
referring to these as the only relevant factors when describing our identity, 
seems exceedingly arbitrary: 
 
it is unclear how one part of the self could be more truly that self than 
any other part. And, in sheer ontological terms, it is far from clear how 
a part which is less than the whole of something could nevertheless be 
more truly that (whole) thing than the whole thing itself.277  
 
Moreover, I agree with Friedman’s claim that the very process required for 
determining the elements, which form the true self, relies on an assessment 
which can only be made in light of an understanding that there be some other 
prior, whole self. She explains, as follows:  
 
The self who recognizes which part is its true self could only be the 
original whole self, and this whole self continues to remain 
conceptually distinct from the constituent part which is regarded as its 
‘true’ self. […] [I]t is the whole self, not the ‘true’ self, which is doing the 
“identifying” with that constituent regarded as the ‘true’ self.278  
 
I think that Friedman’s line of questioning here is worth pursuing. Further, I 
think it is worthwhile to question the fundamental assumption about the 
constitution of the true or real self which lies behind accounts of self-governance, 
such as those put forward by Frankfurt and Watson: we must ask how any one 
part of the self could be considered to be a more authentic expression of that self 
than the whole of that self.  
Contra Frankfurt, Freud and Mary Midgley (following Jung), have 
“suggested how little we understand about our own motives and what deep 
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conflicts perturb even those motives of which we are more or less conscious.”279 
This suggestion is again intuitively plausible. In our experience, who we are and 
who we most truly take ourselves to be, seems to not always map onto what we 
take our better judgement to be. Typically, we find ourselves in a number of 
situations in which we find it difficult to know who we most truly are. Indeed, in 
our reflection, there are many past situations that reveal to us precisely how 
misinformed we were about who we took ourselves most truly to be.  
The writings of philosophers and psychologists, such as Nietzsche, Freud 
and Lear, show “that there are deep currents of meaning, often crosscurrents, 
running through the human soul which can at best be glimpsed through a glass 
darkly.”280 Following these thinkers, it seems that our ability to exercise self-
governance is far more complex in psychology than is suggested in the analytic 
philosophical literature. Recall from my discussion of Freud’s account in the first 
chapter, Freud sees the human mind as divided into the structures of the ego and 
the id. This psychological picture served us well when discussing the mental life 
of a human agent, but it is not enough to give us the full psychological story of a 
person. Crucially, Freud saw the human psyche as divided in a further, important 
way. Freud also saw the human mind as also being divided between the 
conscious and unconscious aspects. This division in the psyche allows Freud to 
provide a richer psychological account of personhood in which personhood 
involves deeper psychological complexity than what is required on the self-
control view of human agency.  
That Freud saw the human mind as also being divided between the 
conscious and unconscious aspects, has perhaps been the most crucial insight 
into the human mind in the history of psychology, and forms the backbone of the 
psychoanalytic tradition that has developed as an influential branch of 
psychology over the last century. Anthony Elliott explains that, from the 
psychoanalytic perspective, this internal boundary reveals a hidden, unconscious 
self that lurks within the psyche beneath the superficial appearance of a unified, 
rational and conflict-free self. According to Elliott:  
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Dismantling the notion of an essential unity to the self, psychoanalysis 
posits a split at the centre of the psyche between consciousness of self 
and that which is unconscious. Lurking behind all forms of self-
organization – that is, our day to day fashioning of self-identity – there 
lies a ‘hidden self’, a dimension of subjectivity that is cut off from self-
knowledge.281 
 
On the psychoanalytic picture, the unconscious or hidden self has a significant 
influence on the formation and governance of the conscious aspects of the self. 
Importantly, the unconscious self is often in conflict with conscious aspects of 
the self. As Elliott explains: 
 
Significantly, this hidden self, however we may choose to act or 
express ourselves, constantly disrupts and outstrips our intentions 
[…].282 
 
Drawing on Freud’s suggestion that unconscious motivations influence much of 
our behaviour, psychoanalytic theorists dismiss the assumption that people 
essentially act in “rational and transparently explicable ways,” focusing rather on 
understanding the fact that “people often act in bizarre ways, ways which cause 
pain to themselves and others, ways which puzzle even the actors 
themselves.”283 Through the development of the broadly psychoanalytic picture, 
what emerges is a far more complex picture of our psyche, which is largely 
characterised by higher order conflict and is far from transparent to itself. 
In what follows in this chapter, Following Midgley and Freud, I challenge 
Frankfurt and Watson’s normative prescription for personhood in the form of 
externalisation and dissociation, using late gothic novels as a springboard for my 
discussion. I argue that, while self-governance – over and above self-control – is 
required for personhood, following Frankfurt’s normative prescription for 
personhood in the form of wholeheartedness is problematic because it leads to a 
psychologically imbalanced self. Personhood, I argue, requires psychological 
stability and unity insofar as it relates to our subjectivity, and thus, contra 
Frankfurt and Watson, I will argue in what follows in this chapter for a 
normative prescription for personhood in the form of integrity. 
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3.3 Gothic Subjectivity  
 
In The Fragility of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum argues that literary works 
provide a commanding source from which to refine our understanding of human 
experiences, or of our subjectivity, which she takes to be defined, in part, by 
interpersonal and intrapersonal clashes. She suggests that we can refine our 
understanding of our subjectivity by turning to literary works because they 
reveal to us, in a particularly poignant way, “the vulnerability of human lives to 
fortune, the mutability of our circumstances and our passions, [and] the 
existence of conflicts among our commitments.”284 Fitting with her primarily 
Aristotelian account of personhood and subjectivity, Nussbaum’s study focuses 
on the literature, in particular the tragedies, of the ancient Greeks. In my 
discussion of the motifs and themes of gothic literature, particularly of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, I will, to some extent, rely on the 
example set by Nussbaum in order to delve into the psychological explorations of 
subjectivity in this genre. 
In this section, I will argue that gothic fiction provides us with insight into 
the psychological aspects of our subjectivity, through which we can explore the 
issues of self-governance and personhood. Gothic fiction in many ways gives 
literary form to philosophically interesting questions about the nature of our 
own subjectivity, namely the nature of the relationship of the self with itself. 
Contra Frankfurt and Watson’s normative prescription that we ought to achieve 
self-governance through externalisation and dissociation (outlined in the 
previous section), I argue in what follows in this thesis that the picture of self-
governance that Gothic authors advance highlights the psychological instability 
which would result from following this prescription. On the gothic picture of self-
governance, the self is to be understood as Midgley puts it, a whole-self, or as I 
argue a self with integrity. Integrity, I argue then, can be seen as a normative 
requirement for personhood.  
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3.3.1 Late Gothic Fiction and Subjectivity 
 
In this century, academic philosophy, as much as psychology, has been 
reluctant to pay much attention to the shadow-side of human 
motivation. It has not occupied itself with the agonizing question ‘can 
it really have been I who did that?’ or with the genuine clash of reasons 
for answering yes or no to it. Nor has it dealt much with the still more 
startling division of the self into two or more selves and shadows 
embattled factions which marks the process of temptation.285 
 
It may at first seem strange to incorporate an analysis based on Gothic fiction in 
my discussion of the nature of personhood and subjectivity. I think that Gothic 
fiction has, to a large extent, been widely misinterpreted because of its 
misleading associations with the horror genre. In literary criticism circles, 
however, Gothic fiction has recently been defended against our misgivings about 
its ties to the horror genre. As literary critic Gary Thompson explains:  
 
Preternaturalism has, of course, been a source of annoyance to some 
critics of the Gothic; and it does, indeed, require a strong palate to 
accept all the bleeding portraits, animated skeletons, lycanthropes, 
rattling chains, and vampires that infest Gothic literature, especially 
the older novels. But the artistic incorporation of the preternatural 
should not, in itself, form a barrier to critical appreciation.286 
 
Robert D. Hume has argued that when we look at Gothic fiction in particular, 
what we are primarily analysing are textual representations of aspects of human 
subjectivity. He claims that one of the major Gothic concerns “might grandiosely 
be called a psychological interest […] [where] there is a considerable amount of 
concern for interior mental processes.”287 Following his famous study in defence 
of the psychological and philosophical importance of the genre, literary criticism 
from the 1960s and onwards has systematically attempted to analyse Gothic 
fiction in terms of our subjectivity by exploring the extent to which it seeks to 
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unmask psychological dread and fear by venturing into “the dark night of the 
irrational.”288 
Elizabeth Napier has challenged the view put forward by Hume and his 
followers, with particular respect to the early Gothic novels of the late eighteenth 
century. She claims, first, that the psychological explorations in the early Gothic 
are one-dimensional in their refusal to deal with morally mixed characters, since 
in these novels the “absolute polarization of good and evil necessitates that 
virtuous and erring characters finally remain permanently apart.”289 However, 
there is a marked shift in late Gothic fiction of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, which distinguishes them from their early Gothic 
predecessors (that they perhaps more accurately outgrew). Napier’s first 
conclusion about the early Gothic is that it is a mistake to think that we can gain 
significant psychological insight from it because of the lack of depth in the early 
Gothic characters’ personalities. However, it is precisely this depth of character, 
or self, that the late Gothic seeks to explore. By delving into the dark and dingy 
corners of the labyrinth at the heart of the human psyche, late Gothic novels 
present us with morally mixed or ambiguous characters, who are disturbingly 
and ambiguously internally divided. For this reason, I see the late Gothic novel as 
a fitting setting in which to explore those interesting philosophical questions 
about the constitution of a mode of experience in which we encounter the self as 
other.   
Late Gothic, or what Richard Davenport-Hines calls the “gothic revival,” is 
seen primarily as a reaction to the Enlightenment’s “emphasis on the need for 
rationality, order, [and] sanity […] in which human happiness and achievement 
rested on the mastery of passion, and on calm, confident regulation”290 of 
potentially conflicting aspects of the self. Arguably, the early Gothic authors 
recognised that this assumption rested on “the opposing half-truth that 
humankind needs passion and fear,”291 but failed to fully explore the implications 
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of this for human psychology and subjectivity in their literary treatments of this 
realisation. In contrast, the literature of the late Gothic authors is concerned with 
irrationality, the forces of the unconscious, and the real and pressing existence of 
a tension between disparate and conflicting forces at work within the person 
themselves, which Davenport-Hines aptly describes as “the power of inward 
goblins to torment one’s psyche.”292 Unlike their predecessors, late Gothic 
authors seek to explore literary characters that provide us with cases that exhibit 
a failure of agency or a breakdown of personhood, in which the characters’ 
thoughts, actions and behaviours are not a reflection of who they really think 
they are, or who they most truly are. In these cases, characters encounter the 
other within themselves. Recently, in support of this argument, Julian Wolfreys 
explains the following: 
 
If there is a transition in the nature of the gothic from the end of the 
eighteenth century to the middle years of the nineteenth century, it is 
marked by an inward turn […]. In writing of the nineteenth century 
which manifests a gothic turn, there is an embrace of the uncanny 
other within ourselves rather than a displacement or projection on to 
some foreign or distant other.293 
 
Late Gothic fiction, then, marks a transition in horror stories from fearful 
transcendental explorations, which involve supernatural realms and 
otherworldly demons, to fearful internalised explorations, in which fears and 
anxieties are generated by and within the self. I take late Gothic literature as 
providing a powerful source for refining our understanding of subjectivity by 
“descending […] into the darker and ‘lower’ realms of human experience, where 
one realises in a fairly visceral way both the precariousness of life and the 
existence of powers greater than oneself.”294 In doing this, Gothic horror intends 
to shock us by asking us to question our own experiences as subjects. In Gothic 
psychological horror, the precariousness ambiguity of life is specifically revealed 
to us in the deeds undertaken by the hero-turned-villain at the centre of the tale. 
Through his dastardly and violent deeds, we are made poignantly aware not only 
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of human physical mortality and frailty (in the torture and death of his victims), 
but also of the hero’s psychological frailty as we see him give in to temptation, 
indulgence and lose the internal struggle in the face of internal conflict and 
division. Having identified with the hero, we are, in turn, made aware of our own 
frailty and the existence of psychological powers that are sometimes 
overwhelmingly beyond our ability to control or remove from our psychological 
constitution. Ultimately, the drama and horror in the Gothic narratives involve 
shocking us because they demand that we recognise a very difficult and painful 
truth about ourselves – that we are less psychologically unified than we typically 
take ourselves to be, and that our own attempts at psychological unity and 
stability could fail just as easily as the hero’s. Late Gothic fiction thus provides us 
with stories generated by the uncanny transcriptions of a fragile human 
psychological condition with which we identify, from our own lived experience, 
but that we often struggle to fully comprehend or embrace. In the following 
section, I will argue that this is particularly prominent in Gothic novels which 
explore the motif of the double. 
 
3.3.2 Internal Division, the Double, Whole Selves and Integrity 
 
The image of the double – the Doppelganger, or second self, the mirror 
image, the Other who is also oneself – tracks, haunts, or shadows 
cultural production in the nineteenth century, and on into the 
twentieth.295 
 
In this section I will turn my attention to a literary motif which undoubtedly 
seems to explore the issue of self-division: the double, otherwise known as the 
doppelgänger, the second or shadow self, or, sometimes, the alter-ego. Stories 
that centre on the doppelgänger, in late Gothic fiction, present main characters 
and their doubles as psychologically divided and fractured aspects of the same 
self. The motif thus illustrates an understanding that the boundary between the 
self and the other also appears to be applicable to divisions within the psyche 
itself.  
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In its dramatisation of this view of the double self, late Gothic fiction 
presents us with a main character who struggles to come to terms with their own 
duplicity. The character ends up in a disastrous, nightmarish situation marked 
not by fear of the other, but by fear of having to embrace the other within. The 
drama in the Gothic begins to unfold when the once hidden duplicity of self is 
revealed: the double typically emerges by appearing in a mirror, portrait, or 
encounter with another person who is, in appearance, identical to the self. The 
Gothic drama reaches its climax as the profound power and influence of the once 
hidden aspects of the self on the individual are realised. The intentionally 
unsatisfying resolution of these stories is achieved when it is realised that the 
conflict within, and fragmentation of the self, can only be circumvented or 
controlled through the murder of the double, which ultimately results in death 
for both parties. Drawing on this motif in Gothic fiction, I argue, in this section, 
that Frankfurt’s normative prescription, in the form of wholeheartedness is 
problematic because it relies on the process of externalisation and dissociation.  
 
With the development of psychoanalytical literary investigations, starting with 
the seminal work by Otto Rank,296 our understanding of the motif of the double 
has shifted. Once interpreted as an author’s depiction of their longing for a 
different existence, the interpretation of the double has evolved as a 
manifestation of the subconscious desire of an author to “lend imagery to a 
universal human problem – that of the relation of the self to the self.”297 Late 
Gothic authors such as Oscar Wilde, Edgar Allan Poe and Robert Louis Stevenson 
(to name but a few), explore this “universal human problem” most explicitly 
through the concept of the doppelgänger – a sinister double of the individual 
who represents the shadow side of human motivation. In their literary 
explorations, the relationship between the self and itself is marked by extreme 
tension and radical division. As William Patrick Day explains, “the double is a 
central motif in the genre; [where] the individual is not one self, but two.”298 The 
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protagonists and their doubles are essentially characterised as psychologically 
distinct and fractured aspects of the same self. As Davenport-Hines argues, the 
late Gothic authors reject a “bourgeois” understanding of the self as “stable, 
abiding and continuous, requiring the assertion of one true cohesive inner 
self.”299 
Using preternaturalism as a springboard, Gothic fiction provides us with 
literary representations of internal conflict, as well as the effect of such conflict 
on our subjectivity. As Peter Garrett explains, “the uncanny events and effects of 
the Gothic already” work to “estrange us from the familiar.” For him, the 
“reflexivity” of these events and effects “is always linked with the problematic” 
and internal “relations of subjectivity.” That is, Garrett continues, the Gothic 
character’s “self-consciousness [is] always in tension with the forces of the 
unconscious.”300  
Similarly drawing on Freud’s picture in which the human mind is 
crucially divided into conscious and unconscious aspects, the psychoanalytic 
perspective maintains that the internal boundaries of the self reveal a hidden, 
unconscious self, which lurks in the psyche, beneath the superficial appearance 
of an Enlightenment picture in which the self is unified, rational and free of 
conflict. Moreover, on this psychoanalytic picture, the unconscious or hidden self 
has a significant influence on the formation and governance of the conscious 
aspects of the self and, importantly, is often discordant with those conscious 
aspects.  
This psychoanalytic picture of the self is clearly at play in the 
development of the motif of the double in late Gothic fiction. Indeed, many 
literary critics have drawn parallels between psychoanalysis and Gothic fiction, 
often providing psychoanalytic readings of Gothic novels. The fact that both 
psychoanalysis and the Gothic are reactions against the Enlightenment picture of 
the self, gives us reason to think that many fruitful comparisons are to be made 
between them. As Michelle Massé puts it, “[i]f the Gothic can be said to influence 
psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis in its turn illuminates the Gothic explicitly and 
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implicitly.”301 In the late Gothic, we see that the ultimate assumption of the 
Enlightenment – the unity of the self – is challenged through the motif of the 
double, in which there is a shift from a portrayal of the other, as something 
contrasted to some entity or person other than the self, to a portrayal in which 
the dialogues between the self and other turn out to be colloquies within a 
fractured and conflicting self.302 
The motif of the double, as expressed in late Gothic fiction, particularly 
and effectively lends itself to these kinds of psychoanalytic interpretations of 
self-division.  The motif is often employed in these texts through a device such as 
a mirror or portrait, which reflects the self as a character’s double or other. This 
reflection is one that is (or would be) otherwise hidden from their view. In Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde, for example, Dr Jekyll writes the following in his “Full 
Statement of the Case:”  
 
There was no mirror, at that date, in my room; that which stands 
beside me as I write, was brought there later on and for the very 
purpose of these transformations […] [W]hen I looked upon that ugly 
idol [Mr Hyde] in the glass, I was conscious of no repugnance, rather a 
leap of welcome. This too was myself.303  
 
Similarly, in Wilde’s tale, the painted portrait of Dorian Gray functions, perhaps 
even more centrally, “as an iconographical establishment of difference”304 in 
which the self is reflected back to itself as other. Like psychoanalytic theory, the 
Gothic picture of the self is one in which we do experience ourselves as internally 
divided. The suggestion of Gothic literature is that this is not experienced as an 
accidental feature of a person, but rather an essential feature. Moreover, in 
revealing to the protagonists those aspects of themselves which would otherwise 
by hidden from view, these Gothic tales bring the experience of confrontation 
between disparate aspects of the self to the forefront of their narratives. 
If we, like the characters in Gothic novels, experience ourselves as 
internally divided, and at times experience conflict between the various aspects 
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of our psyche, it seems only natural to ask how we ought to deal with this 
conflict and division. In this section, I will return to that which I mentioned 
earlier in this chapter: our reaction to the experience of internal conflict and 
division, and its effect on our self-governance. Recall the intuition that when we 
encounter alien forces within us, we react to them with hostility: we want to 
disown and reject them because we do not think that they belong to us. 
Following this intuition, Frankfurt claims that when we encounter any rogue or 
alien elements within our own psyche we must strive to “dissociate ourselves 
from them,” rather than attempt to incorporate them into our conception of 
ourselves. According to Frankfurt, then, through dissociation we declare that 
these rogue elements are external to us. As such, we declare that certain 
elements of ourselves are not constitutive of our true or real selves. By rejecting 
and resisting the allegedly rogue elements of our mental empire, according to 
Frankfurt, we take responsibility for determining the boundaries of our true or 
real self, and in doing so gain the kind of self-control essential to self-governance 
and personhood. 
The question of how we should deal with this conflict and division is also 
central to Gothic literature: Alison Holland explains that “the most characteristic 
energies of the Gothic novel concern the impossibility of restoring to their 
original oneness characters divided from themselves.”305 Rather than an 
assumption of essential unity to the self, the Gothic double reveals – as Judith 
Halberstam explains – the ‘essential duplicity and potential multiplicity’ of the 
self. 306 In Stevenson’s tale, Dr Jekyll attempts to rationalise his internal conflict 
by universalising his condition in order to minimise his culpability for leading a 
life of duplicity. He argues that his divided life was only a more extreme instance 
of an eternal human dilemma. As Dr Jekyll proclaims, “man is not truly one, but 
truly two […] and I hazard a guess that man will ultimately be known for a mere 
polarity of multifarious, incongruous and independent denizens.”307 The internal 
conflict between the various parts of the psyche is then, as we have seen, central 
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to the Gothic picture of fractured subjectivity. Importantly, however, this inner 
conflict is characterised as threatening, especially because, “[p]roverbially, an 
encounter with the double portends the death of the self,” and “closely allied to 
this are fears of the portrait, or of the mirror, as displaying a corrupt or evil 
image of the self.”308  
The basic plots of various novels exploring the above-mentioned themes, 
such as that of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde or Frankenstein, have found fame in non-
literary circles as children’s stories or have been used as descriptively loaded 
catchphrases. People often mistakenly refer to Frankenstein as the Golem who 
was sparked to life by lightning, and use Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde as an almost 
Homeric epithet when referring to people with a split personality or bipolar 
disorder. The problem with these non-literary adoptions is that they are prone to 
provide misinterpretations that lack the subtle nuances that are fundamentally 
important to the texts themselves. This is particularly telling in the case of Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde, for the novel itself is neither intended as a guide-book for 
diagnosing mental disorders, nor as a warning about how monstrous we may 
well become when we give into the temptation of our sinful natures. What is 
most apparent, and indeed most alarming, is that the warning from Stevenson is 
not that we all have the potential to become Mr Hyde when we give in to 
temptation. Rather, the warning is that if we, like Dr Jekyll, attempt to wholly 
separate ourselves from the Mr Hyde, who dwells in each of us, we are simply 
fracturing ourselves rather than achieving integrity and this can only be 
detrimental for our selves. In order to understand the ways in which this 
warning is relevant to the notions of self-governance and personhood and, in 
particular, the problems encountered in both Frankfurt’s and Watson’s accounts, 
we will need to examine more carefully the exact manifestation of this warning 
in the novel itself.   
From the outset of the novel, Dr Jekyll is aware that he is a deeply divided 
individual. I suggest that his division, rather than occurring because of a lack of 
self-control, should be seen as a manifestation of, in Frankfurt’s grammar, the 
second order volitional level. Using Frankfurt’s terms, Dr Jekyll can be described 
as having two radically different and diametrically opposed higher order or 
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evaluative selves, both with which he seems to identify. To this effect, Dr Jekyll 
claims the following:  
 
though so profound a double-dealer, I was in no sense a hypocrite, 
both sides of me were in dead earnest; I was no more myself when I 
laid aside restraint and plunged in shame, than when I laboured in the 
eye of day.309   
 
Dr Jekyll, then, is what Frankfurt would call ambivalent. That is, Dr Jekyll 
experiences a volitional division that prevents him from having a unified 
identity, which, in turn, and according to Frankfurt, prevents us from thinking 
that there is “a certain truth about him at all.”310 Stevenson, however, in my 
opinion, seems to question Frankfurt’s assertion when he wrote the following 
claim which is uttered by Dr Jekyll in the novel: 
 
I saw that, of the two natures that contended within the field of my 
consciousness, even if I could rightly be said to be either, it was only 
because I was radically both.311  
 
With regards to the notion of ambivalence, however, Stevenson seems to agree 
with Frankfurt that such a division would at least hinder the ambivalent 
individual’s ability to achieve certain of his goals or to follow a single 
overarching life plan at all. Dr Jekyll himself admits, with regards to his internal 
division, that “this incoherency of my life was daily growing more 
unwelcome.”312  
In an attempt to explore the complete polarity of selves, which Dr Jekyll 
experiences within himself, we see Dr Jekyll’s interest turn to performing 
experiments which aim to utterly separate the two sides of his nature. Dr Jekyll 
attempts to escape his dual nature, which Frankfurt would call his ambivalence, 
by externalising certain aspects that are associated with only one side of his 
nature. In order to do so, he attempts to wholly separate one half of his nature 
and thereby create what he considers to be an entirely separate person, namely 
Mr Hyde. In the manifestation of Mr Hyde as a separate individual to Jekyll, 
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Stevenson clearly describes the fundamental changes in the physical 
characteristics of the body which both individuals share. In her book Wickedness, 
Midgley explains the significance of the physical alteration in the Jekyll/Hyde 
split as follows: without an understanding of a physical change in either the 
person of Dr Jekyll or Mr Hyde, we typically have difficulty in understanding how 
either person could really be seen as radically different persons. Midgley 
explains:      
 
The disadvantages of oscillating violently in this way are obvious, and 
in fact if we find people who seem to do it we tend to look for an 
explanation in some oscillation of their physical state. Without this 
extra factor, it is hard to see how the oscillator’s clarity of vision can 
really be maintained.313   
 
Initially, once separated, Dr Jekyll no longer associates himself with any of the 
activities performed by Mr Hyde.314 He has become a wholly separate individual 
and there is no longer a need for him to see any of his Hyde-like qualities as, in 
any sense, part of his true or real self. This dissociation of Dr Jekyll from Mr Hyde 
exhibits precisely the kind of externalisation of desires or volitions suggested by 
Frankfurt and Watson’s accounts of self-governance. Frankfurt explains this 
clearly when he says:  
 
Some of the psychic raw material that we confront may be so 
objectionable to us that we cannot permit it to determine our attitudes 
or behaviour. We cannot help having a dark side. However, we are 
resolved to keep it from producing any direct effect upon the design 
and conduct of our lives.315 
 
What Dr Jekyll begins to realise after his first spontaneous transformation into 
Mr Hyde, is that despite his dissociation from the latter, he remains inextricably 
bound to him. I think that it is plausible to say that in realising this, Dr Jekyll 
glimpses his own self-deception. In his attempt to wholly separate himself from 
Mr Hyde he thinks, like both Frankfurt and Watson, that he can isolate certain 
components of his whole self and declare that these aspects no longer truly 
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belonged to him. I suggest that in practicing this kind of self-deception, Dr Jekyll 
takes the first step on a path that ultimately leads to the dissolution of his 
psychological integrity.   
After his first spontaneous transformation into Mr Hyde, Dr Jekyll begins 
to see the danger of attempting to dissociate himself altogether from his Hyde-
like qualities. He explains as much, as follows: “I began to spy a danger that, if 
this [division] were much prolonged, the balance of my nature might be 
permanently overthrown.”316 It is from Dr Jekyll’s claim that we begin to realise 
the danger inherent in the process of dissociation. Indeed, such danger is alluded 
to by psychoanalysts in their discussion of the repression of certain psychic 
elements – by our censoring and relegating certain desires, or perhaps even 
other mental elements – to the realm of the unconscious where they can fester 
and erupt without warning.317 At a later point in Stevenson’s narrative, Dr Jekyll 
discovers that Mr Hyde is wanted for the murder of a high-ranking official. Dr 
Jekyll then makes an attempt at a more total kind of suppression of the part of 
his nature that he previously transferred into the person of Mr Hyde. The 
attempt is successful for a short period only, and eventually Jekyll admits the 
following: “I was still cursed with my duality of purpose; and as the first edge of 
my penance wore off, the lower side of me […] so recently chained down, began 
to growl for license.”318  
 
Gothic tales such as Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde are meant to shock their readers not 
only by presenting us with a narrative which forces us to reflect on our own self-
division, but by problematising our allegedly natural reactions – our attempts at 
rejection and dissociation – to our encounters with those seemingly alien aspects 
of ourselves. The suggestion, then, in much Gothic literature is that by attempting 
to resolve the internal conflict with rejection and externalisation, persons face 
the great danger of the dissolution of their psychological integrity and 
subjectivity.  
While there is some truth in Dr Jekyll’s statements that, first, to be human 
is to know conflict between opposing impulses, and, second, that mental life is 
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complex and multifaceted, by bringing internal conflict to the forefront, the 
conflict in Gothic narratives ultimately serve to estrange the characters from 
their doubles, putting them against one another, which finally results in the 
characters’ desperate attempts to ultimately sever any relation between them. 
So, in presenting himself as simply an extreme example of “the thorough and 
primitive duality of man,” Dr Jekyll is really being transparently and 
unsuccessfully, self-deceptive. The consequences, for him, like for all Gothic 
doubles, are disastrous. The tension between Dr Jekyll’s conflicting aspects of 
himself, and his attempts to dissociate himself from his hidden side (made 
manifest in Mr Hyde), ultimately results in total disintegration. Such a final acts 
of total severance or dissociation from the other within results ultimately in the 
death of the self.  
The kind of self-deception at play here is important, and has been 
described by Midgley as the failure of an agent to acknowledge all the aspects of 
herself, even those alien aspects, as being constitutive of herself. Midgley 
suggests that: 
 
self-deception arises because we see motives which are in fact our own 
as alien to us and refuse to acknowledge them. This is not an isolated 
event, but is one possible outcome of a very common and pervasive 
inner-dialogue, in which aspects of the personality appear to exchange 
views as if they were separate people. We are used to this interchange 
between alternating moods or viewpoints. (If we were not, we should 
probably find it much harder to disown some of them, because it 
would be harder to separate them from our official selves in the first 
place.)319 
 
Gothic fiction illustrates precisely this self-division, as well as the dangers of self-
deception, the kind of which Midgley associates with the naive rejection of 
certain aspects of ourselves as alien or wholly other. While conflict and division 
are essential features of our experience of our own subjectivity, Midgley argues 
that it is also an essential feature of our subjectivity that we experience a deep 
need to bring about inner harmony and integration in our psychic lives. She says:  
 
Integration of the person is not just an optional extra. It is a need. 
Human beings must have a structure, a policy, a continuity. Each has 
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only one life to live. He cannot split up as a coral colony would […] 
[C]omplete disintegration, then is hard to imagine. But partial cases 
are very common. Most of us have personalities fairly well integrated 
on one side, the side we attend to, but fragmented on others, to which 
we pay less attention.320 
 
It is this need which we fail to fulfil when we engage in the kind of self-deception 
mentioned above. The depiction of the doubles portrayed in Gothic fiction points 
precisely to the disintegration of psychical unity experienced when practicing 
Frankfurtian externalisation or dissociation, the result of which is a fractured 
individual who is no longer able to engage in the process of integration. 
Furthermore, on Midgley’s account, as persons, we manage our internal 
conflict by trying to achieve a necessary measure of integration and harmony 
within ourselves. Our efforts at integration and harmony are to a great extent the 
driving forces behind much of our activity when going about the daily business of 
living. Who we take ourselves to be, and what we think our character consists of, 
is constituted by our efforts to achieve a measure of integrity and consistency in 
the choices we make, the values we endorse and pursue, the commitments and 
loyalties we stick to, and the goals and projects that we either continue with, or 
give up on. We also typically think that there must be something wrong with a 
person, who, as Midgley describes, “drifts from act to act without any attempt at 
continuity or interest in relating them.”321 We would certainly think that such a 
person’s agency would be diminished by being in such a state. Our efforts to 
maintain a coherent picture of ourselves, then, is expressed in the “deep need 
which each of us feels to act somehow as a unity,” and marks the lifelong project 
of human personhood. Midgley explains: 
 
When we try, however faintly, to act rather than merely letting forces 
flow through us, we are not just trying to throw off some outside 
tyranny. Though there may be such a tyranny, the distinctively free 
effort surely lies in trying to impose unity on the inner conflict, to 
decide – as a whole person – what to do. That unity is not given. It is a 
constantly ongoing project, a difficult, essentially incomplete 
integration which can occupy our whole lives.322 
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It is at this point, then, that we come to understand Stevenson’s warning. His take 
on duplicity, in its entirety, implies something far graver than the rejection of 
selective identification and dissociation, purely because they are difficult to 
achieve. Stevenson’s ultimate warning is that when we externalise certain 
elements of ourselves, as seen in ways recommended by Frankfurt, the result is 
the loss of the potential to ever be an integrated self. When Stevenson explains 
that “Utterson knew he was looking on the body of a self-destroyer,”323 he gives 
us far more than a euphemism for the fact that Jekyll/Hyde had committed 
suicide. Rather, Stevenson expresses the very essence of the moral of his story, in 
which he “hazard[s] a guess that man will ultimately be known for a mere 
polarity of multifarious, incongruous and independent denizens.”324 In light of 
his statements, then, we deny something of fundamental importance about the 
nature of ourselves when we engage in the process of dissociation. We cannot 
then, if we take Stevenson’s warning seriously, agree that we could achieve self-
governance by adopting Frankfurt or Watson’s models, which require that we 
reject or externalise parts of our whole self. The “inner harmony”325 (the 
harmony Frankfurt associates with being wholehearted), which would result 
from this could only be seen as an inner harmony committed to a constant war 
within the self, and would be akin to a kind of forcing ourselves to be the kind of 
person that we want to be, rather than simply being the kind of person we want 
to be. As Freidman explains: 
  
What ontological importance could there be in the fact (if it is a fact) 
that the self happens to regard some feature of herself as her “true” 
self or to “identify” with it? Such identification may be merely a matter 
of how a person regards herself. Her view that a part of her self is her 
“true” self, or that her identity does reside in this part rather than that, 
does not necessarily bring it about that this part is her true self, or is 
the basis of her identity.326 
 
If we take the moral of the story presented in Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde to heart, then 
it requires that we shift our view. Instead of an account of personhood that 
allows for self-control, in which we understand one part of the self to be more 
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definitive than the whole self, we should move to an account that allows for self-
governance in which we understand the self as whole. It is only when we take 
into account the true nature of the whole self that we can properly achieve 
integration and harmony, which are associated with effective self-governance 
and personhood.  
 
3.4 Integrity 
 
Following, to some extent, Midgley and Nietzsche, I suggest in this section that 
the kind of integrity normatively required for personhood requires that we 
manage our internal conflicts without self-deception or repression. Further, I 
argue that integrity is required of persons not only within a volitional complex, 
but over a life.  
According to Midgley, persons are to be understood as distinct from non-
human animals because they can achieve a kind of integrity which amounts to a 
wholeness of self. Of non-human animals, she says the following: 
 
crudely speaking, though they do share our struggle to harmonize 
conflicting motives, they plainly do not have anything like our power 
of dealing with it by standing back from their various motives, by 
taking the point of view of the whole, and trying to make some kind of 
balanced decision.327 
 
In contrast, the kind of integrity that is unique to a human person involves 
constant reflection and evaluation of the kind of person we are as a whole – 
divisions and conflicts included. Through this constant reflection and evaluation, 
we are able to become clearer about our values, commitments, projects and 
goals, and so become clearer about our understanding of ourselves as persons. 
Recall here that, for Midgley, it is through this process of integration that we are 
responsible for our self-constitution with our whole self in mind, and in keeping 
our whole-self in mind we exhibit integrity.  
Similarly, we have also seen that for Nietzsche self-deception amounts to 
a lack of integrity in which the self is not considered as a whole self. In the 
Genealogy, Nietzsche says of the noble caste that they were “more whole human 
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beings.”328 Furthermore, for Nietzsche, wholeness of self is required for the kind 
of integrity characteristic of the Sovereign Individual, arguing that if we have 
achieved integrity: 
 
our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of 
us with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit – related and each 
with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one soil, 
one sun.329 
 
Recall here that on Nietzsche’s account, the antithesis of the Sovereign Individual 
is characterised by the ‘man of ressentiment’. Through an understanding of 
Nietzsche’s account of ressentiment, we can understand his account of integrity 
as a normative requirement for personhood. Importantly, Frankfurt’s and 
Watson’s suggestion of a normative requirement for personhood in the form of 
rejection and dissociation resembles in many ways what Nietzsche envisions as 
problematic in persons who he sees are guilty of ressentiment. The threat here to 
our personhood, for Nietzsche, is that we practice self-deception when we 
attempt to solve our internal conflicts by denying that some aspects of our whole 
self are really an expression of who we truly are. Recall that for Nietzsche, this 
means, that we might be guilty of ressentiment, since genuine affirmation or 
endorsement of our values or overarching guiding principles requires us to 
acknowledge, rather than reject or deny, the desires which may conflict with the 
desire we endorse. Recall further, that this acknowledgment involves the 
knowledge that the satisfaction of certain desires precludes the fulfilment of 
other of our desires; and if we do not acknowledge these conflicting desires as 
our own desires which now cannot reach fulfilment we are in a very important 
sense deceiving ourselves about ourselves, and are thus guilty of ressentiment. 
This, it seems, is precisely what we would be doing if we followed Frankfurt’s 
normative prescription for personhood in the form of wholeheartedness.  
Frankfurt’s and Watson’s solution to the internal psychological struggle 
within persons is explained and similarly criticised by Amelie Rorty in terms of a 
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practice which she refers to as ‘compartmentalization’ of the self.330 Those who 
practice compartmentalisation, according to Rorty, separate and effectively cut 
off certain aspects of themselves from others. Rorty explains: 
 
Because a divided self tends to undo itself, we naturally, without even 
being aware of it, attempt to smooth over the appearance of internal 
conflicts. Or, equally effectively, we compartmentalize attempting to 
separate different aspects of our lives. Movements toward psychological 
integration are Janus-faced: they can move toward integrity as well as 
toward corruption. And although compartmentalization is often effectively 
soothing, it can rot the mind.331 
 
Importantly, Rorty suggests that the practise of compartmentalisation can be an 
effective tool for an agent working towards integrity of the self, in which case the 
compartmentalisation is what she calls ‘soothing’ – by which, I take her to mean 
that the process is in some sense beneficial to the agent. The practice of 
compartmentalisation takes a sinister turn, however, when agents reject or deny 
various compartmentalised aspects of themselves – seeing them as wholly 
separate from an alleged true or real self. Nietzsche’s understanding of 
ressentiment is in many ways similar here to Rorty’s understanding of the 
practise of problematic compartmentalisation. It is this more sinister practice of 
compartmentalisation which lies at the heart of Frankfurt’s accounts of 
wholeheartedness. Rorty explains the movement towards psychological 
integration as ‘Janus-faced’, moving either towards corruption or integrity. It is 
my argument that the more sinister practice of compartmentalisation endorsed 
by Frankfurt leads to corruption of psychological integrity. For Nietzsche, 
ressentiment is, at least in part, a psychological condition which results in a 
fractured and damaged individual, lacking in integrity in this sense. The lack of 
integrity that Nietzsche associates with the ‘man of ressentiment’ has to do with 
the self-deception involved in failing to acknowledge our whole selves. Integrity 
requires this kind of honesty with ourselves, as Nietzsche explains, it is this 
honesty which secures integrity. This honesty and integrity is seen in the noble 
man, a man who he claims is not guilty of ressentiment. Nietzsche explains that 
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the noble man’s “predominance did not lie mainly in physical strength but in 
strength of soul – they were more whole human beings.”332 In part, however, our 
integrity is, for Nietzsche, also a reflection of a person’s bravery. Nietzsche says 
that: 
 
While the noble man lives in trust and openness with himself..., the man of 
ressentiment is neither upright nor naive nor honest and straightforward 
with himself. His soul squints.333 
 
There is a kind of bravery seen by Nietzsche in the noble man, which he refers to 
as ‘strength of soul’. This noble bravery is reflected in the Sovereign Individual, 
who realises that her genuine endorsement of a value involves stifling one or 
more of her other own desires. Such an agent is brave when she owns up to this 
realisation because she understands that by acting on her endorsed values she is 
herself both the one who commands herself and the one who obeys. Recall 
Nietzsche’s explanation: 
 
What is called “freedom of the will” is essentially the affect of superiority 
with respect to something which must obey “I am free ‘it’ must obey” – this 
consciousness lies in every will, along with a certain straining of attention, 
a straight look that fixes on one thing and one thing only, an unconditional 
evaluation “now this is necessary and nothing else,” an inner certainty that 
it will be obeyed, and whatever else comes with the position of the 
commander. A person who wills -, commands something inside himself 
that obeys, or that he believes to obey. But now we notice the strangest 
thing about the will – about this multifarious thing that people have only 
one word for. On the one hand, we are, under the circumstances, both the 
one who commands  and the one who obeys, and as the obedient one we 
are familiar with the feelings of compulsion, force, pressure, resistance, 
and motion that generally start right after the act of willing.334 
 
With this realisation the Sovereign Individual bravely exhibits the kind of 
‘wholeness’ of self associated with integrity, while avoiding self-deception.335 In 
this respect, then, I take the Nietzschean account to be better suited than 
Frankfurt or Watson’s account to the task of explaining the process of self-
governance effectively employed by the person. The person of integrity, for 
                                                 
332 BG 257. 
333 GM I: 10. 
334 BG 19. 
335 BG, 257; GM II: 2. 
 145 
Nietzsche, embraces her whole self, and feels the sting of this ‘wholeness’ in all of 
her actions which flow from her evaluations. In feeling this sting, she comes to 
terms with what Nietzsche would refer to as her ‘all-too-human’ psychological 
condition. It is in seeing ourselves as whole selves, and in coming to terms with 
our psychological condition, that we are most effectively able to exercise our self-
governance and personhood. And in aiming to be one’s whole-self, though such a 
self is likely to be fraught with some contradictions, it is my contention that it is, 
to some extent, these very contradictions which make up who we actually are. 
Our efforts as persons are not, then, best spent on committing ourselves to a 
constant war between unsynchronised factions of our selves. Rather, in 
recognising that all of these factions are components of our ‘true’ selves, our 
efforts are best spent in attempting to provide a single, integrated and thus 
polychromatic montage in which all of these factions are given representation. 
Even a polychromatic self is naturally subject to certain changes, but is most 
importantly to be viewed as a whole self, and thus a quest for self-governance 
can only result from an attempt to maintain the unity of that whole self.  
Not unlike Frankfurt and Watson, Nietzsche and Midgley maintain that 
integrity cannot be achieved without a degree of inner conflict and tension. For 
the latter, however, the processes of externalisation and dissociation pose a 
threat to our self-governance because they undermine our integrity as persons. If 
we see our inner conflicts as essential to who we are as persons, we lack, to some 
extent, a kind of absolute certainty about ourselves. But this uncertainty is a vital 
aspect of our subjectivity, and is detrimental to our personhood only insofar as 
we attempt to disown or disavow it. Moreover, this uncertainty about ourselves 
is compatible with the kind of integrity that Midgley and Nietzsche see as 
essential for self-governance. Cox, et al. have summarised this view of integrity in 
the following convincing way:  
 
The appearance of certainty throughout a person’s moral and 
volitional life may be, and often is, less a sign of integrity than an 
indication of its lack. Thus, we learn early to beware of the self 
righteous and sanctimonious. Such certainty is fostered by different 
kinds of refusal to reflect upon or acknowledge facts about oneself – a 
refusal to enter into the fray and nitty-gritty of a life in process. 
Certainty and self-righteous overconfidence often go hand in hand 
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with an inexorable consistency of judgment and action. Integrity 
should be confused with neither.336 
 
While Frankfurt and Watson’s positing of the person of certainty provides one 
extreme of a lack of integrity, Dr Jekyll provides an example of a person at the 
other extreme of fragmentation. Cox et al. explain this extreme as follows: 
 
Undue certainty, and concomitant cowardice and self deception, may 
show a lack of integrity but so does excessive or unwarranted, 
sometimes feigned, ambivalence. Those who can never make up their 
minds may be in the grip of a kind of pretence, one reinforced by 
cowardice and self-deception.337 
 
Integrity requires that we view ourselves as psychologically predisposed to have 
internal conflicts. Viewing ourselves as whole selves, acknowledging our internal 
conflict and tensions, thus promotes integrity and this, we think makes us live 
well. Integrity, serving as a normative prescription for personhood, should be 
seen as “a mean between, on the one hand, a disintegrated, utterly fragmented 
and capricious self and, on the other, a hollow, yet ruthlessly consistent self.”338 
Similarly, in support of this view of integrity, Midgley eloquently quotes Jung, as 
follows:  
 
Painful though it is, this [viewing our darker motivations as part of 
ourselves] is in itself a gain – for what is inferior or even worthless 
belongs to me as my shadow and gives me substance and mass. How 
can I be substantial if I fail to cast a shadow? I must have a dark side 
also if I am to be whole; and inasmuch as I become conscious of my 
shadow I also remember that I am a human being like any other.339 
 
 
The kind of integrity required for personhood, however, also requires not only 
integration within the volitional complex, but also over a life. Recall what 
Midgley says on this point: 
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Integration of the person is not just an optional extra. It is a need. 
Human beings must have a structure, a policy, a continuity. Each has 
only one life to live. He cannot split up as a coral colony would.340 
 
Similarly, Mark Freeman argues that there must be a kind of narrative integrity 
which unifies a life, saying: 
 
Human lives lived well, I suggest, are anything but the mere succession of 
moments they are sometimes made out to be or that they can become 
when they have no point. They are works of Imagination, more unruly 
than most works of fiction, to be sure, but no less poetic in their 
connectedness and in the possible beauty of their form.341 
  
And similarly, for Nietzsche our lives and indeed our selves bear striking 
resemblance to works of fiction or biography in that they rely on a similar kind of 
narrative structure. For Nietzsche “nothing that has happened to us is 
contingent”342 the occurrence of any given aspect of our lives or selves 
necessitates all the other aspects of our lives and selves. Nehamas explains the 
similarity clearly as follows: 
 
[A]bsolutely everything a character does is equally essential to it; 
characters and the works to which they undoubtedly must belong, are 
supposed to be constructed so that their every feature supports and is 
supported by every other one. In the limiting case of the perfect character, 
no change is possible without corresponding changes in every other 
feature in order to preserve coherence; and the net result is, necessarily, a 
different character – taking one part away may always result in the 
destruction of the whole. 343  
 
Since our lives resemble, for Nietzsche, the lives of literary characters in their 
structure and composition, the kind of inner harmony or internal coherence with 
which we associate the Sovereign Individual is a kind of narrative integrity – a 
coherence of a whole. The kind of narrative integrity seen as a feature of the 
Sovereign Individual requires the individual to affirm the whole – that is to affirm 
his existence as a distinctive whole character existing in a particular narrative 
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Further, in his paper ‘How One Becomes What One Is’, Nehamas suggests 
that Nietzsche’s concern with authenticity is rooted in the fact that much of 
Nietzsche’s thinking revolves around literary models. According to Nehamas, 
“What is essential to literary characters is their organization”344 – and it is this 
concern for the organisation of the whole which is central to Nietzsche’s 
characterisation of the Sovereign Individual in the form of his living a good and, I 
suggest in chapter four, authentic life. In chapter four, I will turn to the question 
of narrative integrity and authenticity and discuss further the possibilities it 
opens up for living our lives in ways which would express what Freeman calls 
‘beauty of form’.  
 
The kind of integrity which I suggest is a normative prescription for personhood 
requires both that we view ourselves as whole selves over a life, and that we 
view ourselves as whole selves who are psychologically predisposed to have 
internal conflicts and tensions throughout that life.  
Drawing on Midgley and Nietzsche, then, I have argued that since 
personhood involves self-governance over and above self-control, personhood 
normatively requires integrity. In the next chapter, I will argue that there are 
three further normative requirements for personhood. Persons must meet, I 
argue, a normative prescription in the form of ambivalence, and an epistemic 
normative requirement in the form of affirmation, as well as a normative 
requirement in the form of authenticity. 
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Chapter 4: Ambivalence, Affirmation, and Authenticity 
 
In the previous chapter, following Frankfurt to some extent, I argued that the 
concepts of human agency and personhood are to be understood as distinct from 
one another. I argued that as persons we express ourselves, in part, as 
individuals through our engagement with the internal conflict required for self-
control, and thus, through self-governance. Finally, I argued for a normative 
prescription for personhood in the form of integrity. In this chapter, I will argue 
that there is more to being a person than exercising self-governance and living 
with integrity. As such, I will explore in this chapter three further important 
normative prescriptions for personhood, all of which centre on the ability to 
exercise our agency well in the face of our vulnerability. 
 
First, following Nussbaum, I will argue against Frankfurt’s normative 
prescription for personhood in the form of wholehearted wholeheartedness and 
in favour of a normative prescription in the form of ambivalence, which is its 
opposite. In his account of personhood Frankfurt endorses a version of value 
pluralism, arguing that there can be conflicts among our decisive commitments 
themselves, and that the disparate values underpinning our conflicting 
commitments will not at all times be commensurable. In The Fragility of 
Goodness, Martha Nussbaum argues in favour of value pluralism on which 
“valuable things are plural, and are not reducible to some one valuable thing of 
which all other goods are mere functions.”345 Similarly, Lauren Apfel describes 
pluralism as the belief that there is a “plurality of values,” that is, the belief that 
the many values we encounter in life which “cannot be reduced to or derived 
from a single master value.”346 Pluralists maintain that values are irreducible in 
that they cannot always be “cashed out into a common currency, ranked into a 
hierarchy, or related to one another.”347 Most importantly, for my purposes in 
this chapter, pluralists hold that since the valuable things are irreducible, there is 
always the possibility for insoluble conflict between upholding certain values at 
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the expense of others. Nowhere is this conflict more evident, for Nussbaum, than 
in the Greek Tragedies, where the protagonists face “contingent conflicts of value 
that make it difficult or even impossible for them to pursue all the things to 
which they have committed themselves.”348 Apfel explains that on the pluralist 
account: 
… because of the ethical complexity of our lives—the reality that many 
goods will present themselves to us in such a way that their multiplicity 
cannot be diluted—certain of the values that we cherish and pursue will 
be unrealizable together. They will be uncombinable in a single human 
life or society. Some goods will completely preclude others.349 
Frankfurt argues in his account of personhood that regardless of the fact that 
conflict between our decisive commitments can, and does, occur, we ought to 
cultivate a more global wholeheartedness, or a wholehearted wholeheartedness 
as an antidote to the possible psychological destruction which results from cases 
in which we have to sacrifice one of our values for the sake of another. As such, 
Frankfurt maintains the view, popular in current moral philosophy, that we 
should be optimistic about the possibility of resolving value conflict.  
Against Frankfurt’s view, and following Nussbaum, I will argue in this 
chapter that “we should be more pessimistic […] about the possibilities of 
surmounting [value conflicts, because…] some spheres of value can never be 
balanced in a way that puts all conflict to rest for all time.”350 Following 
Nussbaum, I will argue in this chapter that goodness lies not in achieving 
Frankfurtian wholehearted wholeheartedness (in which values must be ranked 
and selected between), but in its opposite, ambivalence (in which we recognise 
that such ranking amongst values is itself problematic). Like Nussbaum, I see 
conflict between our decisive commitments or values as neither “an obstacle to 
be overcome,” nor “a problem to be solved,” rather this conflict must be seen as 
“an irremediable fact of the human condition: not simply a consequence of the 
scarcity of resources or the brevity of human life, but at times a deep and true 
reflection of the intrinsic nature of the values themselves.”351 Following this I 
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will argue in this chapter, contra Frankfurt, for a normative prescription for 
personhood in the form of ambivalence.  
 
Second, I will argue for a normative prescription for personhood in the form of 
acknowledgement and affirmation. According to Nussbaum, the ability to 
recognise the extent to which circumstances, events and other persons play a 
role “in the planning and conduct of our lives,”352 contributes to our ability to live 
well, and should this be seen as a normative requirement for personhood. 
Following Nussbaum, I will argue that it is an epistemic normative requirement 
for personhood that we recognise our own human fragility and our vulnerability 
to things over which we have no control. Further, drawing on Nietzsche’s 
account of the Sovereign Individual, I will argue that to exercise our agency well, 
or to live well, requires not only that a person recognises their own limits and 
vulnerabilities, but that they actively affirm their vulnerability. Affirmation here 
is not to be understood as an emotional state, but rather as an attitude we take to 
a state of affairs, namely our vulnerability. R. Jay Wallace in The View from Here: 
On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret, defines affirmation along 
these lines as follows: 
  
To affirm something, in the relevant sense, is to judge that it is valuable 
along some dimension or other, and also prefer on balance – taking 
everything into account – that it should not be otherwise than it is.353  
 
 
Third, I will argue for a normative prescription for personhood in the form of 
authenticity. On John Stuart Mill’s account in ‘Of Individuality’, he explores the 
concept of human authenticity in terms of our ability to direct ourselves to “use 
and interpret experience in [our] own way”.354 Following Mill, we can 
understand authenticity as the creative response to our environment which 
fosters individuality and originality. On such a view, authenticity adds aesthetic 
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value to our lives, contributing to our living well by making our lives beautiful. 
According to Mill: 
 
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in 
themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth… that human beings 
become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation.355 
 
Again, Mill stresses the importance of authenticity in our understanding of 
ourselves as persons when he says: 
 
Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to 
do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to 
grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the 
inward forces which make it a living thing.356 
 
Authenticity, then, is inextricably linked to the notion of our individuality and the 
aesthetic flourish with which it imbues our lives. In this chapter I suggest that it 
is through being authentic that we might come to practice the ‘art of living’ 
through which we might come to live most fully as persons.  
 
4.1. Wholehearted Wholeheartedness and Ambivalence  
 
In the previous chapter I raised concerns about Frankfurt’s normative 
prescription for personhood in the form of wholeheartedness because of its 
corollary in the form of dissociation and rejection. Given my objections to 
Frankfurtian wholeheartedness, I suggested that integrity rather than 
wholeheartedness is a normative prescription for personhood. In this section I 
raise further concerns about Frankfurt’s normative prescriptions both for 
‘wholeheartedness’ and against ‘ambivalence’. In making his normative 
prescription of wholeheartedness, not only does Frankfurt suggest that 
dissociation and rejection are required for wholeheartedness, but he also 
suggests further that a more global wholehearted wholeheartedness is required 
to combat the kind of ambivalence which threatens our wholeheartedness on a 
global scale. Using cases of tragic conflict as a springboard for my discussion, I 
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argue against Frankfurtian wholehearted wholeheartedness, as it is normatively 
understood. Following Nussbaum, I argue that it is a normative requirement for 
personhood that persons ought to experience ambivalence.  
 
Recall that on Frankfurt’s view, inner conflicts can arise not only between first 
and second order desires, but may also arise at the level of our higher order 
volitions – that is, between and amongst our second order volitions themselves. 
Recall further that, according to Frankfurt,  a person is ambivalent when he 
experiences a tension within his own ‘volitional complex’ – the person can be 
seen to have second order volitions which contradict one another and serve to 
promote mutually exclusive actions on the part of that person. When a person is 
ambivalent, then, Frankfurt says that there is “no unequivocal answer to the 
question of what the person really wants,”357 by which he means that a person is 
unable to make a decisive commitment to one of his second order volitions. The 
ambivalent person is volitionally conflicted and thus, despite having engaged in 
the process of critical reflection on her first order desires, such a person has no 
one particular point of view from which to act which could be seen as her point 
of view.  
Following this, Frankfurt suggests a normative understanding of 
ambivalence in which ambivalence threatens our personhood, because it 
undermines our ability to be particular subjects – that is, to have made decisive 
commitments about our second order volitions, and thus to have formed a 
particular point of view from which to speak which can be seen as our own 
particular, subjective, point of view. On Frankfurt’s view, the ambivalent person 
vacillates between volitions, and this manifests in their lives as inconstancy in 
action, and the inability to form a coherent picture of themselves as subjects 
precisely because of a lack of decisiveness about their volitions. For Frankfurt, 
ambivalence is thus to be avoided, normatively speaking, because it has 
psychological consequences which limit rather than promote our personhood. 
Accordingly, Frankfurt explains the pathology underlying the classical Freudian 
case of the Rat Man – one of Freud’s most famous case studies – as a case of 
ambivalence. Frankfurt argues that in the Rat Man’s case, his volitional 
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vacillation between love and hatred for his father could not be overcome by self-
deception or by repression, but can be solved only by his decisive commitment to 
one or another of his volitions. In Frankfurt’s words: 
 
In order for the Rat Man to be wholeheartedly on the side of his benign 
attitudes, it would not have been necessary for him to conceal his hostile 
feelings from himself. Nor would he have had to refrain from making a 
conscious effort to deal with those feelings in whatever ways might be 
effective and helpful. It would have required only that, in the struggle 
between his hatred and his love for his father, he himself come to stand 
decisively against the hatred and behind the love.358  
 
Frankfurt explains again as follows: 
 
Surely it is ambivalence, and not wholeheartedness, that is a disease of the 
will…the Rat Man’s symptoms “often involved repeatedly doing and 
undoing an action, or thinking and contradicting a thought.” That sort of 
self-defeating behavior and thought violates the elementary requirements 
of rationality. It is not a consequence of repression as such, but 
ambivalence. It is a manifestation of the incoherence in which, precisely, 
the divided will of ambivalence consists. The desire for wholeheartedness 
is nothing other than a desire to be free of this crippling irrationality.359 
 
Through making a decisive commitment, we become, for Frankfurt, 
wholehearted in our commitments, and it is through the psychic unity that 
wholeheartedness brings, that our personhood is promoted. Thus, being 
wholehearted, according to Frankfurt, is the cure to the Rat Man’s ambivalence, 
and indeed to all other cases of ambivalence of this sort. 
In Necessity, Volition and Love,360 published over a quarter of a century 
after ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Frankfurt explicitly 
develops his account of personhood in which the notions of ambivalence and 
wholeheartedness play a central role. Here Frankfurt suggests that over and 
above the self-control required for agency, personhood requires that we live in 
accordance with the ideals which we have set for ourselves through our decisive 
commitments. Wholeheartedness requires, for Frankfurt, that we stand 
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resolutely behind our decisive commitments, and that our decisive commitments 
give us normative reasons for action – that is, when we fail to act in accordance 
with our decisive commitments we fail to exercise our agency well. Importantly, 
Frankfurt argues that while our agency is undermined by actions which are 
compulsive or compelled, as persons we are subject to further normative 
constraints on our actions. He calls actions which are neither compelled nor 
compulsive ‘wholly voluntary’ in the sense that our agency has not been 
undermined (we have still exercised self-control in such cases), but argues that, 
as persons, there are circumstances in which we have ‘no real alternatives’ to 
performing certain of these voluntary actions, normatively speaking. According 
to Frankfurt, our being wholehearted requires that we perform certain voluntary 
actions necessarily. That is, in making our decisive commitments, we are now 
normatively constrained by the things which we have made decisive 
commitments about.  
As persons, Frankfurt plausibly argues, we are constrained in our actions 
by the goals and values we set for ourselves through our decisive commitments 
in three distinct ways: by what Frankfurt calls the ‘necessities of ambition and 
prudence’; the ‘necessities of duty’; and the ‘necessities of love’. Frankfurt suggests 
that we are normatively bound in our actions by the commitments we have made 
to achieve our settled goals, we are normatively bound by a set of moral 
obligations, and we are bound by the commitments we make to the things and 
persons we genuinely care about. Importantly, according to Frankfurt, if we fail 
to act in accordance with our decisive commitments – that is, when we fail to act 
from the necessity given by our decisive commitments – we fail to be 
wholehearted. Any failure in wholeheartedness is described by Frankfurt as a 
form of self betrayal which results in ‘drastic psychic injuries’ to the person, 
which compromises our ability to be good agents, or to live well. He says:  
 
A person who fails to act in the ways that caring about his beloved 
requires necessarily fails to live in accordance with his ideal for himself. 
In betraying the object of his love, he therefore betrays himself as well. 
Now the fact that a person betrays himself entails of course, a rupture in 
his inner cohesion or unity; it means that there is a division within his 
will. There is, I believe, a quite primitive human need to establish and to 
maintain volitional unity. Any threat to this unity – that is, any threat to 
the cohesion of the self – tends to alarm a person and to mobilize him for 
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an attempt at “self-preservation.” … He is opposing ends and interests 
that are essential to his nature as a person. In other words, he is 
betraying himself. We are naturally averse to inflicting upon ourselves 
such drastic psychic injuries.361  
 
An important question about wholeheartedness should be raised at this point in 
Frankfurt’s account: what about the possibility of conflict between our decisive 
commitments themselves? Frankfurt argues, I think importantly and 
problematically that in those rare instances in which a person is torn between to 
opposing decisive commitments which are ‘equally essential to their nature as a 
person’, the self-betrayal involved in acting on either one of those decisive 
commitments undermines their personhood in a fundamental way. Since 
personhood involves for Frankfurt expressing ourselves as a particular 
individual, when our personhood is undermined by self-betrayal, we are no 
longer that same particular individual who we were before. In Frankfurt’s words:  
 
Situations in which it is impossible for a person to avoid this sort of self-
betrayal provide the theme for one variety of human tragedy. Thus, 
Agamemnon at Aulis is destroyed by an inescapable conflict between 
two equally defining elements of his own nature: his love for his 
daughter and his love for the army he commands. His ideals for himself 
include both being a devoted father and being devoted to the welfare of 
his men. When he is forced to sacrifice one of these, he is thereby forced 
to betray himself. Rarely, if ever, do tragedies of this sort have sequels. 
Since the volitional unity of the tragic hero has been irreparably 
ruptured, there is a sense in which the person he had been no longer 
exists. Hence, there can be no continuation of his story.362  
 
 
Frankfurt suggests, then, that in cases of tragic conflict in which a person is truly 
ambivalent with regard to having to act on only one of two competing decisive 
commitments (that is, in cases where an agent must, when acting, sacrifice one 
genuine value for the sake of another genuine value), an agent’s personhood is 
undermined in that they are no longer the same person they were before, after 
acting. Similarly Velleman says of Frankfurt’s account: 
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[A] threat to the self, as conceived by Frankfurt, comes from 
ambivalence, which guarantees that one or another element of the self 
will have to be sacrificed when a choice is made. If the self is to have any 
chance of remaining whole, it must be wholehearted, in the sense of 
being unequivocal in its essential concerns.363 
 
If we care about our selves as persons, it seems to follow normatively from 
Frankfurt’s account that we ought to strive to avoid cases of ambivalence 
between our decisive commitments. We can do this, Frankfurt suggests, by 
cultivating a more global wholeheartedness amongst our decisive commitments, 
or a wholehearted wholeheartedness we might call it.  
 In the case of the Rat Man discussed above, being wholeheartedly 
wholehearted requires that the Rat Man make a decisive commitment to resolve 
his ambivalence. Cases of tragic conflict, however, provide us with the most 
extreme and interesting cases of conflict at the level of our decisive 
commitments. In what follows I will argue contra Frankfurt that that in cases of 
tragic conflict we ought not, like the Rat Man, to make a decisive commitment to 
resolving our ambivalence between our decisive commitments.   
 In his discussion above, Frankfurt uses the ancient Greek tragedy of 
Agamemnon as an illustrative example of a case of tragic conflict in which there 
a person is ambivalent between their decisive commitments. What makes the 
case of Agamemnon of particular interest is that, at least according to Frankfurt’s 
characterization of Agamemnon’s situation, he is caught in a situation in which 
whatever he does, he will commit an act of self-betrayal and his personhood will 
be undermined. Accordingly, for Frankfurt the tragedy of Agamemnon’s case lies 
precisely in the fact that he is obligated by two competing and contradictory, yet 
both normatively required, actions as determined by his own decisive 
commitments. Unlike the Rat Man then, his ambivalence cannot in principle be 
resolved because there is no way for the person to be ‘unequivocal’ in his final 
decisive commitment in his situation, and there is no way for him to resolve this 
conflict. Since the self-betrayal involved in Agamemnon’s actions undermines his 
personhood, it follows that on Frankfurt’s account it would be all things 
considered better if Agamemnon were to be able to wholeheartedly commit 
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himself to either of his competing decisive commitments. Nussbaum, however, 
provides us with a contrary, and I think convincing, reading of the tragedy in 
Agamemnon’s case which should lead us to reject Frankfurt’s suggestion that 
self-betrayal and ambivalence undermine personhood by undermining our 
ability to live well. Further, following Nussbaum, I argue that personhood 
normatively requires that person’s ought to experience ambivalence, and ought 
not to resolve conflicts between their decisive commitments through becoming 
wholeheartedly wholehearted.  
In his characterization of Agamemnon’s case, Frankfurt supports the claim 
that a commitment to value pluralism entails that there can be cases of tragic 
conflict in which persons are forced to betray themselves in their actions. For the 
value monist, even in Agamemnon’s dilemma, there is only one right course of 
action to take. If Agamemnon were to take this ‘right’ course of action, there 
would be no reason for him not to be wholeheartedly wholehearted about his 
choice, and so his lack of wholehearted wholeheartedness would amount to a 
failing on his part to selectively identify with the one, clearly right choice. 
Nussbaum argues, here, that for value monists, in the case of Agamemnon’s 
dilemma, “at most one requirement could be legitimate or valid, if we find it, it is 
the true obligation, and the other one naturally ceases to exert any claim on our 
attention.”364 But as Frankfurt suggests, in the case of Agamemnon, there is no 
clearly right choice to make between his two competing volitions. And it is 
precisely in this incommensurability of values for Agamemnon that leads 
Frankfurt to his conclusion that tragic conflict necessarily leads to self-betrayal – 
that is, the kind of self betrayal involved in acting against our own decisive 
commitments or genuine values.  
In The Fragility of Goodness365, Nussbaum argues that a commitment to 
strong value pluralism entails the possibility of a person finding themselves in a 
situation where a conflict between their values cannot be resolved, or in which it 
is made impossible for a person to be wholeheartedly wholehearted. Nussbaum 
says: 
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The recognition of a plurality of genuine goods always leaves open the 
possibility of conflict; thus we should be more pessimistic than Hegel 
was about the possibilities of surmounting them. I continue to believe 
that this is basically correct: some spheres of value can never be 
balanced in a way that puts all conflict to rest for all time.366 
 
Value pluralism thus entails, for Nussbaum, that persons will, from time to time, 
be subject to “contingent conflicts of value that make it difficult or even 
impossible for them to pursue all the things to which they have committed 
themselves.”367 According to Nussbaum these situations expose the ways in 
which persons are “vulnerable to luck,”368 and she argues that we can distinguish 
between cases in which luck affects not merely our ‘contentment, but ethical 
goodness itself’.  She explains as follows: 
 
We are considering situations, then, in which a person must choose to do 
(have) either one thing or another. Because of the way the world has 
arranged things, he or she cannot do (have) both, or, regardless of what 
he actually wants, he has some reason to do (have) both. Both 
alternatives make serious claim upon his practical attention. He senses 
that no matter how he chooses he will be left with some regret that he 
did not do the other thing. Sometimes the decision itself may be difficult; 
his concerns seem evenly balanced. Sometimes he may be clear about 
which is the better choice, and yet feel pain over the frustration of other 
significant concerns… We want ultimately to ask whether among these 
cases there are some in which not just contentment, but ethical goodness 
itself, is affected: whether there is sometimes not just the loss of 
something desired, but actual blameworthy wrongdoing – and therefore, 
occasion not only for regret but for an emotion more like remorse.369 
 
Agamemnon, she argues, provides us with an example in which ethical goodness 
itself is at stake. On Nussbaum’s detailed reading, Agamemnon commits an 
action “without any direct physical compulsion and in full knowledge of its 
nature,”370 that is to say, he exercises the self-control central to human agency, 
but is constrained by his situation which forces him to choose between to equally 
important values which he selectively identifies with. Agamemnon is forced by 
his situation to commit an action about which it can be said that his “ethical 
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character or commitments would otherwise dispose him to reject the act.”371 
Nussbaum explains: 
 
Agamemnon is allowed to choose: that is to say, he knows what he is 
doing; he is neither ignorant of the situation nor physically compelled; 
nothing forces him to choose one course rather than the other. But he is 
under necessity in that his alternatives include no very desirable 
options.372 
 
In Aeschylus’s tragedy, Agamemnon explains his dilemma as one in which he will 
be forced, whichever way he acts, to betray his own goals and values set by his 
decisive commitments. Agamemnon says: 
 
“A heavy doom is disobedience, but heavy too, if I should rend my own 
child, the adornment of my house, polluting a father’s hands with 
streams of slaughtered maiden’s blood close by the altar. Which of these 
is without evils?”373 
 
Importantly, however, Nussbaum argues that even in Agamemnon’s case, there is 
still room for ethical assessment of Agamemnon in his situation, and this 
assessment has everything to do with his wholehearted wholeheartedness. 
According to Nussbaum’s reading the case of Agamemnon differs from the 
biblical tale of Abraham in an important way, namely in difference between 
Abraham and Agamemnon’s reactions to their ambivalence. While initially 
similar, in that both Agamemnon and Abraham find themselves in situations in 
which generally good men must “either kill an innocent child out of obedience to 
a divine command, or incur the heavier guilt of disobedience and impiety,”374 the 
two tragic tales, she argues, diverge radically from this point onwards. According 
to Nussbaum, in Abraham’s case, we see a “delicate struggle between love and 
pious obligation […] followed by a sacrifice executed with horror and 
reluctance.”375 Abraham, it seems, remains ambivalent about his actions, torn 
between two decisive commitments which are equally constitutive of himself, 
even when the time came to act. Though Abraham is not made impotent in his 
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ability to settle on and choose a course of action - choosing to act in accordance 
with the necessities of duty – it remains true of him that he remains ambivalent 
about the choice he has made. Nussbaum claims that Agamemnon’s tale is quite 
different to the tale of Abraham, precisely because Agamemnon should be seen 
as wholeheartedly embracing his choice and overcoming his ambivalence. 
Nussbaum explains this wholehearted wholeheartedness as an “unnatural 
cooperation of internal with external forces,”376 and claims that unlike Abraham 
who remains conflicted about his choice of action and continues to rile against 
the hand that fate has dealt him, Agamemnon accepts his situation and has no 
remorse or regret about executing his chosen course of action. In wholeheartedly 
embracing one rather than another of his decisive commitments, Agamemnon, 
unlike Abraham, turns himself into a ‘collaborator’ with fate and a ‘willing victim’ 
of circumstances. Nussbaum explains: 
 
Agamemnon now begins to cooperate inwardly with necessity, 
arranging his feelings to accord with his fortune. From the moment he 
makes his decision, itself the best he could have made, he strangely turns 
himself into a collaborator, a willing victim.377 
 
Given his situation, Nussbaum claims that we would expect Agamemnon, who 
has been characterised as a good king and loving father in the narrative thus far, 
to react with ‘pain and revulsion’ to having settled on a course of action in which 
he would sacrifice his own daughter, and betray his decisive commitment to 
being a good father. How Agamemnon in fact approaches his choice, Nussbaum 
argues, radically undermines this basic ethical expectation, and challenges his 
‘goodness itself’. According to Nussbaum’s translation Agamemnon reacts to his 
decision with wholehearted acceptance, saying: 
 
“For it is right and holy that I should desire with exceedingly 
impassioned passion… the sacrifice staying the winds, the maiden’s 
blood. May all turn out well.”378 
 
                                                 
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid. 
378 Aeschylus in Ibid. 
 162 
Nussbaum argues that there are two important things we should take note of in 
light of what Agamemnon says here:  
 
Agamemnon seems to have assumed, first, that if he decided right, the 
action chosen must be right; and, second, that if an action is right, it is 
appropriate to want it, even to be enthusiastic about it.379 
 
Nussbaum argues that Agamemnon’s attitude toward his chosen course of action 
“seems to have changed with the making of it”.380 While his description of his 
situation made earlier in the narrative shows his reluctance to perform either of 
his possible actions, once he has made the choice between alternatives, 
Nussbaum argues that he now takes an attitude of “peculiar optimism,”381 saying: 
  
An act we were prepared to view as the lesser of two hideous wrongs 
and impieties has now become for him pious and right, as though by 
some art of decision-making he had resolved the conflict and disposed of 
the other ‘heavy doom’.382 
 
Along with his new attitude towards his decision Agamemnon also sees his 
choice as justified, since he “has chosen the better course, all may yet turn out 
well.”383  Further, and importantly, in Agamemnon seeing his choice as the better 
or right choice, he also comes to think that it is good for him to be 
wholeheartedly wholehearted in his choice and embrace it with vigour. 
Nussbaum says: 
 
At the same time, we notice that the correctness of his decision is taken 
by him to justify not only action, but also passion: if it is right to obey the 
god, it is right to want to obey him, to have an appetite for the crime, 
even to yearn for it with impassioned passion. 384 
 
Following Nussbaum, then, contra Frankfurt there can be a sequel to 
Agamemnon’s story because Agamemnon overcomes his ambivalence through 
wholehearted wholeheartedness, and thus, ultimately, Agamemnon does not 
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seem to be guilty of the Frankfurtian sort of self-betrayal – he is in fact 
wholeheartedly wholehearted about his decisive commitments. But Agamemnon 
seems to me to be guilty of a deeper kind of self-betrayal, and, according to 
Nussbaum, the tragedy in Agamemnon’s case is the result of what she sees as a 
normative transgression on his part.  
Nussbaum claims that the inescapable dilemma in which Agamemnon finds 
himself – either failing in his duty as King and divine subject or sacrificing his 
own daughter – results from purely “external and contingent”385 factors and not 
from any “personal guilt of Agamemnon’s.”386 The tragic conflict is seen in the 
Oresteia, according to Nussbaum, because Agamemnon commits the 
transgression willingly, and indeed wholeheartedly, and can thus be subject to 
moral assessment - despite the fact that we think Agamemnon would, given a 
different set of alternatives, perhaps not commit the act at all. In support of her 
argument in favour of finding moral fault with Agamemnon’s actions she draws 
on textual support from the lines of the Chorus, saying: 
 
The Chorus does not so much blame the fact of the action, for which they 
feel the gods bear a primary responsibility… What they impute to 
Agamemnon himself is a change of thought and passion accompanying 
the killing for which they clearly hold him responsible. He put up with it. 
He did not struggle against it… Never, in the choral narration or 
subsequently, do we hear the king utter a word of regret or painful 
memory.387   
 
Similarly, she draws on the Chorus in the tragedy of Eteocles, to argue in support 
of her moral assessment of Agamemnon, saying again: 
 
But what we, with the women of the chorus, feel most clearly is, as in 
Agamemnon’s case, the perversity of the king’s imaginative and 
emotional response to this serious practical dilemma. He appears to feel 
no opposing claim, no pull, no reluctance. He goes ahead with eagerness, 
even passion. It is around these deficiencies of vision and response that 
the blame of the chorus centres: his eagerness, his bad eros, his bestially 
hungry desire. Whether or not they would have chosen differently, they 
are clear that he has made things too simple. He has failed to see and 
                                                 
385 Ibid, p. 34. 
386 Ibid, p. 33. 
387 Ibid, pp. 36-37. 
 164 
respond to his conflict as the conflict it is, this crime compounds the 
already serious burden of his action.388 
 
What makes Agamemnon, and equally Eteocles, morally blameworthy in 
Nussbaum’s opinion, is both that he fails to recognise “the situation as a situation 
that forces him to act against his character,” and that he fails to acknowledge that 
this is a case in which he “will have to do wrong” because the case is not 
soluble.389 It is, for Nussbaum then, the recognition on our own part of a genuine 
plurality of goods which is essential to our moral character, further, in 
recognising this, the person of good moral character will cultivate a kind of 
ambivalence in which he still feels “the force of the losing claim”, and in 
Agamemnon’s case “the demand of good character for remorse and 
acknowledgement.”390 Importantly, it is through ambivalence that the person of 
good moral character will “feel and exhibit the feelings appropriate to a person 
of good character caught in such a situation,” Nussbaum says:  
 
He would not regard the fact of decision as licensing feelings of self-
congratulation much less feelings of unqualified enthusiasm for the act 
chosen. He will show in his emotive behaviour, and also genuinely feel, 
that this is an act deeply repellent to him and to his character. Though he 
must, to some extent, act like a person ‘who is called by the worst 
names’, he will remember, regret and, where possible make reparations. 
This emotion, moreover, will not be simply regret, which could be felt 
and expressed by an uninvolved spectator and does not imply that he 
himself has acted badly. It will be an emotion more like remorse, closely 
bound up with acknowledgement of the wrong that he has as an agent, 
however reluctantly, done.391  
 
Following Nussbaum’s argument, then, it would seem that it is ambivalence, 
rather than wholehearted wholeheartedness, which ought to serve as a positive 
normative requirement for personhood. To this effect, Nussbaum argues that is 
‘human goodness itself’ which is at stake in our pursuit of either wholehearted 
wholeheartedness or ambivalence, saying in favour of ambivalence:  
 
If we were such that we could in a crisis dissociate ourselves from one 
commitment because it clashed with another, we would be less good. 
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Goodness itself, then, insists that there should be no further or more 
revisionary solving.392 
 
I think that Nussbaum’s suggestion here is intuitively plausible. If we accept 
value pluralism, being able to make a decisive commitment in the face of a clash 
between two of our genuine commitments would, contra Frankfurt, look quite 
clearly to us like an act of self-betrayal. 
This kind of self-betrayal is often associated in popular discourse with what 
are sometimes called ‘Sophie’s choice cases’ originating from the case of Sophie 
presented in William Styron’s novel Sophie’s Choice.393 In that novel, Styron 
describes the case of Sophie, a woman detained with her two children in a Nazi 
concentration camp during the Second World War. Sophie is forced to make a 
choice between which one of her children will live and which one will die by a 
Nazi doctor:  
 
… the doctor said, “You may keep one of your children” 
“Bitte?” said Sophie. 
“You may keep one of your children,” he repeated. “The other one will 
have to go. Which will you keep?” 
“You mean I have to choose?” 
… Her thought process dwindled, ceased. Then she felt her legs crumple. “I 
can’t choose! I can’t choose!” She began to scream… 
Tormented angels never screeched so loudly above hell’s pandemonium. 
“Ich kann nicht wahlen!” she screamed. 
The doctor was aware of the unwanted attention. “Shut up!” he ordered. 
“Hurry now and choose. Choose goddamnit, or I’ll send them both over 
there. Quick!” 
.. “Don’t make me choose,” she heard herself plead in a whisper, “I can’t 
choose.” 
“Send them both over there, then,” The doctor said to the aide, “nach 
links.” 
“Mama!” She heard Eva’s thin but soaring cry at the instant that she thrust 
the child away from her and rose from the concrete with a clumsy 
stumbling motion. “Take the baby!” she cried out. “Take my little girl!”394 
     
Cases of tragic conflict, like Sophie’s or Agamemnon’s, expose in my opinion the 
shortcomings of Kantian and Utilitarian approaches to ethics, as well as so called 
‘could-have-done-otherwise’ approaches to moral responsibility. On all of these 
approaches we can make a moral assessment of Sophie’s choice. As I see it, such 
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moral evaluation is misguided. Sophie’s choice, it seems to me, is less important 
than the way Sophie’s goes about choosing – that is, what is most important here 
is how Sophie has made the choice, or how Sophie has approached and reacted 
both in and to her situation. Similarly, if ambivalence is a normative requirement 
for personhood, our moral evaluation is directed at Sophie herself, asking 
essentially how we judge Sophie’s character. In Styron’s novel, Sophie reacts to 
her situation in precisely the opposite way to Agamemnon, in Aeschylus’s play. If 
we agree with Nussbaum and if we accept ambivalence as a normative 
prescription for personhood, then we should have a favourable moral judgment 
of Sophie regardless of what her actual choice was precisely because our moral 
judgment should be directed to the way in which Sophie responds to her 
situation and her choice.  
If this is the case, we might expect a happy ending for Sophie’s case, since 
she has, after all, acted as the virtuous person would in her circumstances – if 
Sophie did the right thing by being ambivalent, unlike for Agamemnon, all “may 
yet turn out well”. But Styron’s novel is no less tragic than Aeschylus’s play, and 
Sophie’s eventual suicide is the culmination of a life we would be hard pressed to 
describe as happy. Part of the tragic story in Sophie’s case is the effect of Sophie’s 
choice on her life following her choosing. Sophie’s ambivalence becomes all 
consuming, and she is never able to overcome her loss, or her grief and guilt. In 
light of this, it might be argued in favour of Frankfurt’s normative prescription 
for personhood in the form of wholehearted wholeheartedness, that were Sophie 
to have resolved her ambivalence through her choice, she might have been able 
to better come to terms with that choice, and she might have been able to, after a 
suitable period of morning and regret, go on living out the rest of her life in this 
world, opening herself up to new experiences and what joy the world may still 
have to offer her.  
I think there is little evidence to suggest that if Sophie were to have acted 
wholeheartedly she would have been able, eventually, to enjoy the rest of her life, 
but her life would nevertheless have been compromised from the ethical point of 
view. Having acted wholeheartedly wholehearted in her situation, if it could have 
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been at all possible,395 would have been an act of self-betrayal on her part, which 
I think she would similarly be hard pressed to ‘get over’. Her genuine love for 
two incommensurable goods, her children, precludes her acting wholeheartedly 
wholehearted without deeply rupturing her sense of self which would have 
caused her to have emotionally similar reactions to the case in which she exhibits 
unwavering ambivalence. It seems clear to me, then, that in tragic cases, such as 
those of Agamemnon and Sophie, ethics and happiness may well have to come 
apart. Aristotle himself thought that some lives, however virtuously lived, can 
nevertheless, in light of their tragic circumstances, fail to be flourishing lives. 
Horsthouse explains this intuitively plausible Aristotelian insight as follows: 
 
‘Good action’ is so called advisedly, and although it is conceptually linked to 
morally correct (right) decision and to ‘action of the virtuous agent’, it is also 
conceptually linked to ‘good life’ and eudiamonia.  
 The actions a virtuous agent is forced to in tragic dilemmas fail to be good 
actions because of the doing of them, no matter how willingly or involuntary, 
mars or ruins a good life. So to say that there are some dilemmas from which 
even a virtuous agent cannot emerged having acted well is just to say that 
there are some from which even a virtuous agent cannot emerge with her 
life unmarred…396 
 
Even more importantly, the deeper tragedy at work in Sophie’s Choice stems from 
our acknowledgement of the tension between Sophie’s acting well (by being 
ambivalent) and Sophie’s tragic life. Here is revealed most poignantly the tragic 
truth of life: that a life lived well does not necessitate happiness. And in this 
revelation, we rile at the tragic story because of our distaste for and 
uncomfortableness with the deep injustice of our human situation. But this 
should not overshadow a crucial aspect of Sophie’s story which distinguishes it 
from that of Agamemnon’s, and which is of greatest significance to my claim that 
ambivalence is a normative prescription for personhood. Our judgment of 
Sophie’s character is favourable because she acknowledges the full weight of 
both her situation and her actions, and it is unclear whether our judgment of her 
would remain favourable if her life story did not reflect this tragedy.   
                                                 
395 I think that Sophie’s case presents us with a situation in which wholeheartedness might 
genuinely not be possible. Sophie loves both of her children, and it would be difficult to imagine 
that she could be wholehearted about a decision to have either one of them killed. 
396 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 1999, p. 74. 
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Cases of tragic conflict, then, help us to understand what is normatively 
required of persons, that is, to exercise our agency well. What is required, 
normatively of persons, is that they experience ambivalence in cases of tragic 
conflict. Of course, we are hopeful that we may never ourselves end up in 
situations as desperate as those dreamed up by the tragedians, nevertheless the 
normative insight highlighted through tragedy is no less important for us as we 
go about our daily lives. If we accept value pluralism, we will face real and 
significant conflicts between our values from time to time, perhaps even most of 
the time, and this makes us, as persons, extremely vulnerable sorts of beings. I 
may have to choose to sacrifice familial values for the sake of my professional 
values, or I may have to sacrifice social values for the sake of my political values. 
In many of these cases, my choices to sacrifice something of value should be 
accompanied by a sense of regret, and sometimes remorse. Though I may 
ultimately be satisfied by my choices, in remaining ambivalent about them, I pay 
homage to both values, even when only upholding one in my actions. It is 
through our ambivalence in the face of a plurality of goods that we are able to 
truly understand ourselves as the kinds of creatures that we are, that is, 
creatures living complex and dynamic lives where values often place competing, 
even tragic, demands on us. Persons are vulnerable beings because the world in 
which they live.  
 
In this section I have argued, contra Frankfurt, for a normative prescription for 
personhood in the form of ambivalence. Following Nussbaum I argued that cases 
of tragic conflict highlight the importance of ambivalence for exercising our 
agency well in the face of our vulnerability. In the next section, following 
Nussbaum’s lead again, at least to some extent, and drawing on Nietzsche’s 
account of the Sovereign Individual, I turn my attention to an epistemic 
normative prescription for personhood. Persons, I argue, ought to not only to 
acknowledge, but affirm, their vulnerability.   
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4.2. Acknowledgment and Affirmation  
 
In this section I will argue further against Frankfurt’s characterisation of 
personhood, and argue for an epistemic normative prescription for personhood 
in the form of our own acknowledgement and affirmation of our vulnerability. To 
exercise our agency well we cannot, I argue, attempt to transcend our 
vulnerability as Frankfurt, like the Stoics, seems to suggest. In her paper ‘Pity and 
Mercy: Nietzsche’s Stoicism’ Martha Nussbaum argues that Nietzsche’s 
philosophical project can be seen as an attempt to “bring about a revival of Stoic 
values of self-command and self-formation.”397 She argues that, to his detriment, 
Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual epitomises a kind of Stoic ideal of inner 
strength and self-sufficiency which “goes beyond Stoicism” in its valorisation of 
radical self emancipation from the contingencies of life and from our own human 
vulnerability. Nussbaum thus urges us to question whether the picture of 
strength in Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual is really a picture of human strength 
at which we would be willing to, or at which we ought to, aim. In this section I 
challenge Nussbaum’s criticism of the Sovereign Individual arguing that 
Nietzsche and Nussbaum have more in common than she suggests. I argue, 
following both Nietzsche and Nussbaum, that it is an epistemic normative 
requirement for personhood that we acknowledge and affirm our own 
vulnerability.    
 
One important reason we value human agency, is that it is through our agency 
we have the ability to make our lives less subject to the contingencies of living in 
a world which is largely out of our control. Human agency, which I have 
explained as our unique ability to guide our selves and lives in a world which is 
indifferent to our desires and efforts, relies in part on our ability to increase our 
control over our internal situation. That is, in a world in which we largely cannot 
control external circumstances, we are, perhaps uniquely, situated by our ability 
to control our internal psychological conditions and hopefully the actions and 
behaviours which flow from them. On such an account, as I have argued so far in 
this thesis, what is fundamental is self-control, or control over our internal 
                                                 
397 M. Nussbaum, ‘Pity and Mercy’, p. 140. 
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psychological situation. This picture is clearly illustrated by Frankfurt when he 
explains:  
 
For to deprive someone of his freedom of action is not necessarily to 
undermine the freedom of his will. When an agent is aware that there 
are certain things he is not free to do, this doubtless affects his desires 
and limits the range of choices he can make. But suppose that someone… 
has in fact lost or been deprived of his freedom of action. Even though he 
is no longer free to do what he wants to do, his will may remain as free 
as it was before. Despite the fact that he is not free to translate his 
desires into actions or to act according to the determinations of his will, 
he may still form those desires and make those determinations as freely 
as if his freedom of action had not been impaired.398  
 
For Frankfurt, whether or not our actions are in fact limited by our situation, or 
indeed when our freedom of action has been entirely constrained, the freedom 
which is available to all human agents, in all circumstances, cannot be 
undermined in this way because, as Frankfurt puts it, “he may still form those 
desires and make those determinations as freely as if his freedom of action had 
not been impaired” - though we may not all actually exercise this freedom at any 
given time, or ever. The most persuasive cases for the centrality of specifically 
self-control as central to our understanding of agency are made by appealing to 
our intuitions about what happens to agents in situations of extreme constraint, 
as Frankfurt says cases in which someone “has in fact lost or been deprived of… 
freedom of action”. Recall here Viktor Frankl’s discussion in Man’s Search for 
Meaning, in which a kind of inner freedom or self-control remains available to us 
in even the most restrictive and oppressive circumstances such as a 
concentration camp. According to Frankl, at the very last we have control over 
our internal mental and psychological states, and this is the kind of control which 
external circumstances cannot have an effect on. He writes: 
 
Every day, every hour, offered the opportunity to make a decision, a 
decision which determined whether you would or would not submit to 
those powers which threatened to rob you of your very self, your inner 
freedom; which determined whether or not you would become the 
plaything of circumstance, renouncing freedom and dignity to become 
moulded into the form of the typical inmate.399 
                                                 
398 H. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, pp. 14-15. 
399 V. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 74. 
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On such a view, when I am faced with a world in which the ends and goals I have 
conceived of are made unattainable, I need not necessarily feel my agency 
restricted or diminished because my agency is constituted by my self-control – 
as Frankfurt would put it, we still have freedom of the will. Nothing and no-one 
outside of me can truly affect my agency, because my agency is purely about the 
kind of control I am able to achieve for myself regardless of what is happening to 
or around me.400 Further, recall here Nietzsche’s talk of the Sovereign 
Individual’s right to make promises. The right to make promises is afforded to 
the Sovereign Individual because he is able to master his own inclinations and 
thus, he is able to stand surety for his promises because of this motivational 
steadfastness. But there is also something else Nietzsche says about the 
Sovereign Individual, he claims in the Genealogy that: 
 
To ordain the future in advance in this way, man must first have learned 
to distinguish necessary events from chance ones, to think causally, to 
see and anticipate distant eventualities as if they belonged to the 
present, to decide with certainty what is the goal and what is the means 
to it, and in general be able to calculate and compute. Man himself must 
first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary, even in his own 
image of himself, he is to be able to stand security for his own future, 
which is what one who promises does!401 
 
 
Nietzsche here claims that the Sovereign Individual has recognised the extent to 
which the external circumstances can undermine his ability to be certain that he 
will be able to reach the goal he has set for himself, or to fulfil the promise that 
he has made. Unless, Nietzsche seems here to suggest, he can remove those 
necessities and contingencies given by external circumstances, he is vulnerable 
to failure in his attempt to fulfil the promises he has made or to attain the goals 
he has set for himself. The Sovereign Individual looks, then, as if he might need 
to, like the Frankfurtian person, also only care about the kind of control he is able 
                                                 
400 This view might seem like an extreme, but what it is doing is providing us with an ideal 
picture – of course it is true that agency comes in degrees, and we may not be able to exercise this 
kind of freedom at all times. Torture and illness often break people, and the circumstances in 
which we find ourselves can certainly diminish our capacity (and strength of will) to exercise this 
kind of self-control. What Frankfurt, like Sartre, endorses is that this is the kind of freedom which 
is always available to us as human agents, though we may not always exercise it.  
401 GM II: 2. 
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to achieve for himself regardless of what is happening to or around him – that is, 
it looks as if the Sovereign Individual might, like the agent on Frankfurt’s picture 
need to be self-sufficient: immune to the kinds of external influences which 
threaten to supplant her authority, at least over himself. 
On the face of it then, both Frankfurt and Nietzsche’s pictures are 
remarkably close to one other. On the Frankfurtian type picture, our capacity to 
exercise a kind of inner freedom through self-control is definitive of our agency. 
For Nietzsche, this is also true. And there is, of course, something quite 
significant about our capacity to exercise this kind of control over ourselves, to 
exercise the kind of inner freedom we take to be definitive of our agency. It is not 
surprising, then, that we spend a great deal of time reflecting on this capacity, 
thinking of ways to improve it, which will hopeful lead us to living lives which 
are more under our own control and less subject to the contingencies and 
necessities of the physical world in which we find ourselves – and I discussed 
some of these strategies which human agents might employ in chapter two. This 
line of reasoning, however, may further be suggestive of the idea that by gaining 
more control we will be able to live better lives – that is lives in which we 
exercise our agency well – precisely because our lives will be ‘up to us’, rather 
than determined by the forces which are external to us and which are indifferent 
to our well being. This line of reasoning has been suggested perhaps most 
fervently by the Stoics, and by various forms of asceticism, but I think it is also 
subtly suggested by Frankfurtian type pictures, as discussed above. While 
Nussbaum suggests that this is true of Nietzsche’s picture of the Sovereign 
Individual, and we might be inclined to agree with her based on the above 
statements, in what follows I will argue that it would be a mistake to read 
Nietzsche in this way. 
While I agree with Nussbaum that the self-emancipation characterisation 
of the Sovereign Individual provides us with, in many important ways, an 
ultimately unattractive ideal of strength at which to aim, I argue that this 
characterisation of the Sovereign Individual is itself problematic. It is my 
contention here that the Sovereign Individual, like the Stoic, is to be 
characterised in terms of his deep recognition of the necessity of his own 
vulnerability, but that, importantly, it is the Sovereign Individual’s reaction to 
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this recognition that distinguishes the ideal of strength which we find in him 
from the problematic Stoic ideal. While the Stoics overemphasise the ideal 
subject’s capacity for control, suggesting that he will do so in an attempt to 
transcend his necessary human vulnerability through an escaping and rejecting 
of it. It is, however, my contention that the Sovereign Individual is antithetical to 
the Stoic in precisely this respect: Sovereign Individuals live through and with 
their vulnerability by actively affirming it. The Sovereign Individual is thus, more 
properly, I argue, to be understood as embodying and affirming precisely the 
kind of fragility and vulnerability, which the Frankfurtian and Stoic person seeks 
to transcend through rejection and denial.402 Given Nussbaum and Nietzsche’s 
criticisms of the Stoic position, I argue that Nietzsche and Nussbaum may have 
more in common than Nussbaum suggests. And further, that in his depiction of 
the Sovereign Individual, Nietzsche, like Nussbaum, provides support for what I 
see as an epistemic normative prescription for personhood in the form of 
acknowledgement and affirmation.  
 
Nussbaum has argued that the Frankfurtian line of reasoning outlined above is 
central in Ancient Greek philosophy to some extent, where Socrates, the Stoics 
and Aristotle all agree that we should “above all value our inner resources.”403 
Central to this line of reasoning is that, since the capacity for self-control 
definitive of agency is to be cultivated in order to make our lives go better, this is 
all that must be cultivated in order to truly live well. In the Stoic tradition the 
‘good person’ is “a self-commanding person – one who, rather than being the 
slave of fortune, is truly free just because she doesn’t care for the things that 
fortune controls. Commanding herself, she commands all that is important for 
living well; she is thus a person of real power and command in a world”404 where 
human vulnerability is to be overcome. Through exercising the capacity for self-
                                                 
402  In putting forward my own reading of the Nietzschean notion of the Sovereign Individual I do 
not necessarily take the notion to be either straightforward or uncontroversial. I recognise that 
there has been much debate amongst Nietzsche scholars about how we should interpret 
Nietzsche’s notion. While I do not contrast my own reading of the notion of the Sovereign 
Individual with competing views in this literature explicitly in this paper, I do recognise that 
there may be room for contention and debate on this.  
403 M. Nussbaum, ‘Pity and Mercy’, pp. 157-158. 
404 Ibid, p. 146. 
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control, the Stoic gains power, and takes himself to have, thus, escaped his 
human vulnerability. 
Nussbaum takes this Stoic line of reasoning, that having power over 
ourselves allows us power over “the vicissitudes of fortune,”405 to be central to 
Nietzsche’s account of the Sovereign Individual. She characterises the Sovereign 
Individual as one who is hostile to “human vulnerability and fragility in general,” 
seeing it as a kind of “impotence.” She quotes Nietzsche’s Aphorism 251 of 
Daybreak called ‘Stoical’ in which Nietzsche says: 
 
There is a cheerfulness peculiar to the Stoic: he experiences it whenever 
he feels hemmed in by the formalities he himself has prescribed for his 
conduct; he then enjoys the sensation of himself as dominator. 406 
 
The suggestion is that by allowing ourselves to focus only on what is under our 
control we are able to remove all the chanciness and necessity that comes along 
with living in the physical world by making all the happenings and contingencies 
of that world no longer important for our well being. What happens inside of us 
is all that is relevant for here we have control in spite of what is or could be going 
on around us. Nussbaum argues that since Nietzsche’s approach is Stoic, his 
valorisation of self-command and self-overcoming can be criticised on precisely 
the same grounds that the Stoic’s can, namely, because of their failure to 
recognise that the vulnerability which is being escaped is in part necessary for 
living well. For Nussbaum, Nietzsche and the Stoics are “committed to denying 
that the physical goods of life are necessary conditions for eudaimonia. And 
thus… are committed to holding that people who are severely deprived, and even 
imprisoned and tortured, can still retain eudaimonia, so long as they are virtuous 
and self commanding.”407 She explains, I think quite convincingly, that the 
removal of the external conditions which make us vulnerable might be 
problematic because: 
 
…one would need to decide how much worth persons and things and 
events outside ourselves actually have in the planning and conduct of 
our lives; what needs we actually have from the world and to what 
                                                 
405 Ibid, p. 151. 
406 D 132 in Ibid in favour of this point. 
407 Ibid, pp. 158-160. 
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extent those needs can be removed by a new attitude of self command 
toward and within oneself.408  
 
However, she goes on to argue that the Nietzschean picture of ideal strength in 
the character of the Sovereign Individual is not an attractive picture of strength 
for precisely this reason, saying: 
 
What should we think about the human being who insists on caring 
deeply for nothing that he himself does not control; who refuses to love 
others in ways that opens him to serious risks of pain and loss; who 
cultivates the hardness of self-command as a bulwark against all the 
reversals that life can bring? We could say, with Nietzsche, that this is a 
strong person. But there clearly is another way to see things. For there is 
a strength of a specifically human sort in the willingness to acknowledge 
some truths about one’s situation: one’s mortality, one’s finitude, the 
limits and vulnerabilities of one’s body, one’s need for food and drink 
and shelter and friendship. There is a strength in the willingness to form 
attachments that can go wrong and cause deep pain, in the willingness to 
invest oneself in the world in a way that opens one’s whole life up to the 
changes of the world, for good and for bad. There is, in short, a strength 
in the willingness to be porous rather than totally hard, in the 
willingness to be a mortal animal living in the world. The Stoic [and the 
Sovereign Individual]409 by contrast, looks like a fearful person, a person 
who is determined to seal himself off from risk, even at the cost of love 
and value.410  
 
In her criticism of Nietzsche, she goes on to say:  
 
Nietzsche knows, or should know, this. For a central theme in his work is 
that Christianity has taught us bad habits of self-insulation and self-
protection, alienating us from our love of the world and all of its 
chanciness, all of its becoming. On this account we have become small in 
virtue, and will remain small, unless we learn once again to value our 
own actions as ends, and our worldly existence as their natural home. I 
think that in the end Nietzsche fails to go far enough with this critique. 
He fails, that is, to see what the Stoicism he endorses has in common 
with the Christianity he criticizes, what “hardness” has in common with 
otherworldliness: both are forms of self-protection, both express a fear 
of this world and its contingencies… 411 
 
While I agree with Nussbaum that, were her characterisation of the Sovereign 
Individual correct, the Sovereign Individual would not provide us with an 
                                                 
408 Ibid, p. 156. 
409 By extension because she takes him to be stoic, or even beyond stoic 
410 Ibid, p. 160. 
411 Ibid. 
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attractive ideal at which to aim, because he would be living, as Nussbaum thinks, 
a radically impoverished human life by removing412 himself from the activities 
which, while on the one hand make us vulnerable, on the other actually add 
significant meaning and value to our lives. But Nussbaum does not go far enough 
with her claim that Nietzsche does, or ought to know, that this aspect of Stoicism 
is problematic. 
 
For the Stoics, cultivating the capacity for self-control is an attempt to escape the 
contingency and vulnerability of a life lived in the physical world, which must be 
done through a kind of transcendence. This transcendence involves, for the Stoic, 
a rejection or a denial of the importance those aspects of our lives which are 
deeply vulnerable to the kinds of “contingencies and reversals,”413 which 
Nussbaum suggests actively engaging with the world around us might bring. 
Isaiah Berlin has provided us with a canonical passage of what this line of 
reasoning amounts to, in which he describes a ‘retreat to the inner citadel’ in 
which we might take precisely this approach to transcendence in an attempt to 
gain control. He says: 
 
I must liberate myself from desires that I know I cannot realize. I wish 
to be master of my kingdom, but my frontiers are long and vulnerable, 
therefore I contract them… to… eliminate the vulnerable area… The 
tyrant threatens me with imprisonment… But if I no longer feel 
attached to property, no longer care whether or not I am in prison… 
then he cannot bend me to his will… It is as if I had performed a 
strategic retreat into the inner citadel…  I have withdrawn into myself; 
there and there alone, I am secure… I illuminate obstacles in my path by 
abandoning the path: I retreat to my own sect, my own planned 
economy, my own deliberately insulated territory, where… no external 
forces can have effect.414  
 
Berlin is hostile to this approach. In his discussion of freedom or autonomy, he 
rejects this line of reasoning about gaining control through the kind of 
transcendence suggested by the Stoics. As Berlin, I think rightly, argues, Stoic 
                                                 
412 The question here of removing oneself may be a question about values: by removing ourselves 
what we mean is that we no longer care about or value those things over which we have no 
control – for such a person these things are deemed of little value or worth.  
413 Here I am borrowing Martha Nussbaum’s terms, this issue is important for her in the context 
of living a flourishing life particularly. I am drawn to her conception of the flourishing life when 
assessing what the concept of a person is.   
414 I. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 129. 
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transcendence only appears to offer us freedom, only appears to offer us a path 
to follow in order to escape our vulnerability, but this path is deeply problematic. 
Berlin is particularly worried about how such a misconstrued picture of human 
freedom could be abused in political life, but Berlin’s concerns, I think, highlight 
why even though Frankl’s picture of the concentration camp inmate as still able 
to exercise agency, is plausible, it somehow riles against our intuitions that the 
inmate has been dehumanised – they have had an important aspect of their 
personhood undermined -  and furthermore, as Berlin seems to suggest, why 
Frankl’s picture riles against our intuitions that the camp inmate has been 
robbed of their ability to live well. He says: 
 
If I find that I am able to do little or nothing of what I wish, I need only 
contract or extinguish my wishes, and I am made free. If the tyrant… 
manages to condition his subjects… into losing their original wishes and 
embracing… the form of life he has invented for them, he will, on this 
definition, have succeeded in liberating them. He will, no doubt, have 
made them feel free – as Epictetus feels freer than his master (and the 
proverbial good man is said to feel happy on the rack). But what he has 
created is the very antithesis… 
If I save myself from an adversary by retreating indoors and locking 
every entrance and exit, I may remain freer than if I had been captured 
by him, but am I freer than if I had defeated or captured him? If I go too 
far, contract myself into too small a space, I shall suffocate and die. The 
logical culmination of the process of destroying everything through 
which I can possibly be wounded is suicide.415  
 
Nussbaum, similarly, rejects this kind of transcendence and valorisation of 
control, suggesting – as pointed out above – that we cannot live a good life by 
removing ourselves entirely from our entanglements and engagements with the 
world. Given my discussion of the role I see vulnerability playing in living well, I 
agree with Berlin and Nussbaum in their criticism of this Stoic transcendence.  
Increasing our self-control in the way Frankfurt and Nietzsche suggest in 
their pictures, is important and vital for our understanding of ourselves as 
human agents. When control is central, however, we lose sight of an aspect of our 
personhood which I believe to be of the utmost importance to us – the necessity 
and centrality of human vulnerability which Nussbaum points out most explicitly 
in her work (not only the paper discussed here, but throughout The Fragility of 
                                                 
415 Ibid, p. 164. 
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Goodness as well). There is an aspect of our personhood which seems to contrast 
most explicitly with the capacity for agency understood in terms of self-control, 
that is, our reliance as persons on external goods and those things over which we 
do not have complete control. While it seems clear that agency is necessary to 
our understanding of what it means to be a person, to be a person also requires a 
recognition on the part of the person themselves of their own limits and 
vulnerability – the ability to recognise the extent to which circumstances, events 
and other persons play a role “in the planning and conduct of our lives”416 and 
contribute to our ability to live well.  If our understanding of what is most central 
to our conceptualisation of what we as human persons are is somehow at odds 
with what is central for achieving or maintaining good or worthwhile lives, then I 
think we have done a great injustice to the notion of personhood, and we face a 
great danger because of this. We face a great danger because a misconstrued 
picture of what is central to personhood will lead us to developing an ideal, a 
picture of personhood towards which we ought to strive, and if our ideal is out of 
sync with what we actually take to be important for living well, then we will have 
a great deal of difficulty achieving a good life by aiming at such an ideal. Contra 
Nussbaum, I think that Nietzsche recognises this, and addresses this issue when 
discussing his ideal of personhood made manifest in the Sovereign Individual. I 
see Nietzsche, similarly to Nussbaum, providing support for a normative 
prescription for personhood in the form of acknowledgement and affirmation of 
our vulnerability.  
 
Why might Nussbaum think of the Sovereign Individual as offering us with a 
Stoic ideal at which to aim? Well, Nietzsche does say that: 
 
Honesty, supposing that this is our virtue from which we cannot get 
away, we free spirits – well, let us work on it with all our malice and love 
and not weary of “perfecting” ourselves in our virtue, the only one left 
us… And if our honesty should nevertheless grow weary one day and 
sigh and stretch its limbs and find us too hard, and would like to have 
things better, easier, tenderer, like an agreeable vice – let us remain 
hard, we last Stoics!417  
 
                                                 
416 M. Nussbaum, ‘Pity and Mercy’, p. 156. 
417 BG 227. 
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And here it would be easy to misinterpret what Nietzsche says because of his 
explicit reference here to Stoicism. In fact, Nietzsche often says things which we 
may interpret as supporting the Stoic doctrine of asceticism, especially when he 
says like: 
 
To those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, 
desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities – I wish that they should 
not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self-
mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, 
because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is 
worth anything or not – that one endures.418 
 
And citing this passage, Nussbaum argues that Nietzsche “does not grasp the 
simple fact that if our abilities are physical abilities they have physical necessary 
conditions,” he does not grasp what she calls a “basic vulnerability,” and that this 
leads Nietzsche to his conclusion “that even a beggar can be a Stoic hero.”419 And 
so Nussbaum interprets this passage of Nietzsche as aligning him with the Stoic 
ideal of transcendence. Certainly, there are some aspects of Nietzsche’s account 
of morality and personhood which are vulnerable to the criticisms that 
Nussbaum raises here. However, there is another aspect of Nietzsche’s account 
of personhood that is not, namely his suggestion that the Sovereign Individual 
not only acknowledges, but affirms his vulnerability. It is this aspect of 
Nietzsche’s account which I think requires closer attention, and an aspect of 
Nietzsche’s account which I think Nussbaum should be sympathetic to.    
When Nietzsche talks about the Sovereign Individual’s right to make 
promises he emphasises that the right to make promises is an act of self-
overcoming. For Nietzsche, however, this overcoming cannot be seen, as the 
Stoic would have us believe, as a ‘retreat to the inner citadel’420 by which we 
deny the important role those aspects of our lives that are not under control play 
in our living well. In order to have the right to make promises, we must also 
recognise the important role our own vulnerability plays in the actual planning 
and conduct of our lives; as we have seen this is necessary for the Sovereign 
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Individual to have the right to make promises at all. That we are deeply 
vulnerable is not just something that the Sovereign Individual can ignore. For 
Nietzsche unless we can be honest with ourselves about the role of things which 
are beyond our control (that is if we attempt to transcend our vulnerability) we 
would be guilty of ressentiment.421 It is precisely this honesty with ourselves 
about our own ‘all too human’ condition that Nietzsche thinks we should 
cultivate and remain steadfast in, in order to prevent ourselves from succumbing 
to ressentiment. What is beyond our control is vital precisely because it forms an 
important part of who we actually are – unlike the man of ressentiment, in 
owning up to this realisation the Sovereign Individual has a more integrated 
understanding of herself which includes not only those aspects of herself which 
‘command’ (are under my control) but also those which ‘obey’ (which are 
beyond my control). What this shows us is that for Nietzsche, as Elveton puts it, 
“[t]he fundamental Stoic opposition between what is mine (my will and what 
falls under its direct control) and not mine reduces the self in a one-dimensional 
and artificial way.”422  
But perhaps even more importantly for my argument against Nussbaum’s 
characterisation of the Sovereign Individual, Elveton claims that Nietzsche 
rejects the fundamental Stoic picture in which it “is my attitude, my inner 
composure, that is reflective of my individual power…. [and so] my actions in the 
world elude me and are not a significant part of me… what I am is not so much 
what I do, but my rational attitude toward what I do, and my rational attitude 
toward what is done to and what happens to me.”423 I agree with Elveton that 
Nietzsche is against this, and I think that this explains Nietzsche’s claim that we 
cannot separate the doer from the deed for precisely this reason. We might like 
to think here of the seemly strange account of personhood in the 13th section of 
the Genealogy where Nietzsche admonishes the separation between the ‘doer’ 
and the ‘deed’. This passage suggests that Nietzsche is reluctant to view 
personhood as something which could be separated from our actual actions in 
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the world of riskiness and chance. Nietzsche claims that there is an inextricable 
link between persons and their actual experiences, saying also: “if I remove all 
the relationships, all the properties, ‘all the activities’ of a thing, the thing does 
not remain over”. Moreover, I think, that Nietzsche cannot be seen to valorise 
self-control in the Stoic mode of transcendence precisely because, above all, 
Nietzsche wants us to affirm life, ourselves and the world of chance and necessity 
in which we live. This is the world we live in and we cannot seek to escape it, but 
must rather seek to thrive in it, and this will require our recognition of our 
vulnerable place in it. Above all in his Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, where 
according to Nietzsche, “nothing that has happened to us is contingent,”424 and 
affirming any given aspect of our lives or selves entails our affirming all aspects 
of our selves, our pasts, and indeed the whole history of the physical world in its 
entirety. Recall Nietzsche’s description of the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence in 
The Gay Science:  
 
‘This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once 
again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it, 
but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything 
unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the 
same succession and sequence… The eternal hourglass of existence is 
turned over again and again, and you with it speck of dust!’425  
 
Through the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence Nietzsche claims most explicitly that 
the harmonious integration of various aspects of ourselves required for self-
creation entails our affirmation of all of these aspects. According to Nehamas: 
 
The final mark of this integration, its limiting case, is provided by the test 
involved in the thought of the eternal recurrence. This mark is the desire 
to do exactly what one has already done in this life if one were to live 
again.426 
 
Nietzsche suggests in The Gay Science that there can only be two possible 
reactions to this psychological test posed by the doctrine: that we reject it as the 
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most detestable malison or we welcome it with the greatest joy. Nietzsche 
writes:  
 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the 
demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous 
moment when you would have answered him: ‘You are a god, and never 
have I heard anything more divine.’427  
 
What is important for our reaction to the suggestion of the doctrine is the 
understanding that it will be all aspects of our life, our self, and indeed the entire 
chronological history of the world as it has been, that we will be either affirming 
or bemoaning. Recall that, for Nietzsche, if we deny even the smallest part of who 
we are or what has come before, we cannot affirm our present selves, for our 
present self is necessarily constituted by our own past and all effects of the world 
on it. What Nietzsche wants us to realise is that if we can at any point in our lives 
affirm who we are, even for a ‘moment’, we must necessarily affirm all aspects of 
ourselves, our past actions, attitudes and opinions. “Have you ever said Yes to a 
single joy? O my friends, then you have said Yes to all woe,”428 proclaims 
Zarathustra. And considering this carefully, we understand that in order to 
answer positively in light of the demon’s question, to affirm the demon who 
presents us with the doctrine, we must will all that has gone before, even the 
very worst of the worst: and in realising this, Nietzsche’s ultimate man, 
Zarathustra, “finally becomes able to want to undergo again all that is cheap and 
detestable about the world for the sake of what is not.”429 Through the doctrine 
of eternal recurrence, Nietzsche “asks us whether we merely want to drift with 
the tide of things or whether we would be creators”430 – whether we would float 
along unthinkingly or whether we would engage our capacity to actively affirm 
all that is past, all that is present, and indeed all that is necessary. “Prior to [this, 
Nietzsche asks in the thought of the eternal return] whether we desire the 
conditions by which we might again become creators.”431  
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Nietzsche suggests that the Sovereign Individual expresses an inner 
harmony grounded in the affirmation of life - such as that which is involved in 
affirming the demon’s proposition of the eternal recurrence of the same. This 
affirmation and revaluation is required for the kind of self-creation which is 
compatible with Nietzsche’s Amor Fati. As I have already argued, a plausible 
explanation of what he means here is that we affirm, along with all the joy and all 
the positive aspects of ourselves, the suffering and contrary aspects of ourselves 
as well. The acceptance, or rather love, of fate adopted by the Sovereign 
Individual, then, is also to be understood as a normative requirement for 
personhood. We must affirm our lives in their particular structure and in their 
entirety. In section 49 of the Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche says:  
 
Such a spirit who has become free stands amid the cosmos… joyous and 
trusting… in the faith… that all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole.432 
 
In his account of personhood Nietzsche seems to go further than simply saying 
that we are required to acknowledge the conflicting aspects of ourselves which 
constitute our whole-selves – as discussed in the previous chapter – he claims 
that we need to actively affirm these aspects. A word of clarification on the sense 
in which Nietzsche here uses the term affirmation is required. As I have already 
suggested, there are parts of ourselves which we do wish to overcome, and this 
overcoming requires knowledge of what is to be overcome as well as the 
knowledge that what is to be overcome is precisely some aspect of my very own 
self. Here Nietzsche’s use of the term affirmation might sound misleading – why 
should I affirm that aspect of myself which I wish to overcome? What I take 
Nietzsche to mean by this is that I must affirm those aspects because, on the one 
hand, they are my own and on the other hand, because without those aspects I 
would have nothing to overcome and my ability to overcome them is the basis 
for my ability to exercise self-governance in the first place. Importantly, for 
Nietzsche, there will be times when certain aspects of ourselves, the more deeply 
ingrained aspects of ourselves, cannot be overcome; there are, as Frankfurt 
would say, recalcitrant aspects of ourselves. For Nietzsche, this is also a 
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fundamental part of what it means to be a person – the ‘animal’ man. In coming 
to terms with this Nietzsche suggests that it is of primary importance not only to 
affirm these aspects of ourselves – reinterpreting their value for ourselves – but 
also to affirm in this respect the kinds of creatures we humans are.  
Nietzsche’s doctrine suggests that if we deny even the smallest part of who 
we are or what has actually happened in the world, we cannot affirm our present 
selves, for our present self is necessarily constituted by our own past and all 
effects of the world on it – we cannot separate who we are from our lives, nor 
can we separate our lives from the world in which they have been lived. So, for 
Nietzsche, although “Stoic thought is suggestive of spiritual strength” to some 
extent, he also sees it as “superficial, with fateful consequences.”433 He says most 
tellingly: 
 
I believe that we do not understand Stoicism for what it really is. Its 
essential feature as an attitude of the soul… [a]… comportment toward 
pain and representations of the unpleasant: [it is] an intensification of a 
certain heaviness and weariness to the utmost degree in order to weaken 
the experience of pain. Its basic motifs are paralysis and coldness; hence 
a form of anaesthesia…. In summa: turning oneself into stone as a weapon 
against suffering and in the future conferring all worthy names of divine-
like virtues upon a statue… I am very antipathetic to this line of thought. 
It undervalues the value of pain (it is as useful and necessary as 
pleasure), the value of stimulation and suffering. It is finally compelled to 
say: everything that happens is acceptable to me; nothing is to be 
different. There are no needs over which it triumphs because it has killed 
the passion for needs.434 
 
Broadly speaking, Stoicism is for Nietzsche a doctrine in which we acquire self-
salvation by transcending or escaping the world in which we live, and this is 
precisely the kind of anti-naturalism which Nietzsche is at pains throughout his 
works to rally us against. Although the Stoics purport to be naturalists, Nietzsche 
thinks that they offer a new brand of anti-naturalism by falsely transposing their 
ideals on nature. Nietzsche says in Beyond Good and Evil:  
 
“According to Nature you” want to live? O you noble Stoics, what 
deceptive words these are! Imagine a being like nature, wasteful beyond 
measure, indifferent beyond measure, without purposes and 
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consideration… -how could you live according to this indifference?... In 
truth, the matter is altogether different: while you pretend rapturously 
to read the cannon of your law in nature, you want something opposite… 
Your pride wants to impose your morality, your ideal, on nature.435  
 
What a more accurate version of naturalism, according to Nietzsche, teaches us is 
precisely that vulnerability, contingency and risk are part of this world and so 
also our lives in it. In seeking to transcend this aspect of the world and our lives 
we strive towards what he refers to as ‘other-worldly’ hopes, and cannot 
properly affirm this life, this world, as it is – and this will impoverish our 
experience of it. For Nietzsche, Elveton argues: 
 
Stoic morality testifies to a very high level reached by man’s moral 
consciousness, but in the last resort it is a decadent and pessimistic morality 
of despair, which sees no meaning in life; it is inspired by the fear of 
suffering. One must lose sensitiveness to suffering and become indifferent – 
that is the only way out.436   
 
For Nietzsche, this is unacceptable, and for this reason he characterises his hero, 
the Sovereign Individual, against this Stoic ideal as having “the strength to suffer 
pain and to add to it.”437 Unlike the Stoic, then, the Sovereign Individual does not 
seek to escape the misery and pain which comes along with being vulnerable to 
all the chance and necessity which the world holds in store for us, but seeks to 
actively affirm it, live through and with it. The Stoics cannot affirm life to the 
highest degree precisely because they seek to transcend their vulnerability and 
the suffering of this world, and for Nietzsche, this is symptomatic of the ‘will to 
nothingness’ – a form of nihilism seen in “Platonism-late Judaism, Christianity 
and ‘slave morality’.”438 As May elegantly explains:  
 
They will ‘nothing’ because they are driven by an all-consuming will to 
escape a world of suffering, a will that, because it repudiates what is 
constitutive of living – the loss or elusiveness of what we most desire, such 
as loved ones, health, achievements, predictability, joy, and ultimately life 
itself – wills what is not human life, not the world of transience, chance, fate, 
and time in which we are actually situated. In refusing to affirm that life is 
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structured by the possibility of loss they imagine an ideal order out of which 
this possibility has been conceptually airbrushed, an order that is clearly not 
the one into which humans are born.439  
 
Thus, it is only by affirming his own vulnerability that the Sovereign Individual is 
able to engage in ‘affirming life to the highest degree’ and thus living well. 
 
Wallace has summarised Nietzsche’s position in the Doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence as follows: 
 
[T]he idea of eternal recurrence is tied to our epistemic situation. This 
situation is one in which we have excellent reason to believe that our 
unconditional affirmation of our own lives commits us to affirming all 
manner of regrettable events and circumstances in the past, but without our 
knowing of any particular event or circumstance that we are implicated in it 
in particular […] only if we are prepared to will the totality of world history 
can we honestly adopt an attitude of unconditional affirmation toward our 
lives and the things to which we are attached. Because for all we know, that 
attitude already commits us to affirming as well the most catastrophic and 
egregious aspects of the larger histories in which our lives are caught up.440  
 
 One major objection to the Nietzschean suggestion of affirmation, discussed by 
Wallace, is that unconditional affirmation of our lives entails affirmation of 
events and states of affairs which do not seem to warrant our affirmation. If we 
affirm all of history in affirming ourselves, we affirm catastrophes, wars, 
genocides, slavery, inequality, and innumerable other states of affairs for which 
affirmation would seem, at best, inappropriate. The unconditional Nietzschean 
affirmation, according to this criticism, requires that we affirm things which we 
ought not to affirm if we unconditionally affirm our lives. Wallace concludes that 
in maintaining an attitude of unconditional affirmation we affirm that it is all 
things considered better that we have lived our lives, rather than not having 
lived at all, even though this requires us to also affirm the existence of things 
which considered in isolation do not warrant our affirmation:  
 
But what about this attitude of unconditional affirmation itself? Couldn’t we 
revise this attitude, adopting toward our lives a more ambivalent stance 
once we are clear about our potential implication in historical catastrophes 
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of various kinds? This is a theoretical possibility – there are people, after all, 
who give up on life while they are in the midst of it, and they would not 
appear to affirm their lives unconditionally. But this is not how things are for 
most of us. The same vital forces that lead us to cling to life as we are living 
also give rise to an unconditional preference to have lived – a preference, 
looking backward, to have lived our actual lives, as against the alternative 
that we should not have lived at all […] Our plight as humans might be that 
we are condemned, in virtue of our attachment to life, to affirming 
conditions in the world that we cannot possibly regard as worthy of this 
attitude. There is something absurd about this situation, involving as it does 
the persistence of attitudes that don’t fundamentally make sense to their 
bearers. But the absurdity may be one that is endemic to the human 
condition.441  
 
And given my reading of Nietzsche above, Wallace’s sensible conclusion here is 
something that Nietzsche himself is likely to accept, given that a central aspect of 
Nietzsche’s account which I highlighted above is that we ought, as persons, to 
recognise and affirm our own vulnerability, and in so doing, unconditionally 
affirm the life that we have lived. Part of affirming our vulnerability in this way 
must, I think, involve our recognition of what Wallace calls an absurd situation, 
that human vulnerability and the undeniable value of a human life lived well go 
hand in hand with one another. To wish for a life devoid of vulnerability, devoid 
of things which we may have difficulty affirming, is to wish for a life that is no 
longer the life lived by a person like ourselves.  
My life, I think, would not be recognisably human and it would be 
radically impoverished, if not wholly undesirable, if I did not care very deeply 
about the things over which I have no control – specifically we could mention 
concerns such as how my projects actually fare in the external world and my 
interpersonal relationships with other people. Here, I think, that Nussbaum is 
right to point out that our human vulnerability and our reaction to this 
vulnerability are necessary for understanding what good agency, or personhood, 
entails. In this section, I have argued following Nussbaum and Nietzsche, against 
the Frankfurtian and Stoic normative pictures of personhood, claiming that it is 
an epistemic normative requirement for personhood that we recognise and 
affirm our own vulnerability.   
Taking the notion of vulnerability as a fundamental idea in Nietzsche’s 
ethics may, at first blush, seem somewhat controversial, and it has certainly not 
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been a widely discussed aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy in general. As I have 
argued in this section, I take the notion of vulnerability to be something 
addressed by Nietzsche in subtle, yet nuanced ways. I think that this aspect of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy warrants further philosophical investigation. In the 
following section I argue for a final normative prescription for personhood in the 
form of authenticity.   
 
4.3. Authenticity and the Art of Living 
 
In the hit song ‘My Way’, written by Paul Anka and most popularly performed by 
Frank Sinatra, questions about human agency, personhood and authenticity are 
simultaneously raised in the following lyrics: 
 
I planned each chartered course, 
 each careful step along the byway, 
and more, much more, than this,  
I did it my way…442  
 
The first two lines in the quoted lyrics tap into a picture of human agency which I 
explored in detail in the first part of this thesis. Human agents, on such a view, 
are able to construct certain life plans and goals within the framework of liberty 
and freedom accorded by their ability to exercise self-control. Rachels and 
Ruddick have argued that our agency, understood in this way, is a necessary 
constitutive part of personhood:  
 
freely chosen actions are constitutive elements of one’s life, while forced 
actions are interruptions, limitations, or obstacles in that life… By 
exercising these capacities in making choices… [we] create… [our] lives: 
liberty makes lives not beautiful, but possible.443 
 
I agree with Rachels and Ruddick here, that agency is a fundamentally 
constitutive part of our even being able to set goals, make life plans, and, 
ultimately, to live the kind of life we consider human.  
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But what is meant by Sinatra when he sings that “more than this”, he did it 
his way? How can we explain the notion of, over and above being agents and thus 
being in control of our lives in the relevant sense, also living our lives in a 
manner which is uniquely our own, or our way? It is in answering these 
questions, I think, that we are prompted to consider what it means to live well in 
a way not often discussed in analytic philosophical accounts of personhood such 
as Frankfurt’s. While human agency makes our lives possible, I will argue in what 
follows that when we live authentically, our lives are made not only possible, but 
also beautiful. To live well, I will argue, is to live authentically, and so 
authenticity can be seen as a normative requirement for personhood.  
 
Documents or objects are considered to be authentic when we can verify their 
origins. Authentic documents and objects are originals in the sense that they are 
of undisputed origin or are considered genuine. When we refer to authentic 
persons, however, the question of origins is not typically what is at stake.444 
When referring to persons we typically use the notion of authenticity to refer to 
what can be seen as an ideal mode of existence, one in which a person lives their 
life in such a way that they might be considered to have been true to themselves. 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche suggests that in order to be true to ourselves, in 
order to become Sovereign Individuals, we must listen to our conscience which 
shouts, “You must become who you are.”445 This idea of being true to oneself, or 
being authentic, which lies at the very heart of Nietzsche’s understanding of the 
Sovereign Individual, requires further explanation, since the idea of being true to 
oneself, or authentic, has been understood in a number of ways.  
According to Charles Guignon in his popular book On Being Authentic, the 
“contemporary ideal of authenticity directs you to realize and be that which you 
already are, with the unique, definitive traits already there within you.”446 
According to this ideal of authenticity, we already have a defining essence buried 
deep within us, and it is only in being true to this essence – by giving expression 
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to all the traits and dispositions which are already there within us – that we can 
exercise our authenticity. From literature to self-help books the words of 
Shakespeare’s Polonius ‘To thine own self be true’447 have been invoked in 
support of this view of authenticity. Cooper thus refers to this view as the 
‘Polonian View’.448 He explains that on such a view what is required for 
authenticity is that we turn our gaze inwards on ourselves and discover who we 
really are. Who we most truly are, is thus assumed to already lie within us, 
identifiable through self-reflection and in a sense ready-made. The Polonian view 
thus understands authenticity as a project of my uncovering and expressing 
what is already there within me. Similarly, on Frankfurt’s account, when the 
authoritative power of our better judgement shines forth in our behaviour and 
actions, we exercise the self-governance associated with personhood. Frankfurt, 
however, claims that rather than simply uncovering a pre-existing true self lying 
deep within ourselves, we must play an active role in the formation or 
constitution of ourselves – we must be involved in some form of self-control in 
which we are responsible not only for self-modification, but self-creation. On his 
account a request for active control in the form of self-creation, rather than 
merely self-discovery, is central to securing our understanding of ourselves as 
particular persons. Nietzsche finds similar fault with the Polonian view of 
authenticity, according to Cooper: 
 
Nietzsche is, first, consistently hostile to the metaphysics of the self 
encouraged by Polonian talk: to the idea of a self which persists, unchanged 
in its essence, through the vicissitudes of life, and hidden perhaps from view. 
Such a self is as mythical for Nietzsche as it had been for Hume; hence his 
references to the ‘false substantializing of the “I”’, and to the wrong-headed 
view that the self is the source of thought when, on the contrary, it is 
‘through thought that the “I” is posited’.449  
 
Nietzsche agrees that a form of self-creation is required for the project of 
becoming who one is. In The Gay Science Nietzsche claims: 
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We, however, want to become those we are – human beings who are new, 
unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create 
themselves.450  
 
Much like Frankfurt’s persons, Sovereign Individuals, on Nietzsche’s account, are 
to be thought of as actively asserting control over or governing themselves in 
such a way as to make their actions and lives their own, and which establish 
them as particular someone’s. According to Pippin on Nietzsche’s account: “If 
herd morality, conformism and sheep-like timidity are to be held in contempt, 
then some contrary notion seems suggested, some ideal of social independence 
and a kind of self-rule or self-reliance.”451 Emerson, in his famous piece “Self-
Reliance,” makes the following rather dramatic claim: 
 
Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one 
of its members. Society is a joint-stock company, in which the 
members agree, for the better securing of his bread to each 
shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The 
virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion […]. 
Absolve yourself to yourself, and you shall have the suffrage of the 
world.452  
 
Like Emerson, Nietzsche’s idea of personhood is intricately linked to the idea of 
challenging blind conformity to the values and ideals of society at large. 
Nietzsche suggests that by blindly conforming to society’s values and ideals, we 
deny our capacity to derive our values for ourselves, which is fundamental to our 
living well. As much is evident when Nietzsche claims the following in 
Schopenhauer as Educator:  
 
The man who would not belong to the mass needs only to cease being 
comfortable with himself; he should follow his conscience which 
shouts at him: ‘Be yourself; you are not really all that which you do, 
think, and desire now.’453 
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For Nietzsche, subscribing to, or endorsing, the values and ideals advocated by 
society, or any other source of authority for that matter, poses a danger to the 
possibility of our becoming Sovereign Individuals. The biggest danger, however, 
is that we may find ourselves having slipped into an unreflective acceptance of 
these values and ideals.454 Nietzsche’s claim that we should be self-creating 
agents or Sovereign Individuals can thus, first and foremost, be seen as a call to 
reflect not only on our social existence, but the values and ideals which lie at the 
core of this existence. Moreover, according to him, by unreflectively accepting 
transmitted values and ideals, we might be led to make equally unreflective 
assessments and evaluations about aspects of ourselves. Thus, we may find 
ourselves slipping into comfortable unreflective understandings of our selves. 
For Nietzsche, this is a most dangerous threat to our sovereignty and our ability 
to truly exercise our agency well. In Schopenhauer as Educator Nietzsche claims:  
 
The man who would not belong to the mass needs only to cease being 
comfortable with himself; he should follow his conscience which shouts at 
him: ‘Be yourself (sei du selbst); you are not really all that which you do, 
think, and desire now’.455 
 
What is most important for our authenticity, however, is a kind of narrative integrity. 
Recall here my discussion of narrative integrity in the previous chapter. Recall that 
for Nietzsche our lives and indeed our selves bear striking resemblance to works 
of fiction or biography in that they rely on a similar kind of narrative structure. 
Since our lives resemble, for Nietzsche, the lives of literary characters in their 
structure and composition, the kind of inner harmony or internal coherence with 
which we associate the authentic individual is a kind of narrative integrity. Recall 
further, Nehamas suggests that Nietzsche’s concern with authenticity is rooted in 
the fact that much of Nietzsche’s thinking revolves around literary models. 
However, Nietzsche’s thinking, almost as often as centring on literary models, 
centres on artists and the creative endeavour of art. Nietzsche views art as not 
merely a form of human activity, but as the highest expression of what the 
human spirit is capable. Most notably in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche claims 
                                                 
454 See Cooper, Authenticity and Learning, p. 4.  
455 SE in Hollingdale, R., Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 127. 
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that ‘art, and not morality, is presented as the truly metaphysical activity of 
man.’456 
The importance of authenticity to our personhood on Nietzsche’s account 
can be understood when we think of what is wrong with an artistic forgery, and 
consequently why it is that we value those masterful artists who have shaped the 
history of Art itself. According to Alfred Lessing, we can understand the notion of 
a forgery in light of its antithetical occurrence, which encapsulate what we mean 
by ‘genuineness’ or ‘authenticity’:457 “forgery is a concept that can be made 
meaningful only by reference to the concept of originality, and hence only to art 
viewed as a creative, not as a reproductive or technical activity.”458 He claims, 
moreover, that the offensiveness of forgery lies not in the fact that it is “against 
the spirit of beauty (aesthetics) or the spirit of law (morality),”459 but rather that 
is “against the spirit of art”460 itself. What this means then when we are 
considering the art of living (as the creative response of the individual to the 
world), is that without the kind of originality which is lacking in the artistic 
forgery our lives are not merely against the ‘spirit of art’, but against the very 
spirit of life itself. To have a life devoid of opportunity to respond creatively to 
our environment encompassed by the normative requirement for authenticity 
suggested here, is to have a life in which all activity lacks artistic integrity in the 
same way that the artistic forgery lacks artistic integrity, and prevents our lives 
from being beautiful. Authenticity, for Nietzsche, is thus to be seen as a kind of 
artistic integrity about our lives. 
Nietzsche frequently implores us to take the artist’s perspective on our 
lives. Nietzsche thinks that in shaping our lives in the way that great artists 
compose their works we can truly begin to understand the convergence of 
necessity and creation – that is, express Amor Fati. Nietzsche claims that: 
 
We should learn from artists while being wiser than they are in other 
matters. For with them this subtle power [of arranging things and of 
making them beautiful] usually comes to an end where art ends and life 
                                                 
456 BT 5. 
457 A. Lessing, ‘What is Wrong with a Forgery?’, in Warburton, N., (ed.), Philosophy: Basic 
Readings, 2nd Edition, London and New York, Taylor and Francis, 2005, p. 536. 
458 Ibid, p. 543. 
459 Ibid, p. 542. 
460 Ibid. 
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begins; but we want to be the poets of our life – first of all in the smallest, 
most everyday matters.461  
 
Nietzsche claims that the unity of self required for living authentically is found 
primarily in artists, who he claims: 
 
seem to have more sensitive noses in these matters, knowing only too well 
that precisely when they no longer do something ‘voluntarily’ but do 
everything of necessity, their feeling of freedom, subtlety, full power, of 
creative placing, disposing and forming reaches its peak – in short, that 
necessity and ‘freedom of will’ then become one in them.462  
 
Nietzsche praises those who have become who they are by fashioning their lives 
as the great artists have done, with their own individual style. Artists who are 
seen by Nietzsche to own themselves through the expression of their individual 
style, experience on Nietzsche’s view what we might be inclined to call ‘the art of 
living’. Thus, I refer to the final feature of the Sovereign Individual on Nietzsche’s 
picture as ‘individual style’. The introduction of the notion of individual style 
introduces into our evaluations of persons a consideration of whether a person’s 
actions and behaviours make up a personality or an identity which could be 
judged aesthetically. This consideration, it seems to me, is relevant to our 
understanding of ourselves as persons. In fact, this is one of the primary 
considerations which inform our interactions with one another as persons with 
individual personalities capable of authentic interactions and lives.463  
What traditional accounts of agency and personhood try provide us with 
are the conditions under which we can make our lives our own, but what they do 
not explain is that, over and above simply making our lives our own, we also 
want to make our lives beautiful: we want to be engaged in the fine art of living. 
Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual is not simply free from constraints, but is free to 
shape her life with the aesthetic qualities which in a very important sense make 
that life worth living. The account of Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual, as I have 
explained it in this chapter, it is concerned with our directing ourselves to “use 
                                                 
461 GS 299. 
462 BG 213. 
463 See A. Nehamas, ‘How One Becomes What One Is’, p. 276. 
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and interpret experience in [our] own way”464 – to become who we are 
artistically. This view of authenticity thus adds aesthetic value to our lives which 
traditional accounts of personhood, such as Frankfurt’s, fail to capture. 
                                                 
464 J. Mill, On Liberty, p.  122. 
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Conclusion 
 
I think… that I would rather recollect a life mis-spent on fragile things than 
spent avoiding moral debt… I wondered just what I had meant by fragile 
things. 
There are so many fragile things, after all. People break so easily, and so 
do dreams and hearts.465  
 
 
In this thesis I have argued for distinct conceptions of human agency and 
personhood which incorporate the important consideration of our own human 
vulnerability. While I defended the self-control view of human agency central to 
analytic philosophical accounts such as Frankfurt, Watson and Mele’s, I have 
supplemented this account arguing that vulnerability is also constitutive of 
human agency and personhood. I have also argued that personhood should be 
understood as a substantive notion pointing to our ability to exercise our agency 
well, or to thrive. Following Neil Gaiman, quoted in the epigraph above, I see 
human agency and personhood as ‘fragile things’. Like Nussbaum, however, I 
also see this vulnerability as an essential ingredient for our thriving. 
Against Frankfurt’s normative prescription for personhood in the form of 
wholeheartedness, I have offered four normative prescriptions for personhood 
of my own. While there may be a number of further normative prescriptions for 
personhood, I see the ones presented here as offering some hope for the possibility 
of living a meaningful and worthwhile human life in the face of our vulnerability.  
As persons, I have argued, we must live our lives embedded in the world; 
embedded in meaningful interactions with others; and living our lives to the 
fullest will require pursuing goals and ends which may result in failure and loss. 
In order to exercise our agency well, then, we are required to make the sincere 
acknowledgment of our own vulnerability. That is, as Pedro Tabensky points out, 
“the sincere acknowledgement that life is largely about muddling through darkness, 
always with limited personal resources at one’s disposal.”466 This vulnerability, I 
have argued, is neither something to always be escaped, nor always something 
                                                 
465 N. Gaiman, Fragile Things: Short Fictions and Wonders, London, Headline Publishing Group, 
2006, p1. 
466 P. Tabensky, ‘The Self-Righteous Attack’, Mail and Guardian, 29 September 2011, 
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which we must overcome. Rather, I have suggested that our vulnerability is 
something about our human situation which we must acknowledge and affirm.  
Finally, it is important to point out that the arguments presented above 
should not be taken as evidence for the extreme, and implausible, view that our 
vulnerability is something which we should actively pursue as an end which is 
valuable in itself. As Nussbaum points out in her account of human vulnerability: 
   
[T]his sensible reminder that a completely invulnerable life is likely to prove 
impoverished by no means entails that we should prefer risky lives to more 
stable lives, or seek to maximize our own vulnerability, as if it were a good in 
itself.467  
 
The suggestion that we should strive to maximize our vulnerability, or see it as a 
valuable end in itself, is not only an extreme and implausible suggestion, but it 
would also be a particularly offensive view to defend. The vast majority of people 
across the world today live in extremely vulnerable situations – in many 
important ways not unlike the conditions of deprivation and confinement found 
in concentration camps. It is not just insensitive, but plainly offensive, to argue 
that such persons are living well because of their extreme vulnerability. Rather, 
my arguments in favour of the recognition and affirmation of our own 
vulnerability could provide reason for thinking that we should be more sensitive 
to the importance and impact of our human vulnerability on our lives, 
particularly when designing the political institutions which govern our society. 
To acknowledge and affirm our vulnerability might, in an important sense, also 
be to affirm our interconnectedness – to recognise one another as in a sense 
united by our shared vulnerability. Jointly affirming our shared vulnerability 
could, I think, form an important way to foster solidarity in human society, which 
remains divided along racial, ethnic, religious, gender and class lines. All of this, 
of course, is work for another occasion, but points to further avenues of thought to be 
pursued.  
                                                 
467 M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, pp. xxix – xxx. 
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